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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal of the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiff/A ppellant Frantz's (Frantz)

attorney malpracti ce suit against Defendan t/Respond ent Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
(HTEH) under the provision s ofI.R.C.P . 12(b)(8). The District Court recognize d that the claims
of malpracti ce and breach of fiduciary duty were properly assets of Frantz's Bankrupt cy Estate
and that the Bankrupt cy proceedin g constitute d another action pending between the same parties
for the san1e cause. Accordin gly, the action was appropria tely dismissed pursuant to judicial
estoppel and the defense of abatemen t.
This Appeal also encompas ses the District's Court's denial to Attorney Jeffrey Katz of
admission pro hac vice, and the Court's ultimate award of attorney' s fees to HTEH under LC.
§ 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121.
Plaintiff Frantz' case is based in its entirety on his belated and opp01iunistic contentio n,
first asserted in an October 2014 Bankrupt cy proceedin g, that an attorney- client relationship had
existed between himself and Merlyn Clark, a partner with Responde nt HTEH. Frantz sought
disqualifi cation of HTEH as a former client of the firm, contendin g that its represent ation ofldaho
Independ ent Bank (IIB) as a creditor against him in his Bankrupt cy proceedin gs and HTEH's use
of confident ial infonnati on violated Idaho's Rules of Professio nal Conduct (I.R.P.C. 1.9) and
breached fiduciary duties.
The record on this appeal demonstr ates that Frantz' s claims of malpracti ce and breach of
fiduciary duty (hereinaf ter "Attorney Claims") against HTEH arose prior to his filing of
bankruptc y in 2011 and are rooted in Frantz's pre-bankr uptcy past. Further, Frantz's Complain t
alleges damages occurring prior to the Bankrupt cy and prior to the conversio n of the Bankrupt cy
case to a Chapter 7. Thus, those claims are property of the Bankrupt cy Estate and Frantz is
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estopped from pursuing them in this action. Further, as a fundamental element of
Frantz's claim against HTEH in this action was determined against Frantz after a full evidentiary
hearing in the Bankruptcy proceeding, dismissal or abatement pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) is
appropriate.
The District's Court's denial of Respondent's request that Attorney Katz be admitted pro

hac vice falls solidly within the appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion, and likewise should
be upheld. The District Court considered a number of actions by Mr. Katz which clearly raised
questions regarding Mr. Katz's understanding ofldaho's Rules of Professional Conduct, or as to
his willingness to comply with them. Without an adequate explanation by Mr. Katz for the
questioned conduct, and in light of Mr. Katz's likely appearance as a witness if the case were to
proceed, the District Court appropriately declined to admit Mr. Katz pro hac vice.
Finally, the District's Court's award of attorney's fees under either LC. § 12-120(3) or
I. C. § 12-121 was proper and should be upheld.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
The Plaintiffs description of the course of proceedings is accurate as to the dates but the

following additions and corrections are required:
a)

This matter was filed, but not served on Feb 20, 2015. Counsel for HTEH

orally appeared on March 3, and requested that he be advised when service was
accomplished. (Aff. ofRiseborough, R. Vol. I, pp. 27-28)
b)

The Complaint alleged that HTEH used confidential inforn1ation to support

a claim that the IIB debt was not dischargeable for fraud, and that, but for the use of that
information, Frantz would have been able to discharge his debt to IIB. (Complaint, R.
Vol. I, p. 18,

i;i[ 29d, 33; p.
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19, 138c; p. 20, ,144 and 45)

c)

The Complaint alleges that HTEH' s actions occurred within his Bankruptcy

proceeding. (R. Vol. I, pp. 27-28)
d)

The Complaint does not limit the allegations of wrongdoing and harm to

HTEH's representation of IIB in the Adversary Proceeding, but makes broad based
contentions that HTEH breached its duties to Frantz in the Bankruptcy Proceedings in
general. (Complaint, ,r,r 30, 32, 38(c), 43, R. Vol. I, pp. 18, 19 and 20)
e)

Frantz's counsel moved for the Admission of Katz on April 7, 2015 but did

not advise defense counsel of the motion - it was received from the client on April 13,
2015. Defendant's counsel filed an objection on April 22, 2015.
f)

Defense counsel for HTEH filed a Notice of Appearance on May 4, 2015.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 108-110)
g)

On June 1, 2015, Attorney Frantz filed a "Response to Objection to Motion

for Pro Hae Vice Admission." (R. Vol. II, pp. 306-308)
h)

On June 26, 2015, counsel for HTEH filed its "Reply re Objection to

Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission," (R. Vol. II, pp. 336-340) as additional questionable
conduct had been learned.
i)

On July 13, 2015, Frantz filed his "Brief in Support of Motion for Pro Hae

Vice Admission" (R. Vol. I, pp. 341-344) as well as lengthy declarations by Mr. Katz
(R. Vol. I, pp. 345-348), and by Attorney Frantz (R. Vol. I, pp. 349-351). Neither denied
the complained of actions. Neither recognized the violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct those actions represented.
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Statement of Facts.
Facts Relevant to the I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8) Motion.
Beginnin g in 2008, Bruce Owens and Regina McCrea, partners in the law firm of Owens
& Crandall, began represent ing Martin Frantz in a legal malpracti ce action Frantz was pursuing
against the Withersp oon Kelly law firm ("WKDT "). In preparing their case for Frantz, Owens and
McCrea retained Merlyn Clark, a partner with HTEH, to serve as an expert witness on the standard
of care. (Aff. of Regina McCrea, R. Vol. I, pp. 116-118; Aff. of Merlyn Clark, R Vol. I, pp. 139144) By letter, Mr. Clark was advised of McCrea's theory of actionabl e conduct by WKDT and
asked to evaluate and to provide his "indepen dent assessme nt" as to whether WKDT had violated
the standard of care applicabl e to attorneys . (R. Vol 1, pp. 129-133) Mr. Clark reviewed materials
provided him by McCrea and, on May 4 2009, produced a 21-page written report for Owens &
Crandall reflecting his opinions and detailing the materials he had received and reviewed. (R. Vol.
I, pp. 154-174) Mr. Clark did not receive any confident ial informati on in connectio n with his work
for Owens & Crandall. He had cautioned them that any material they did send would be subject to
disclosure to their opponent s. (Aff. of Clark, R. Vol. I, p. 141; Oral Decision of Judge Myers
R. Vol. I, p. 245) Frantz never spoke with Mr. Clark, and never provided him any infonnati on
(Aff. of Clark, R. Vol. I, pp. 141-142). HTEH billed Owens & Crandall for Mr. Clark's services.
One of those invoices, in the amount of $10,664.0 0, was paid directly to HTEH by Frantz in May
of 2009. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-180; Declarati on of Frantz R. Vol. I, p. 124) Frantz's suit against
WKDT was resolved through mediation in July 2009. (Declarat ion of McCrea, R. Vol. I, p. 117)
Less than a year later, on June 28, 20 I 0, attorney Sheila Schwager of HTEH wrote a letter
on behalf of her client, IIB, demandin g payment on a commerc ial indebtedn ess Frantz had
guarantee d and advising of the prospect of legal action to collect if payment was not received. (R.
Vol. I, pp. 135-137) Payment was not received and an action was brought by HTEH on July 14,
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10, on behalf of IIB, under Cause No. CV-10-6088, District Court, First Judicial District of State
Idaho, County of Kootenai. Subsequently, Frantz filed for protection from creditors,
(reorganization) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court,
District of Idaho. It was assigned Case No 11-21337-TLM, and the Honorable Chief Judge
Terry L. Myers began presiding. This halted the state action against Frantz.
On April 23, 2013, the Bankruptcy proceedings were converted to a Chapter 7. (Add., BR
193) In Re Frantz, 2015 W.L. 1778068 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2015). On August 23, 2013, HTEH filed
an Adversary Proceeding (No 13-07024-TLM) in the Frantz Bankruptcy proceeding against Frantz
on behalf of IIB, seeking a determination that Frantz's debt to IIB was not dischargeable due to
fraud. A pre-trial hearing was held in December of 2013, and a trial date of December 1, 2014 was
set. (R. Vol. I, p. 75, ll. 4-5)
Thereupon, on October 31, 2014, Frantz brought his Second Motion to Disqualify HTEH,
claiming that Merlyn Clark had been his attorney in 2008-2009, that Clark had been given
confidential infonnati on during that representation, and that HTEH must be using that infonnation
to support its claim of fraud. (Exh. B to Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol 1, p. 39) 1 Affidavits were submitted
in support of and against the motion, but Chief Judge Myers determined that he needed to hear live
testimony, subject to cross-examination, to resolve the questions of fact the affidavits raised. (Oral
Decision of Judge Myers, R. Vol. I, pp. 241-242)
In connection with his Motion to Disqualify, Frantz identified as an expert witness, attorney
Jeffrey Katz. (Exh. C, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 62-64) Neither Frantz nor Katz disclosed to the
Bankruptcy Court (the finder of fact) that Mr. Katz had a personal interest in seeing HTEH
1

Frantz's first Motion to Disqualify HTEH resulted in a Stipulated Order of January 17, 2012,
reflecting that HTEH "does not and has not" represented Frantz in any matters and no conflict
existed. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 189-90)
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disqualified as he was representing Frantz in a legal malpractice suit to be pursued against HTEH.
That suit involved the same matter, i.e., the substantial indebtedness of Frantz to IIB and his efforts
to avoid it.
The Court held a full evidentiary hearing on December 1 and 2, 2014, with testimony by
Regina McCrea, Plaintiff Frantz, and Merlyn Clark. After hearing direct and cross examination
and considering numerous exhibits, the Court found that (a) Merlyn Clark never formed an
attorney-client relationship with Frantz, and (b) Merlyn Clark never had or utilized any
confidential materials. (Exh. D, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 77-83) The Court thus denied the
Motion to Disqualify, entering its Order on December 9, 2014. (Add., AP 85, Aff. ofRiseborough,
R. Vol. I, p. 272)

Despite his failure to prove that Mr. Clark had been his attorney, or that Mr. Clark had
received confidential materials, on February 20, 2015, Frantz filed but did not serve the instant
action, contending again that, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's express holding, Mr. Clark had
been his lawyer in 2009.
On February 27, 2015 Frantz brought a Motion to Dismiss the Bankruptcy or Reconvert it
to a Chapter 11 as well as a Motion for Relief from Stay. The basis for these motions was an
alleged desire to litigate the claims by and against IIB in the original State Court action which had
been stayed since 2011. ln re Frantz, supra at *3; (Add. BR421, BR 425) The Court held a hearing
and on April 16, 2015 in a lengthy Memorandum Opinion, the Court denied both motions. (Add.,
BR 484, pp. 28, 33; 2015 WL 1778068)2 The Court observed that the Bankruptcy Court (through
the pending Adversary Proceeding) could resolve the amount of the debt, its dischargeability, and
the Debtor's (Frantz's) defenses. (Add., BR 484, pp. 28-31; In re Frantz, supra at** 13-16)
2

The opinion contains a comprehensive history of the Frantz Bankruptcy. In re Franz, No. 1121337-TLM, 2015 WL 1778068 at** 1-7 (D.Idaho April 16, 2015).
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On May 1, 2015, Frantz sought approval of a Waiver of Discharge as to all debts and
creditors, including the IIB indebtedness. (Add., BR 508, BR 509) The Court granted that motion
on May 20 2015 (Add., BR 516)
On June 2, 2015, HTEH, on behalf ofIIB, brought a Motion for Sanctions and for an award
of attorney's fees in the Adversary Proceeding. (Add., AP 117) One basis for the Motion for
Sanctions was Frantz's unfounded Motion to Disqualify HTEH. (Id., pp. 5-7; pp. 15-17)
The Court held a hearing on June 15, 2015, and issued its oral ruling on September 14,
2015. (The Court granted the part of the Motion for Sanctions that was based on the failed Motion
to Disqualify in the amount of $49,477.46 (Court's Oral Ruling, Add., AP pp. 142, 142-1) In
granting the sanctions motion, the Bankruptcy Court stated:
Given their very nature and timing, the disqualification motions
before this Court were guaranteed to cause IIB and its counsel to spend
significant resources. This Court found the motions lacked any merit. It also
now appears that another strategy was at play, the use of the motion to
disqualify counsel was a test of the law firm in order to evaluate an
anticipated collateral malpractice suit and nematic of the behavior and this
Court on the disqualification motion, when the malpractice suit was actually
brought, the debtors and their counsel disclosed to the state court the
existence of the bankruptcy disqualification motion but not its unsuccessful
outcome ... This Court, therefore, on the entirety of the record and with
emphasis of the facts set forth today, as well as in the prior decisions, finds
that the motions to disqualify IIB 's counsel and witnesses were made in bad
faith, for an improper purpose, and manifest willfulness conduct. Id. at p.
34, ll. 4-15; p. 35, ll. 8-12.
An Order was entered that same day. (Add., AP 135) The Court also entered an Order dismissing
the Adversary Proceeding as moot. (Add., AP 136)
Frantz did not appeal the dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding as moot. Frantz DID
appeal the award of sanctions, but did not appeal the underlying order on which sanctions were
based, i.e., the meritless disqualification motion. (Add., AP 143, AP 150)
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2.

Facts Relevant to the Pro Hae Vice Issue.

Frantz retained attorney Jeffrey Katz on October

2014, to represent him in an attorney

malpractice case against HTEH, based on the alleged conflict of interest posed by Mr. Clark's
alleged attorney-client relationship with Frantz. (Aff. of Katz, R. Vol. II, p. 346) Katz advises that
he had been contacted as early as mid-2014. (Id.) Katz accepted the case on a contingency fee
basis. (Exh. B, Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 334) The damages alleged included Frantz's inability
to discharge his indebtedness to IIB, the same indebtedness HTEH was seeking to collect from
Frantz for TIB. (Complaint, R. Vol. I, p. 13, et seq.) "At the outset" Katz advised Frantz to attempt
to enlist the participation of IIB in the suit as a plaintiff to share in a future "insurance settlement"
this as a means to reduce or eliminate the debt that IIB was pursuing against Frantz. (Exh. B,
Aff of Gustave!, Vol. II, pp. 333-334) On Mr. Katz's advice, Frantz brought the motion to
disqualify HTEH as a tactical "probe" to allow Mr. Katz to evaluate HTEH's response to the claim
of conflict of interest, and thus, theoretically, assist in preparation of the state malpractice case.
(Exh. B, Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 334) Mr. Katz was thus aware of HTEH's representation
of IIB and its scope. Mr. Katz agreed to act as an expert witness in this probe and he authored an
expert disclosure (Exh. C, Aff. of Kurtz, R. Vol. I, pp. 60-66), despite his financial interest in
obtaining a favorable ruling that would significantly enhance the malpractice case. Neither Katz
nor Frantz disclosed Katz's interest in the outcome of the motion. Neither Katz nor Frantz advised
the Bankruptcy Court that the Disqualification Motion, which interrupted the Court's schedule and
caused it to strike a trial date that had been set for a year, was a tactical "probe" for another lawsuit.
(Oral Decision R. Vol. I, p. 75, l. 4

p. 77, l. 22)

On April 7, 2015, Frantz filed a motion for pro hac vice admission, seeking the admission
of Mr. Katz in the instant action. (R. Vol. I, pp. 22-23) The motion was signed by Mr. Katz on
February 25, 2015, and by attorney Frantz on March 3, 2015. (Id.)
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On March 9, 2015, with the bankruptcy still pending, and after this

had been filed

not served, Mr. Katz sent an email to Mr. Jack Gustavcl, the CEO of IIB. This contact was made
without notice to HTEH (Aff. of Kurtz, ,I9, R. Vol. I, p. 32) The email suggested the business
proposal Frantz and Katz had discussed, i.e., the proposal that IIB join Frantz in the lawsuit against
IIB' s lawyers, HTEH as a means of satisfying Frantz' s debt. (Id., R. Vol. I, p. 107)

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff's claim on the basis of
judicial estoppel/lack of standing where damages are alleged to have occurred pre-petition
and pre-conversion, where the operative facts underlying Plaintiffs claim of conflict of
interest-based attorney malpractice preexisted the Bankruptcy filing and where such claims
are substantially rooted in Frantz's pre-bankruptcy past?

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing Frantz's Complaint under
LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) where a ruling disposing of an essential element of Frantz's claim in the
instant action was previously made in his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and that dispositive ruling
remains the law of the pending Bankruptcy proceedings?

3.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in declining to admit a non-resident attorney
where the attorney may be a trial witness and where evidence of attorney misconduct in
connection with the case was brought to the attorney's attention, but not satisfactorily
explained?

4.

Defendant accepts Plaintiff's characterization of the two issues regarding the award of
attorney's fees.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

The Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
Plaintiff has appealed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case under principles of

judicial estoppel, dismiss the case under principles of abatement, decline to admit counsel pro hac
vice, and to award attorney's fees. The standard review for each of these decisions is abuse of
discretion. As this Court is aware, in evaluating a decision under this standard, this Court considers
"(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
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court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by
an exercise ofreason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 ldaho 87, 94, 803
P .2d 993, 1000 (1991 ). Absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, the Appellate Court will
uphold the decision of the trial court. Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760; 215 P.3d 476,
480 (2009). A district court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Young v. Williams, 122 Idaho 649,
652, 837 P.2d 324, 327 (App. 1992). A district court's decision is based on "an erroneous view of
the law" if the court "does not apply the correct legal test or consider the factors laid out in an
applicable rule or statute." Sammis v. Magnetek. Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 352, 941 P.2d 314, 324
(1997). The record herein amply demonstrates the Court appropriately exercised its discretion in
each of its determinations.

B.

The District Court Correctly Ruled that Frantz was Judiciallv Estopped/Lacked
Standing as Frantz's Attornev Claims are Based on Facts and Occurrences
Sufficiently Rooted in His Pre-Bankruptcy Past.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs action on the basis of judicial estoppel and standing.

Those are separate but related concepts. In the bankruptcy setting, judicial estoppel is applied to
prevent a debtor, who fails to disclose a cause of action on his schedule of property, subsequently
seeks to pursue that cause of action for his own benefit. Standing relates to the fact that, if a cause
of action is considered property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Trustee is the only party with
standing to pursue that cause of action. McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,898,303 P.3d 578,
585 (2013) (citing Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008).
1.

Judicial Estoppel in the Bankruptcy Setting.

The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial system, by
protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial
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proceedings." A&J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682,685, 116 P.3d 12, 15 (2005). Broadly, it
is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. Id.
Judicial estoppel applies to inconsistent positions taken in bankruptcy proceedings and may
act to bar a subsequent action. McCallister, 154 Idaho at 894, 303 P.3d at 581. Under Federal
Bankruptcy law, a cause of action is property which can be properly included within the
Bankruptcy Estate. The bankruptcy code requires a debtor to make full disclosure of all known
and potential assets, including contingent causes of action. 11 U.S.C. § 521 et seq. Under 11 U.S.C.

§ 541(a), debtors are required to disclose "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case" and "the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be
overstated." A&J Constr. Co., 141 Idaho at 685, 116 P.3d at 15. This duty continues through the
pendency of the bankruptcy. Bums v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, judicial estoppel can prevent a debtor from pursing a cause of action for his own
benefit that should have been included in his Bankruptcy Estate.
In determining whether the debtor should have disclosed the cause of action, the courts
take into account what the estopped party knew or should have known at the time the original
position was adopted, not his intent. McKav v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222, 1229
(1997). That knowledge or chargeable knowledge is determinative as to whether that person is
"playing fast and loose with the court." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 236, 178 P.3d 597, 601
(2008).
In deciding whether a cause of action is includable in the Bankruptcy Estate, courts are
called upon to determine the nature and extent of the debtor's interest in property, as well as
whether title to that property has vested in the Bankruptcy Estate. In perfom1ing that analysis, state
law informs the nature and extent of the debtor's interest in property, while federal law determines
whether the property is properly considered an asset of the Bankruptcy. Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d
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(9th Cir. 2001). Causes of action that arise after the filing of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
but before its conversion to a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, become the property of the Chapter 7 estate
and possession of the Trustee. See Cantu v. Schmidt (In Re Cantu), 784 F.3d 253, 257-58 (5th Cir.
2015). The same analysis, however, applies.
Finally, questions of whether a cause of action should be included in the Bankruptcy Estate
arise in three scenarios: (a) where all facts creating the cause of action occurred before the
bankruptcy petition was filed; (b) where all facts creating the cause of occurred after the
bankruptcy petition was filed; and (c) where the operative facts of the legal wrong occurred prepetition, but the injury or legal harm occurred post-petition. Scenarios (a) and (b) are
straightforward: if all elements of a cause of action arose pre-petition, that cause of action is
property of the Estate; if all elements of the cause of action arose after the petition was filed, the
cause of action is the property of the debtor. Scenario (c), however, requires a different analysis.
Includability under scenario (c) turns on whether the operative facts, i.e., those facts which created
the potential benefit, entitlement or recovery, are sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy
past to justify including the cause in the Estate. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,380, 86 S.Ct. 511,
515 (1966). That analysis is not the same as one done in detennining the commencement of the
running of a statute oflimitations, which requires a strict "accrual" assessment. Rather, the analysis
focuses on whether, under the facts, the post-petition damages are due to causes put in motion by
occunences pre-petition, which are "sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy past." See
In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10, 14-15 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1997); In Re Ellwanger, 140 B.R. 891,898
(Bankr.W.D.Wash. 1992).
2.

Facts Relevant to Includability of Frantz's Claims.

In an attempt to avoid the judicial estoppel doctrine, the Appellant now argues that the
Attorney Claims \Vere limited to the Adversary Proceeding which was filed after the Chapter 7
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Yet his Complaint in this action is not so limited and establish that the Attorney Claims
are claims held by the Bankruptcy Estate, which were never scheduled or disclosed in his
Bankruptcy proceedings.
The pre-petition facts creating Frantz's interest in the Attorney Claims are well reflected
m the record. Beginning with the Complaint, Frantz alleges an action "sounding in legal
malpractice" arising from Defendant's adverse representation against Plaintiff AND/OR for the
use of Plaintiff's confidential :financial information (Complaint, ,II, R. Vol. I, p. 13), Frantz alleges
that he retained Merlyn Clark to provide consultation in 2009 and that in that connection Clark
reviewed a large number of confidential documents. (Id. 4J2, R. Vol. I, p. 14) Frantz alleges as a
result of this professional negligence, he lost an amount in excess of $10,000 in attorney's fees
paid to HTEH for Clark's services in 2009. (Id. ,I4, R. Vol. I, p. 14) The Complaint alleges that
Defendant began representing IIB to pursue a claim against him in June of 2010. (Id. ,Il 8, R. Vol. I,
p. 16); and that Defendant HTEH continued to pursue Mr. Frantz, filing a claim on behalf of IIB
for $6.4 million. (Id., ,ii[l 9-20)
That IIB claim was filed in January 2012, before the subsequent conversion of the
Bankruptcy proceeding to a Chapter 7 in April 2013. In Re Frantz, supra, 215 W.L. 1778068 at *2
*fn. 45.

Further, Frantz alleges that HTEH breached the standard of care by representing a party
with materially adverse interests to Frantz in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings (Id., ,I29, R.,
Vol. I, p. 17), by: (a) failing to properly screen out Merlyn Clark, (b) failing to give proper notice
to Frantz of the conflicting representation, (c) thus depriving Frantz of the opportunity to ascertain
Defendant' s compliance with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, (d) using infom1ation
related to Hawley Troxell's representation to Frantz's disadvantage; and (e) otherwise acting in a
negligent and careless manner. (Id. ,I29, R. Vol. I, p. 18, (b), (c), (d) and (e), ,I30) Frantz alleged
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negligence prevented him from timely seeking removal of Defendant

to prevent

Defendant from asserting claims contrary to Frantz' s interests based on improperly gained
information. (Id. ,I32, R. Vol. I, p. 19). Frantz contended he was damaged, inter alia, in the form
of legal fees previously paid to Hawley Troxell. (Id. 134, R. Vol. I, p. 19)
Frantz's Complaint also makes a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the same
actions as the malpractice claim and seeking the same damages. (Id. 135-46, R. Vol. I, p. 19-20)
The record reflects that Frantz personally paid an invoice Hawley Troxell had sent Owens
& Crandall for Mr. Clark's services. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-180; Exh. A, Aff. of Gustavel, R. Vol. II,
p. 334,) Further, Frantz has represented that in 2009, Mr. Clark was his "key attorney." (Exh. A,
Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p. 333) Finally, Frantz moved to disqualify HTEH alleging a different
conflict of interest early in the bankruptcy proceedings and before conversion to Chapter 7. Upon
stipulation, HTEH continued representing JIB. (Stipulated Order, Exh. 6, Aff. ofRiseborough, R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 189-190) The record reveals that on April 23, 2013, Frantz converted his Chapter 11 to
a Chapter 7. The adverse representation by HTEH continued beyond that conversion, through and
to the present. (Add.; BR 193) Based on the foregoing, the basis for Frantz's claims in this action
are firmly rooted in Frantz' s pre-petition and pre-conversion past.
3.

Frantz's Interest in the Claims Pre-Petition and Pre-Conversion.
(a)

Frantz 's Property Interest in the attorney claims under Idaho Law.

State law determines the nature and extent of a debtor's interest in property. In Re Alvarez,
224 F.3d 1273, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2000). An act that creates a specific and concrete risk of harm
comprises a legally cognizable injury sufficient for inclusion in the Bankruptcy Estate. In Re
Cantu, 784 F.3d at 260-61 (5th Cir. 2015).
The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice in Idaho include (a) the existence
of the attorney-client relationship; (b) a duty on behalf of the attorney towards the client; (c) breach
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that

by the attorney and damages proximately caused by the breach of duty. Bishop v.

Owens, 1

Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012). As to the damages element, evidence of

"some damage" is sufficient to meet this element. For example, the loss of a right to act for one's
benefit represents "some damage." See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 662-63, 201
P.3d 629, 635-36 (2009) (loss of chance to enter a settlement agreement and release of right to sue
additional tortfeasor recognized as "some damage" for accrual of attorney malpractice claims).
Frantz resists dismissal by claiming that his Attorney Claims did not accrue prior to filing
his bankruptcy petition. He contends that the causes of action were incomplete because he wasn't
damaged until HTEH utilized "confidential information" that he had provided Mr. Clark during
his prior "representation." He dates the occurrence of this damage, and thus the accrual of his
action, to the filing of the Adversary Proceeding in August 2013. This is contrary to the allegations
of his Complaint and to Idaho law. 3
Assuming Frantz' s allegations to be true, Frantz had sustained "some damage" for purposes
of accrual of his causes of action prior to filing of his Bankruptcy petition. Frantz was aware as
early as June 2010 that HTEH was representing a party adverse to him in litigation arising out of
a loan he had secured and guaranteed with IIB. (HTEH Demand Letter, R. Vol. I, pp. 135-37) He
alleges that he had provided confidential information to Merlyn Clark sometime between
December of 2008 and June 2009. He was aware that Merlyn Clark was a partner with HTEH at
the time he paid the $10,664 bill it had invoiced Owens & Crandall for Merlyn Clark's services.
Per his Complaint, HTEH's negligence in failing to screen Merlyn Clark from the IIB case, failing
to advise Frantz of the conflict and failing to obtain his permission to proceed damaged him by
preventing him from seeking to prevent HTEH from participating in the adverse representation.
This loss of his legal rights constitutes "some damage" under Idaho law. City of McCall, 146 Idaho
3

Frantz is in error when he asserts that defense agrees his damages did not occur until post-petition.
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at 662-63. Frantz further alleges that these actions damaged him by rendering the legal services he
had paid, $10,664, worthless, entitling him to seek disgorgement of those fees. These rights to seek
legal redress arose in Frantz at least by the time HTEH brought IIB' s lawsuit against him, prior to
his 2011 Bankruptcy filing in 2010, if not at the time of his receipt of the June 281h demand letter.
By his Complaint, Frantz could have acted to prevent the continued representation by withholding

his consent. If refused, Frantz could have sought relief from the Court seeking an injunction to
prevent HTEH's further participation, seeking his attorney's fees in connection with that
injunction, and seeking disgorgement of fees for HTEH's adverse representation. These rights of
Frantz continued after the Bankruptcy was filed, and after his Chapter 11 Bankruptcy was
converted to a Chapter 7 on April 23, 2013, and continues today.
The facts Frantz has alleged as occurring prior to his Bankruptcy filing are actionable in
Idaho, and thus constitute a property interest. Given that, federal bankruptcy law determines
whether that interest is sufficient to be included in his Bankruptcy Estate. In Re Ellwanger, 140
B.R. at 898; In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. at 14-15; In Re Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1276-78.
(b)

Frantz 's Causes ofAction were lncludable in his Bankruptcy Estate under
Federal Bankruptcy Law.

"Property" of the Bankruptcy Estate is construed broadly. This is because the goal is to
provide as much relief for creditors as the debtor's assets can afford. In Re Feiler, 218 F.3d 948,
955 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal courts approach the issue of includability with those principles in
mind.
As indicated above, cases concerning causes of action which are fully developed prepetition and cases concerning causes of action that arise only post-petition are not informative
when evaluating a case like this one, where the facts demonstrate actionable conduct pre-petition
and damages alleged both pre- and post-petition. Those cases, termed by some courts as "straddle"
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cases,

a different analysis, one that looks to the nature and extent of the pre-petition activity

and relationships giving rise to the causes of action to assess whether they are sufficiently rooted
in the pre-petition history to justify including the post-petition receipt of benefits, payments, or
damages as an asset of the Bankruptcy Estate. 4
This principle had its genesis in the United States Supreme Court case of Segal v. Rochelle,
382 U.S. 375, 380, 86 S.Ct. 511, 515 (1966). That case involved loss carryback refunds, the
entitlement to which occurred pre-petition, but which were received post-petition. The Court
observed that Congress intended the term "property" to be broadly interpreted, and that the purpose
of bankruptcy was to afford creditors everything of value that a debtor held at the time of the
bankruptcy. While Segal pre-dated the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the principle continues to be
applied in a variety of situations where facts creating a contingent entitlement pre-petition result
in occurrence of the contingency and receipt of entitlement post-petition. See In Re Schmitz, 270
F.3d 1254, 1256-58 (9th Cir. 2001) (post-filing fishing quota rights, based on fisherman's prefiling catch history, not "sufficiently rooted" where the regulations creating such rights did not
exist pre-petition).
Substantial federal authority supports inclusion of Frantz' s claims in his Bankruptcy Estate.
Federal Courts favor an assessment of how the pre-petition facts relate to the debtor's
circumstances and the definition of his estate over a technical assessment of when a cause of action
accrues for statute of limitations purposes. In Re Richards, 249 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.
2000) (pre-petition exposure leading to post-petition diagnosis-damage properly includable); In
Re Alvarez, 224 F.3d at 1276-78 (accrual for statute oflimitations purposes irrelevant; a cause of
4

As indicated above, Frantz's claims likely fully accrued pre-petition. However, even if his
damages accrued post-petition, his causes of action are properly considered property of the
Bankruptcy Estate.
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action can accrue for ownership purposes in a bankruptcy proceeding before the statute of
limitations begins to run); In Re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. at 14-15 (accrual for bankruptcy ownership
purposes is not confined to those elements sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of
limitations as such questions have unique considerations).
In Re Strada Design Assoc., Inc., 326 B.R. 229,236 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2005) is informative.
There the court held that although the accrual date for state law purposes is important, it is not
critical in deciding whether a cause of action will be "property of the estate." The Court observed
that § 541 (a) is not restricted by state law concepts such as when the cause of action ripens or when
a statute of limitations begins to run. Property of the estate may include claims that were inchoate
on the petition date. Accordingly, a cause of action will be "property of the estate" if it has
sufficient roots in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy activities regardless of when the claim accrues under
State law or the statute of limitations begins to run. Id. at 236.
The case of In Re Ellwanger, supra, is likewise informative. There, the Court considered
whether separate legal malpractice claims arising out of representation both pre and post-petition,
but which accrued under state law post-petition were property of the estate. The debtor argued that,
although the acts of malpractice occurred pre-petition, his cause of action for malpractice did not
accrue until he was damaged which, under California law, did not occur until the attorney's errors
became "irredeemable," i.e., incapable ofremedy. The Court rejected that analysis, observing that
the debtor's position "collapses into one analysis several distinct concepts oflaw." While state law
defines the nature of the debtor's interest in property, whether this interest is property of the estate
is a matter of federal bankruptcy law. The Court observed that if the pre-petition representation
was negligent, the debtor had a contingent claim against his attorneys for those services at that
time. The fact that this contingent interest may never come to fruition if the harm is remedied
before finality does not alter the fact that the debtor's interest arose when the representation
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As a debtor is required to schedule contingent assets, the malpractice actions were
properly included as property of the Bankruptcy Estate.
4.

The District Court Properly Applied the Applicable Law.

Although the foregoing federal case law was not referred to by the District Court in its
opinion, the Court recognized that contingent assets must be disclosed either at the time the petition
is filed, or during the bankruptcy by amendment. The cases the Court cited recognize the obligation
of the debtor to schedule all property, including pre-petition contingencies. They also recognize
the debtor's obligation to amend his schedules to reflect contingent assets which ripen during the
bankruptcy. These cases, discussed below, are fully compatible with the Federal Authority cited
above.
The trial court relied on the case of Mc Callister v. Dixon, supra, in support of its conclusion
that Frantz was judicially estopped from pursuing a claim when he was aware of that claim's
potential at the time of filing his Bankruptcy but failed to disclose it. The Court was correct in its
reliance. McCallister cited with approval the following language from this Court's prior decision
in A&J Constr. Co. v. Wood:
Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough
facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of
the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to
identify the cause of action as a contingent asset.
Mccallister, 154 Idaho at 895 (quoting A&J Constr. Co., 141 Idaho at 686). A&J Constr. Co.
involved a bankruptcy debtor who failed to list his interests in a joint venture or in real property
owned by that joint venture at the time he filed for bankruptcy in 1991. Some time after bankruptcy
was filed, the property of the joint venture was sold and A&J sued its joint venturer, Wood, for an
accounting of the proceeds and distribution of profits. Despite the occurrence of the losses postpetition, A&J Construction was estopped from pursuing the suit against his joint venturer Wood
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because

potential for such claim was known to A&J prior to the bankruptcy, and he failed to

list it.
Further, A&J Constr. Co., cited with approval Hav v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell,
N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992). In Hav, the debtor was judicially estopped from suing a
bank for actions which had occurred pre-petition, but which the debtor did not discover until during
the bankruptcy proceeding. Despite this discovery, the debtor did not amend his schedules to assert
the potential cause of action. After his Bankruptcy closed, the debtor sued the bank, but his suit
was dismissed on the basis of judicial estoppel. Again, the potential claim, once discovered, should
have been included in an amended schedule. The Court stated: "We recognize that all facts were
not known to Desert Mountain (Hay) at the time the bankruptcy was filed. However, enough was

knovm to require notification of the existence of the potential asset to the Bankruptcy Court." Hay
at 557.
Finally, the Court in McCallister cited with approval Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001 ). Although cited for a different principle, of interest is the fact
that the cause of action that Hamilton was estopped from pursuing against State Fam1 did not
technically accrue until several days after he had filed bankruptcy, although the acts and omissions
of the parties prior to the bankruptcy filing suggested the potential for such a claim.
Thus, under state and federal law, Frantz had an obligation to include his Attorney Claims
in his schedules at the time of filing bankruptcy, or, if not then, to amend his schedules to reflect
those claims once his damages should have become apparent to him. Especially considering that
Frantz was aware of HTEH' s adverse representation of IIB both before and after his Bankruptcy
filing, that he was litigating his obligations under the IIB debt to and through the time of filing this
action, that a principal reason for filing this lawsuit against HTEH was to attempt to satisfy that
debt, and considering that Frantz's alleged damages arose from HTEH's activities on behalf ofIIB
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collection of that debt, Frantz's causes of action were sufficiently rooted in his pre-petition
history to justify their inclusion as assets in the Estate.
5.

Plaintiffs Authorities Do Not Address the Issue.

Plaintiff cites three cases in support of his contention that a cause of action is onlv
includable in the bankruptcy's estate of a debtor if that cause of action has fully accrued under
state law pre-petition. The cases do not so hold. The first case, Wade v. Bailev, 287 B.R. 874 (S.D.
Miss. 2001), excluded a cause of action as property of the Bankruptcy Estate because the action
accrued after the petition was filed. The Court held that, as there was no showing that the debtor's
claims where traceable directly to pre-petition conduct, they were property of the debtor and not
the Estate. Id. at 881. The case does not hold that cases which are fully accrued pre-petition are
the onlv causes includable in the Bankruptcy Estate.
The second case, In Re Forbes, 58 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fl. 1986), considered a cause of
action which fully accrued before the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, it was
property of the Estate. It did not hold that only causes of action which have fully accrued prepetition are includable in the Bankruptcy Estate.
Plaintiff also cites Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001).
As indicated supra at page 27, Hamilton is actually a "straddle" case with the cause of action finnly
rooted in the debtor's pre-petition history and therefore properly included in the Bankruptcy Estate.
C.

Res Judicata Bars Frantz from Relitigating an Element Essential to His Malpractice
Claim Decided Adversely to Him in a Prior Proceeding.
In this action, Frantz is attempting to litigate claims of attorney malpractice and breach of

fiduciary duty, despite the fact that an essential element of those claims, i.e., the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between him and Merlyn Clark/HTEH has been decided against him
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pending bankruptcy. 5 As established above, those claims should have been identified at the
time ofFrantz's Bankruptcy filing or during its pendency. Plaintiff did not do so, but rather elected
to litigate the existence of an attorney-client relationship through a Motion to Disqualify HTEH
from further representation of its client, IIB, in the Frantz Bankruptcy. After a full opportunity to
prove these contentions, Frantz lost. After Frantz filed a Waiver of Discharge as to all of his
creditors, including IIB, the Bankruptcy Court found the dischargeability issue of the Adversary
Proceeding was moot and accordingly dismissed that proceeding. That dismissal was a final,
appealable order, as discussed infi·a. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata apply, this case
falls squarely within the defense of abatement, and dismissal is appropriate. Meanwhile, the Frantz
Bankruptcy continues and HTEH continues to represent IIB in its pursuit of Frantz as the
Bankruptcy Court's ruling on disqualification continues as the law of that case. Thus, it is
appropriate for the District Court to refrain from deciding an issue which might affect or interfere
with the pending action.
1.

Nature of the Defense.

Although asserted as a defense under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), the elements of the defense of
abatement are determined by Idaho case law. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905,
907,684 P.2d 307 (App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms,
Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 73 3 P .2d 721 (1987). Abatement is the power of a court to dismiss or stay an
action where a similar action is already proceeding in another forum. It is a decision committed to

5

Plaintiff agrees that he must prove, as an essential element of his Attorney Claims, an attorneyclient relationship between himself and Clark/HTEH. Further, Plaintiff also must concede that he
was provided a full evidentiary oppmiunity to prove that an attorney-client relationship existed
between himself and Clark/HTEH.
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sound discretion of the trial court.

· see also Klaue v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437,988 P.2d 211

(1999).
In Idaho, there are two tests that are applied to determine if abatement or dismissal are
proper. The first test is whether the other case has proceeded to a final determination. In that event,
the Court will consider the principles of res judicata in determining whether to proceed with the
case before it. Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440; Wing, 106 Idaho at 908. In Idaho, res judicata includes
both claim preclusion as well as issue preclusion. Claim preclusion requires that the current action
have the same parties or their privies as the prior action, that those parties be litigating the same
claim as in the prior action, and that there was a final judgment on the merits in that prior action.
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirev, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994). Issue preclusion, on
the other hand, requires that the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier case; that the issue decided in the earlier case is
identical to the issue now presented; that the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in
the prior litigation; that there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and that the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.
It is important to note that for issue preclusion, the "final judgment" requirement pertains to the

case in which the issue was raised, not that there needs to be a separate final order on the
determination of that issue. Ticor Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007).
The second test is whether the Court, although not barred by res judicata, should
nevertheless refrain from deciding it. Wing, 106 Idaho at 908; Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440.
The policy behind the second test is to prevent concurrent litigation of the same issue in
different courts that could result in conflicting decisions. Further, proper application of the defense
advances the goals of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to the litigants, promoting the
prompt and orderly disposition of claims, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments. A Court
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reach its determination by evaluating the identity of the real party-in-interest, the degree in
which the claims or issues are similar, and whether the court in which the matter is already pending
is in a position to determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties. Diet
Center. Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-44 (App. 1993). Abatement is
appropriate under this second test as well.
2.

Issue Preclusion Bars the Frantz's Claim. 6

Frantz elected to attempt to establish an existence of an attorney-client relationship
between himself and Clark/HTEH, the precise issue he is required to prove in this action. The
Bankruptcy Court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in which it heard the testimony of not only
Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark, but also Regina McCrae, Frantz's former attorney who had hired
Mr. Clark as an expert witness. As reflected in his oral Opinion (R. Vol. I, p. 77, l. 15

p. 78, l.

21 ), Chief Bankruptcy Judge Myers listened to the testimony, argument of counsel and considered
numerous exhibits. He then unequivocally found that there was no attorney-client relationship
between Mr. Frantz and Merlyn Clark, and further, that no confidential materials had been
provided to Mr. Clark. Subsequently, Chief Judge Myers found that the disqualification motion
was wholly without merit, entering sanctions against Frantz and his attorney for pursuing that
motion. (Add., AP 142, p. 34, ll. 4-15; p. 35, ll. 8-20)
Under these facts, the elements of issue preclusion have been met, with the possible
exception of a "final judgment," depending on whether the Adversary Proceeding or the parent
Bankruptcy proceeding is considered the prior action. Mr. Frantz had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue (existence of attorney-client relationship), the attorney-client relationship issue in
the disqualification hearing is identical to the issue presented in this action, Judge Myers actually
6

Claim preclusion likely also bars Frantz' s claim under the "Marshall" application of res judicata.
See Farmer's Nat'l Bank v. Shirey. 126 Idaho at 70, 878 P.2d at 769, and the cases cited therein.
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'-'""'"'-'·"'"' that specific issue, and the party against whom the issue is asserted

this action was the

party in the earlier litigation. As to the "Final Judgment" element, if the Adversary Proceeding is
the prior action as contended by Frantz, it has been dismissed as moot and Frantz failed to appeal
that decision. There has thus been a final order and issue preclusion bars Frantz's claims. If,
however, the Adversary Proceeding is viewed as a component of the overall Bankruptcy, final
judgment awaits closure of those Bankruptcy proceedings. Whether it is considered that the
Adversary Proceeding has concluded in a final judgment due to Frantz's failure to appeal, or
whether it is considered that the Bankruptcy proceeding will ultimately conclude with the precise
issue in question having been determined, dismissal was appropriate. Under either scenario, the
issue has been determined and Frantz's Attorney Claims in this action defeated. Accordingly, the
District Court properly applied legal principles in exercising his discretion and the dismissal should
be upheld.
3.

Abatement is Appropriate Under the Second Test.

Application of the policy considerations undermining the second test, i.e., should the Court
nevertheless abate, results in the same conclusion. Frantz does not dispute that the Bankruptcy
proceeding continues and that HTEH continues to represent IIB in those proceedings, adverse to
Mr. Frantz. Allowing Frantz to proceed to litigate the same issue in District Court raises a danger
of potentially inconsistent decisions, does not promote the prompt and orderly disposition of
claims, nor does it advance the goal of judicial economy. The Plaintiff does not dispute that HTEH
is the real party-in-interest on the issue of disqualification that the issue, attorney-client
relationship, is identical in both proceedings, and the Bankruptcy Court is in the position to
determine the whole controversy, settling all the rights of the parties. Accordingly, abatement was
appropriate and the District Court's decision should be upheld.
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4.

Plaintiff's Arguments are Unpersuasive.

Plaintiff presents several arguments:
(a)

The two actions do not involve the "same matter" as malpractice actions are

not disqualification motions; therefore abatement cannot apply;
(b)

Several arguments related to the "same matter" argument, without citation

to authority;
(c)

There is no "other action" as the Adversary Proceeding has been dismissed;

therefore Judicial Estoppel does not apply;
(d)

There will never be a final judgment of the Adversary Proceeding and

therefore res judicata cannot apply.
None of these arguments have merit and will be addressed seriatim.
(a)

Plaintiff's argument that a disqualification motion and cause of action for

malpractice are different assumes that the claims must be identical for abatement to apply. Issue
preclusion, however, does not require that the claims be the same, it only requires that the issue
determined in the first proceeding be identical to that being litigated in the second. Ticor, 144
Idaho at 124. The relevant issue here, i.e., the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
Frantz and Merlyn Clark/HTEH, is identical. Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of that
relationship or the possession by HTEH of confidential information. A determination of that issue
defeats his Attorney Claims in this action.
Further, Plaintiff's citation to case law from Indiana, South Carolina, and Illinois, are
inapposite. The Indiana case, Davidson v. Perron, 716 N .E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), applied
Indiana's Court Rule, l 2(b )(8), which allows abatement of one of two Indiana court actions, and
turns on whether the outcome of one action will affect the adjudication of the other. Its requirement
that a party's subject matter and remedies be precisely or even substantially the same is much
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Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 323, 701 S.E.2d. 39, 45 (S.C.App. 2010), relied on the fact that the same
parties were not litigating in two actions. Its "same claim" analysis was based on that Court's
observation that South Carolina's 12(b)(8) Rule is based on an old statute which required that the
rule be construed narrowly hence the requirement that the matters be identical. Eckert v. Freeborn
& Peters, LLP, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexus 23477 (N.D. Ill., February 26, 2015), applied claim
preclusion, not issue preclusion. Thus, an assertion of claim preclusion failed as the two "claims"
were not identical.
Finally, Plaintiff's reliance on the Idaho case of Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32-33, 175
P.3d 186, 194-95 (2007) is wholly inapposite. The disqualification being considered in that action
was under Idaho RPC l .12(a). A former appellate court clerk who had worked on an earlier appeal
of the case subsequently joined the law firm of one of the parties. The objection was not being
made by a forn1er client and there was no issue as to whether an attorney-client relationship had
ever been established. Thus the elements of disqualification cited by Frantz in his briefing have no
application to the instant circumstance.
(b)

Plaintiff asserts several "policy" arguments related to the differences between

motions to disqualify and actions for malpractice. Whatever their merits, they again miss the point
as the basis for abatement in this matter is the disposition in the Bankruptcy proceeding of an issue
essential to Frantz's successful prosecution of his claims in this action, i.e., the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between Frantz and Merlyn Clark/HTEH.
(c)

Plaintiff next contends that there is no "other proceeding", apparently based on an

argument that an adversary proceeding is a stand-alone lawsuit, independent of the bankruptcy
proceeding. No authority is cited for this proposition, which is contrary to bankruptcy law. A
bankruptcy "case" is comprised of all components of the bankruptcy that is commenced by the
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of a petition, including all litigation. It is, in short, "the whole ball of wax." In Re The Caldor
303 F.3d 161, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2000). An adversary proceeding in bankruptcy is not a distinct
piece oflitigation, but is a component of a single bankruptcy case. Cohen v. Bucci, 905 F.2d 1111,
1112 (7th Cir. 1990). Frantz's Adversary Proceeding is authorized by Rule 7001(6), "A proceeding
to determine the dischargeability of a debt." This is a determination unique to bankruptcy.
Rulings in an adversary proceeding apply throughout the Bankruptcy case under the "law
of the case" doctrine. "In the bankruptcy context, the law of the case doctrine should be applied to
disputes arising in the main bankruptcy case as well as all of its related adversary proceedings."
This is to insure certainty of bankruptcy proceedings and unifonn results throughout. In Re
Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 442 B.R. 522, 530-31 (Bankr.N.D. Tex. 2010). Law of the case is a rule of
practice that once an issue is decided," ... that should be the end of the matter." United States v.
United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198-99, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544-45
(1950). The law of the case doctrine is applied to disputes arising in the main bankruptcy as well
as all of its adversary proceedings. In Re Bordeau Brothers, Inc. v. Montagne. Bankr. No. 0810916, 2010 WL 271347 at **5-6 (Bankr.D.Vt. January 22, 2010).
Accordingly, Plaintiff errs in contending that, with his Adversary Proceeding dismissed,
there is no "other case". Frantz's Bankruptcy proceeding continues. Chief Judge Myers' Order
based on the finding of no attorney client relationship remains the law of that case, and HTEH
continues its adverse representation of IIB, something Frantz claims is actionable in this lawsuit.
(d)

Finally, Plaintiff argues that res judicata cannot apply because there will never be

a final judgment in the Adversary Proceeding. Again, no authority is cited for this proposition. It
is likewise contrary to the Federal Rules of Procedure and Federal Bankruptcy law.
In Bankruptcy, an Order is final and thus appealable if it 1) resolves and seriously affects
substantive rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to which it is addressed.
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Holdings. Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2008); In Re Brov.n, 484 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir.
2007). Appeals of bankruptcy are governed by 28 U.S.C § 158. In Re Frontier Properties. Inc., 979
F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). Finality for purposes of appealability in Adversary Proceedings
is considered under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Lower Elwha Band of S'Klallams v. Lummi Indian Tribe,
235 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000). An order dismissing an Adversary Proceeding is a final Order.
In Re King City Transit Mix. Inc., 738 F.2d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 1984). See also FRCP 41(b)
"Involuntary Dismissal, Effect: any dismissal other than one under this rule operates as an
adjudication on the merits."

7

At the time of the dismissal in this action, the Adversary Proceeding remained pending
within the Bankruptcy. Subsequently the Bankruptcy Court heard and granted a Motion by HTEH
for sanctions, (Add. AP 135) one basis of which was Frantz's prosecution of the disqualification
motion. (Add. AP 142 - Oral Ruling re Sanctions, p. 33, l. 15 - p. 13, l. 20) The same day,
September 14, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order dismissing the Adversary Proceeding
as moot. (Add. AP 136) Frantz had 14 days from the entry of those Orders to appeal. F.R. BKR.
P. 8002(a), 8003(a).
On September 25, 2015, Frantz filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's granting of
sanctions. He did not appeal the Order dismissing the Adversary Proceeding. Nor did he appeal
the denial of his Motion to Disqualify. (Statement of Issues on Appeal Add. AP 150). Thus, if
Frantz's argument that the Adversary Proceeding is the only "other action" is accepted, his time
to appeal has expired, the orders are final, and the final judgment element of issue preclusion is
met. On the other hand, if the "other action" is the Bankruptcy proceeding, then the orders entered
in the Bankruptcy proceeding will become final and appealable upon the closure of that

7

An Order refusing to disqualify counsel, although not immediately appealable, is appealable after
the final judgment. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368,377 (1981).
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Bankruptcy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contention that there will never be

order for

purposes of application of issue preclusion is meritless.

D.

The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion in Denving Admission, Pro Hae
Vice, to Attorney Katz.
1.

Conduct Warranting Disqualification Includes, But is Not Limited To. Violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Although the primary concern of the District Court in evaluating Katz's Pro Hae Vice
motion was the potential he would be required as a witness, Katz's actions as well as violation of
LR.P.C. 4.2 were clearly on the Court's mind. Considering the totality of circumstances, the
Court's decision was correct. Several Courts have found that an attorney is not entitled to appear
Pro Hae Vice where the attorney's conduct is in question, even if that conduct does not technically
violate a specific ethical cannon. See Meschi v. Iverson, 805 NE.2d. 72, 74-75, 60 Mass.App.Ct
678 (2004); Kampitch v. Lach, 405 F.Supp.2d. 210, 215-16 (D.RI 2005). The Meschi case is
particularly informative. There, pro hac vice admission was denied because counsel's ex-parte
contact with an adverse client "Skated perilously close to the line of the Massachusetts Rules of
Professional Conduct". As will be demonstrated, attorney Katz's conduct actually violated LR.C.P.
4.2 and, combined with his other actions, support the District Courts' denial.
2.

Facts Relevant to the Pro Hae Vice Motion.

Sometime in "mid to late" 2014 (Aff. of Katz, Deel., ,I6, R. Vol. II, p.346), Frantz contacted
attorney Jeffrey Ogden Katz in connection with a potential malpractice claim against HTEH. At
that time, HTEH was actively pursuing collection of the $6.4 million claim filed in Frantz' s
Bankruptcy proceedings and further was pursuing an Adversary Proceeding on behalf of IIB for
non-dischargability. IIB 's goal in that proceeding was to prevent Frantz from discharging his $6.5
Million indebtedness.
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the outset", Katz advised Frantz of a plan to obtain IIB's agreement to participate in a
proposed malpractice action against HTEH as a way to satisfy Frantz's indebtedness to IIB, being
litigated in the Adversary Proceeding. (Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, p.333) The plan apparently
was to be "beneficial" to HTEH as IIB would consider its "good relationship with HTEH" in
approving any settlement offers. Frantz envisioned that there would be an "insurance settlement"
and all would be accomplished within six months. (Id. at 334)
On October 7, Frantz signed an attorney retainer agreement providing for a contingency
fee to Katz. (Aff. of Gustave!, R. Vol. II, pp. 333-334; Katz Deel., R. Vol. II, ~7, 9, p. 346.) On
October 16, attorney Katz wrote a letter to the managing partner of HTEH advising of Frantz's
intent to bring a suit for legal malpractice. No mention is made in that letter of the Katz/Frantz
plan to invite HTEH's client, IIB, to join the lawsuit as a party plaintiff. (R. Vol I, p. 36)
Then on October 31, Frantz brought a Motion to Disqualify HTEH in the Bankruptcy
Proceeding on the basis of conflict of interest. In connection with that motion, Frantz served a
FRCP 26(a)(2) expert disclosure, authored by attorney Katz, setting forth Katz's opinions as to
why HTEH should be disqualified. (R. Vol. I, p. 62) Although aware that the trial judge would be
deciding the motion as the trier of fact, Katz did not disclose his attorney-client relationship with
Frantz, nor how that representation would be advanced if the Court granted the motion. (Id.)
On February 20, 2015, Frantz filed but did not serve the instant litigation. On March 9,
2015, Katz, without notice to HTEH, directly contacted Jack Gustave!, CEO of IIB. The email
invited a response to discuss a "business proposal which might be of benefit to you." (R. Vol. I,
p. 107) The Bankruptcy continued at that time and HTEH continued to represent IIB. On April 7,
Katz moved for admission pro hac vice in this action. Defendants objected, raising a question of
whether attorney Katz was aware of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and suggesting that
the Court make inquiry. (R. Vol I, p. 24-26)
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Katz's response was telling. Rather than recognizing the error and committing not to
repeat it, Mr. Katz doubled down, seeking to excuse the conduct with the contention that
I.R.P.C. 4.2 only applies to attorneys representing opposing parties in a specific lawsuit.
Subsequent to this response, the defendants learned of the Frantz communication to Mr. Gustav el,
revealing that the Motion to Disqualify had been a "probe" and laying out in detail the Katz/Frantz
plan for eliminating Frantz's debt through litigation against HTEH. R. Vol II, p. 333. Accordingly,
on June 26, defendants filed a Reply to the Frantz Response disputing Katz's interpretation of
I.R.P.C. 4.2 and raising additional issues related to I.R.P.C. 3.3 - Candor Toward the Tribunal and
Rule 11. The latter was based on Mr. Katz's failure to advise of his representation of Frantz at the
time he presented himself as an expert witness and the fact that the Motion to Disqualify HTEH
had been a subterfuge.
On July 13, Frantz filed his Brief in Support of Motion (R. Vol. II, pp. 341-42) contending
that Katz would not be a witness and that Katz had not violated any Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct. At that time, Frantz attempted to excuse Katz's conduct by arguing that Katz's failure to
advise the Court of his bias was "immaterial" as the Court did not allow his affidavit, that the
allegations of a probe were "outlandish and unfounded" (even though based on Plaintiff Frantz's
email to Gustave!) and contending that Mr. Katz did not care how the disqualification motion
turned out. In connection therewith, a Katz Declaration was submitted. (R. Vol. II, p. 345) Katz
again attempted to excuse his ex parte contact on the basis that he was representing Mr. Frantz in
a different lawsuit than the Adversary Proceeding, and asserting that the disqualification motion
was brought to prevent an argument of mitigation of damages. 8 Of significance, is the fact that
Katz did not deny that he had proposed the questionable plan laid out in Mr. Frantz' s email to IIB.
8

This assertion by both Katz and Jonathan Frantz is curious given the fact the Frantz's duty to
mitigate arose as early as his receipt of the demand letter in June 2010!
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the face of this inadequate explanation for Katz's conduct, and the real potential that
Katz would become a witness in this action, the District Court properly declined to grant him
admission.
The Protection Afforded by I.R.P.C. 4.2 is Not Limited to Lawsuits.
Plaintiffs argument is that the "in the matter" language of the Rule refers to lawsuits and
only applies to attorneys representing clients on either side of that suit. However, the purpose of
the Rule and its scope, as reflected in the Commentary, demonstrate that such an interpretation is
too restrictive. That interpretation reflects either ignorance of the Rule, or an inclination to read
our ethical rules so as to obviate the protection afforded.
Next to the attorney-client privilege, there is probably no ethical rule more sacred to
attorneys than the one protecting their clients from ex parte contact by attorneys adverse to their
client in the matter being discussed. As the commentary makes clear, the Rule is designed to
protect lay persons from possible overreaching by other lav.ryers who are participating in the
matter, interference by those lawyers with the attorney-client relationship, and the uncounseled
disclosure of information relating to the representation. I.R.P.C. 4.2: Communication with Person
Represented by Counsel, Comment [ 1] .9 In this instance, the Rule protects IIB, who had chosen to
be represented by HTEH in the matter of recovery of Frantz' s indebtedness to it. Pursuant to the
Katz/Frantz plan, the reason Katz was contacting Mr. Gustave! was to suggest a way that IIB could
obtain satisfaction of the same Frantz debt, with the idea that IIB would stop litigating in the
Bankruptcy where it is represented by HTEH and instead join a different lawsuit as a plaintiff
against its lawyer! This would benefit both Katz and Frantz as it would eliminate the still pending
Adversary Proceeding, remove IIB's claims from Bankruptcy and advance the malpractice action
by IIB agreeing that there had been an undisclosed conflict. It is clear that contact by Katz posed

9

A limitation to a specific piece of litigation is found nowhere in the rule or commentary.
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risk of everything the Rule seeks to prevent, including overreaching by Katz, causing IIB to lose
confidence in its attorney, and a substantial risk of uncounseled disclosure of infonnation relating
to HTEH's representation. Contending that Katz's discussion with IIB would be on an unrelated
matter is flatly negated by Frantz's full description of the proposal Katz wanted to make.
Mr. Katz had violated I.R.P.C. 4.2. Rather than recognizing the error, he attempted to
excuse it. This alone was sufficient basis for a District Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to
deny pro hac vice admission.
4.

Katz's Additional Actions are Factors a District Court Should Evaluate m
Determining Pro Hae Vice Admission.

While it is correct that I.R.P.C. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal) or I.R.P.C. 3.7 (lawyer as
witness) do not specifically address Katz's actions, when taken in connection with Mr. Katz's
refusal to acknowledge his violation of I.R.P.C. 4.2, such conduct provides additional reasons to
give a District Court pause in granting pro hac vice admission. Attorney Katz presented himself
as an expert witness to the Bankruptcy Judge who he knew would be the finder of fact. He did not
disclose at that time that Mr. Frantz had retained him to pursue a legal malpractice claim against
HTEH, an essential element of which was the very subject of the motion on which he was
testifying. The fact that the trial judge ultimately did not consider Katz's Affidavit is no excuse. It
is the belief that such conduct is acceptable that raises eyebrows.
Further, before the District Court was Mr. Katz's participation in the "probe"
disqualification motion. That conduct raises a serious question as to a violation of I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l)
or its federal equivalent. The record presented to Judge Mitchell revealed that this motion was
brought in Bankruptcy at the eleventh hour and required the Bankruptcy Cami to alter its trial
schedule to hold an evidentiary hearing. The hearing ultimately demonstrated that Mr. Frantz had
nothing more than his supposition of what had happened to support his claim of attorney-client
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relationship and possession of confidential materials. (R. Vol. I, p. 82, l. 23 - p. 83, l. 5) The
District Court would be well within its discretion to consider these acts and omissions of Mr. Katz,
in connection with his violation ofl.R.P.C. 4.2, in declining to grant admission pro hac vice.
5.

Plaintiff's Legal Authorities Do Not Infom1 the Court.

On appeal, as he did below, Frantz submits only two cases to support attorney Katz's pro
hac vice admission. Neither of the cases inform the Court. The first case, Sanders v. Russell, 401
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), is entirely inapplicable. (The Sanders case is found at R. Vol. II, pp. 370376.) That case presented the issue of" ... whether the petitioners had a federal right to retain
counsel of their choice in non-fee generating school segregation and civil rights cases in federal
court." Sanders, 401 F.2d at 244. At issue was a Mississippi rule which, as applied, operated to
unduly restrict litigant's choice of counsel in civil rights litigation. Further, the case specifically
provides, "this case does not involve the right to practice in state courts." The second case cited
by Frantz is Schlumberger Technologies v. Wvlie, 113 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1997). Although that
case addresses pro hac vice admissions, it reflects the standard for a federal district court operating
in the Eleventh Circuit, i.e., that a trial court lacks discretion in arriving at such a determination.
As such, it is contrary to Idaho practice and the majority rule. See, DiSabatino, Attorneys Right To
Appear Pro Hae Vice in State Court, 20 ALR 4th 855 (1983).
6.

Katz as a Witness.

The District Court believed that attorney Katz would, of necessity, become a trial witness.
Although perhaps not a "stand alone" basis for declining admission, when combined with the
history presented to the District Court of Katz's activities, it certainly would give a District Court
pause.

It is not difficult to envision circumstances developing where Mr. Frantz's case would be
prejudiced if he was unable to call Mr. Katz as a witness at trial. For example, Frantz's and Katz's
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plan to turn IIB against HTEH as a means of obtaining relief from Frantz's indebtedness is fair
game in attacking Frantz's credibility. Frantz could need some corroborative testimony to help
explain this credibility impacting testimony.
Considering the totality of the circumstances brought to the attention of the District Court,
the potential that this counsel may become a witness is an additional consideration in arriving at a
proper decision to deny admission pro hac vice.

E.

An Award of Attorney's Fees Under Either J.C. § 12-120(3) or I.C. § 12-121 Was
Appropriate.
The statute, I.C. § 12-120(3), Attorney's Fees in Civil Actions, provides that:
(3) In any civil action to recover on ... a contract relating to the purchase
or sale of ... services, and any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. The
tenn "party" is defined to mean any person ... corporation ....
Plaintiff recognizes that negligence in providing legal representation can qualify as a

"commercial transaction" and that the inquiry is whether the commercial transaction constituted
the gravamen of the lawsuit and was the basis on which a party was attempting to recover. See,
e.g., City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009) (fees allowed where attorney
advice caused losses arising out of construction contract). The sole basis for this appeal is Frantz's
contention that the gravamen of the dispute was not a commercial transaction. Plaintiff does not
contest the amount of fees awarded, nor does he contend the Defendant failed to appropriately
allege a commercia l transaction in its Amended Answer or that it failed to affirn1atively seek an
award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Plaintiff also apparently agrees that fees are awardable even
where a commercia l transaction is not established by trial. See Garner v. Povev, 151 Idaho 462,
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469-70, 259 P.3d 608, 615-16 (2011). There is no dispute that the indebtedness being pursued by
HTEH on behalf of IIB was a commercial obligation and under commercial guaranties of the
indebtedness owed by IIB to which Frantz held a majority interest. See In re Frantz, 2015 W.L.
1778068, at *1, fn. 41, 44.
Plaintiff cites Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,890 P.2d 714 (1995), as well as Kelly v.
Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,631,90 3 P.2d 1321, 1328 (1995), in support of his "gravamen"
position. However, neither of those cases are attorney malpractice cases, nor are either of them
based on a commercial transaction. Spence v. Howell is a fraud case. Although the fraud occurred
in a commercial setting, the gravamen of the case was misrepresentation and fraud. Spence, 126
Idaho at 775-76. The Kellv case involved a straightforward winding up of partnership affairs
pursuant to statute. Although the partnership was involved in commercial transactions, the purpose
of the suit, i.e. winding up the partnership affairs, was the basis for the Court's decision. Kelly,
127 Idaho at 631.
Spence has likely been overruled, sub silentio. In Blimka v. My Web Wholesalers. LLC,
143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007), the court held:
From time to time the court has denied fees under I.C. §12-120(3) on the
commercial transaction ground either because the claims sounded in tort or
because no contract was involved. The commercial transaction ground in
I.C. §12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction
that involves tortious conduct (cites omitted) or does it require that there be
a contract. Any previous holdings to the contrary are overruled.
As Blimka sustained damages as a result of a commercial transaction, he was entitled to fees,
despite the fact that his claim was asserted as fraud.
Fmiher, Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to Kelly by contending that his suit is an
effort to enforce a statutory scheme. It is nothing of the sort. First, the Idaho Rules of Professional
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Conduct do not constitute a "statutory scheme. Further, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
do not form the basis for causes of action. The cases cited are not dispositive.
Instead, the gravamen of the instant action is Frantz's claim that HTEH's use of
confidential information has prevented him from escaping his commercial indebtedness to IIB,
and the goal of the suit is to obtain a means to exhaust that indebtedness. Further, the gravamen of
the suit is the alleged failure of Clark to meet his duties as an attorney under his contract of services
and HTEH's failure of a continuing duty thereunder. Viewed as a whole then, the gravamen of
Frantz's suit is a commercial transaction and fees were appropriately awardable under l.C. § 12120(3).
Turning to I.C. § 12-121, that statute, when read in connection with I.R.C.P. 54(a)(l),
allows fees where the case has been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Frantz brought his suit after a two-day evidentiary hearing had demonstrated that he lacked the
evidence to prove an attorney-client relationship with Merlyn Clark, or to prove that Merlyn Clark
was provided with any confidential information. The Court denied his disqualification motion and
HTEH was continuing to represent IIB pursuant to that ruling at the time this action was brought.
Thus there is no basis for Frantz contending that he had a good faith claim, well founded in law
and fact, at the time he commenced this action against HTEH.
Frantz supports his objection by contending that the District Cami's basis for dismissing
the action is inconsistent with an award of fees. He contends that the District Court found that
claim preclusion and issue preclusion "do not apply because there was not and will not be a final
judgment on the merits." Brief of Appellant p. 24-25, but then found the suit frivolous because of
the earlier suit. However, that is not what the Court held.
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On the contrary, what the Court found was that because the adversary proceeding remained
pending, claim preclusion and issue preclusion did not apply, m. (R. Vol. II, pp. 445-449) Indeed,
in discussing claim preclusion, the Court specifically stated:
In the near future there may be a final judgment in the bankruptcy action.
At that time this state court action will be barred based on the additional
ground of claim preclusion.
(R. Vol. II, p. 446)
Frantz cannot contend that his suit was pursued in good faith. The award of attorney's fees
pursuant to LC. § 12-121 was appropriate.

F.

Defendant Seeks Attorney's Fees On Appeal.
Pursuant to I.A.R. 3 5( 5) and I.A.R. 41 defendant requests attorney's fees on appeal. An

award of attorney's fees on Appeal may be granted under those rules to the prevailing party. Excel
Leasing Co v. Christiansen 115 Idaho 708, 712, 769 P.2d 585,589 (App. 1989). Fees are awardable
pursuant to LC.§ 12-121. Such an award is appropriate when the Supreme Court is left with the
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Id. An appeal may be deemed frivolous, and attorney's fees awarded, for failure to properly comply
with I.A.R. 35(5)(6) (regarding the extent of legal argument and citation to authorities and the
record). Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 61, 244 P.3d 197, 205 (2010). In particular an award
will be made if an appeal does no more than simply invite the Appellate Court to second guess a
trial court on conflicting evidence, or, on review of discretionary decisions, no challenge is
presented with regard to the Trial Court's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445,
449, 797 P.2d 153, 157 (App. 1990).

BRIEF OF RESPONDE NT HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP - 46

IV. CONCLUSION
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case on the basis of judicial
estoppel or, alternatively on the basis of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). The Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to admit attorney Katz pro hac vice in light of the unexplained evidence of
misconduct. Finally, the award of attorney's fees was proper under either I.C. § 12-120(3) or LC.
§ 12-121 as set for above. Defendant requests that the District Court decision be affirmed in all
respects.
DATED this

Jlr1 day of February, 2016.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

;1_.__--____

By:_~4"--""1.-::_C.
__
C. Riseborough
Kttorneys for Respondent

J9fui
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ADDENDUM
JUDICIALLY NOTICED DOCUMENTS
Bankruptcy Documents (BR-)
No. 11-21337-TLM

NO.

DATE

BR 193

04/23/2013

BR421

02/27/2015

Motion to.~D~is-,m-iss or Reconvert

BR425

02/27/2015

Motion for Relief from Stay

BR484

04/16/2015

Decision on Motions: Dismiss, Reconvert, Stay Relief

BR509

05/13/2015

Motion to Allow Waiver of Discharge

DESCRIPTION
Order Granting Stipulated Motion to Convert Case to
I Chapter 7

516

Adversary Proceeding Documents (AP-)
No. 13-07024-TLM

DOCKET NO.

DATE

AP 117

06/02/2015

HTEH Motion for Sanctions

AP 135

09/14/2015

Order Granting Motion for Sanctions in Part

AP 136

09/14/2015

Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding as Moot

09/14/2015

Transcript of Oral Ruling re: Sanctions

AP 143

09/25/2015

Notice of Appeal of Sanctions Motion

AP150

10/09/2015

Statement of Issues on Appeal

AP 142, 142-1

I

DESCRIPTION

BR 193

L,d::,t: LL-.::'..l,::i,.:i /- I LIVI

UOC l::Jj

Hied 04/23/13
Document
Page 1

STATES

:.6:47:33

COl;"RT

(Boise)
Lri Re:

Iv1A.c~TIN D. FRANTZ and C{NTHL-\ lvL
FRA....NTZ,
Debtor.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CaseNo.11-21337-TU..1
Chapter 11

ORDER A.PPROVING STIPULATED MOTION TO COI'{
VERT CASE
Upon consideration of the A.mended Notice of Stipulated 1vfotio
n to Conve1i Case filed
matter between Martin D. Frar1tz and Cynthia lvi. Frantz, the
Debtors herein,
I11dependent Bank on March 29,
as set

Idaho

13, ("Stipulation") [Docket No. 187]; and no objection filed

in the Statement of No Objection to Stipulated :Motion to Conve
1i Case filed on April

23, 2013 [Docket No. 192), and after considering the record
herein, and for good cause shmvn,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Tl:-LA.T, the Stipulated Motion to Conve
1i Case is approved
iI1

accordance ·with the terms and attachments set forth therein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDER,

this Order is effective innnediately upon entry.

//end of text//

DATED: April 23,

13

S. BA.NKJU}PTCY

BR421

Case 11-21337-TLM

Doc 421

Filed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 16:08:59
Document
Page 1
5

STEPHEN B. McCREA
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1501
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
(208) 666-2594 I FAX (208) 664-4370
email: sbmccrea@cda.twcbc.com
---rdano StateS-arNo.16S4- ---- - - - ~ - - ----- ---

Desc Main

~

Attorney for Debtors
U1'HTEDSTATESBANKRUPTCYCOURT
DISTRJCT OF IDAHO
IN THE lv1ATTER OF:
Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz,
Debtors.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 11-21337-TLM
Chapter 7

)

MOTION TO DIS1\TISS OR RECOi{VERT TO CHAPTER 11
STEPHEN B. McCREA, one of the attorneys for the above named debtors, moves this court
an order dismissing proceedings in the above entitled matter or, in the alternative, reconverting
the case to a Chapter 11 of the Code instead of Chapter 7.
This motion is made pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §706(a) and (b).
The grounds for this motion are that the debtors want to pay all their creditors. They desire
to continue to litigate their claim against Idaho Independent Bank. Dismissal, or conversion ofthis
case to Chapter 11, is the bes\,1 a to accomplish this goal.
1

Dated thiC)-=?aay
o
--

I

Attorney for Debtors

MOTION TO DlSMISS OR RECONVERT TO CHAPTER l I: P,I\GE !

BR425

11-21337-TLM

Doc 425

Filed 02/27/15 Entered
Document
Page 1 of

Desc Main

Jonafao:1 Frantz
FR.A..c'\JTZ LAW, PLLC
. Lic'1coln St Suite
Idaho 854
E::-nail: jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for :1\fartin and Cynthia Frantz.
uNlTED STATES BA,\1<:RUPTCY C01)RT
DISTRICT OFIDARO
(Coeur d'Alene)

In re:
Case "N"o. 11-21337-TLM

:1\1ARTIN D. FR.A....l'\JTZ
FRANTZ,

CYNTHL.\ :1\1.
Chapter 7

:VIOTION FOR RELIEF FR0:'.\1 STAY
Ma1iin and

Debtors, by and through their attorney of record, Jonathon

Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, hereby mo-ve the Comi for relief from the automatic stay pursuant
to

11 U.S.C. §362(d)(l), for the purpose of dete1mining the amount, if any, the Frantzes mve

putative creditor Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB"). The Frantzes do not seek stay relief on
counterclaim litigation or third paiiy litigation, but merely their defenses and affinmtive
defenses to IIB' s complaint i11 Kootenai County Case No. CVI 0-6088. This motion is made
based upon the follmving:
Background
Prior to the Frantzes filing
for a

on July 19, 2010,
m

filed litigation against tte

District Comi, czse ;10. CVl0-6088.

Case 11-21337-TLM

Doc 425

f=i.\ed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 17:38:28
l)ocume nt
Page 2 of 11

Desc

From that time, until October 17, 2011, when the debtors filed for ban..la:uptcy protection, the
extensive

cost the Frantzes more than Sl00,000 in
ill

Frantzes continued 'Nith negotiatio:1s and mediation with IIB. Hmvever, on August 23, 2013,
IIB
filed an adversarv action mrainst the Frantzes seeking: the nondischarg:eabilitv of their nut2.tive
.;

._,

._,

._.,

.;

.l.

court has yet adjudicated IIB' s claim. However, at triis point, the debtors have
deter111i11ed that settlen,ent ·with IIB "no 10112:er 2.nnears
tenable." 1
r
A

._.

any continui..11g

..l

ofresolution, the Frantzes now vvish to challenge IIB's assertion that the Frantzes are liable for
breach

contract. Since IIB and the Frantz es have a!Jeady 1) spent hundreds of thousands of

dollars in litigation over th2.t issue in the state com1, 2) litigated that issue for more than a year
in
3) 2.re close to a final tiial resolution in. the state com1 litigation (t1ial date), the

state

reEef to resolve this question of pure, state la1v L."1

st2.te cou11

it

ARGU:\1ENT
11 USCS §362(d)(l) allows stay relief for cause. While "cause" is not defined, "as

Congress has observed, the interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical
determination oflitigation

the pai1ies is a fundamental bas:s for granting stay relief. .. "

re

Arundotech, LLC, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1705, 13, 2009 VlL 7809008 (9th Cir. BAP :'.\fay
4,

2009). "[I]t will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings to continue in their place
ongm,

to the

710

p2.11ies to their chosen forum

estate would result,

order to leave the

to relief the bankruptcy from many duties that may be handled

}vfa11in Frantz in

of Discharge

\10TI0N

401),p.3 ,ln.12-1 3.

RELIEF FROM STAY- 2

11-21337-TLM

Doc 425

elsewbere." Id.; see

Filed 02/27/15 Entered
Document
Page 3 of 11

re

4705285 (Banl::r. D.

:38:28

Ordinance & Equip.

Desc

Bankr. LEXIS 3038, 5,

17, 2005).

are t'ivelve non-exclusive

CoUit

:ised to

for r·elief of stay:
1. \\!nether :he reliehvill result ii1 a pa1tial or complete resolut:on of the issues;
2. The lack of any connection with or interference v,ith the bankruptcy
3. \\!nether the foreign proceedfr1g involves the debtor as a fid1:ciary;
4. Whether a specialized tribunal has been established to hear the pa1ticular cause
of action and \Vhether that t1ibun2.l has the expe1tise to hear such cases;
5. \Vbether the debtor's ii1surance carrier has assumed full financial
for defending the litigation;
6. Vlhether the action essentially invoi-ves third panies, and the debtor functions
only as a bailee or conduit for the goods or proceeds question;
7. Vlhether the litigation in another fornm would prejudice the interests
creditors, the creditors' committee and other interested parties;
8. Whether the judgment claim arising from the foreign action is subject to
equitable subordination under Section 510(c).
9. \Vhether movant's success
foreign proceeding ·would result ii'1 a
avoidable by the debtor under Section 522(f)
10.
interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and vvc,.,vui.ivu,
determination litigation for the parties;
11. "\Vhether the foreign proceedings have progress[ ed] to the point where the
paities are prepared for trial, and
12. The impact of the stay on the parties and the "balance of hurt. 11

In re Tactical Ordinance & Equip. Co1p., supra. 6-7. "Not all factors will be relevant and some
factors may 1veigh heavier in a comt's determination than others."
The only factors relevant to the present inquiry are nw.ubers 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, and 12.

·will be briefly addressed in tum. Factor No. 1: stay relief to allow the Frantzes to defend
against IIB 's allegations
1s

breach of contract ·will reso]ye the issue of liability completely as

sole theory of liability aileged. Factor No. 2: allowing the stay will not intern1pt or
bankruptcy comt as there is not yet any
on the matter

liability.

MOTION

is a

to

a11y

3
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Doc 425

Filed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/1517:38:28
Document
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Desc Main

the Frantzes may mYe is dischargeable, that litigation ,vill proceed unaffected unless
Frantzes as

state court adjudges

until

thereunder to IIB. 2 Factor No. 7: no

no

to

to

to

against IIB's state comi lav;suit. Factor No. 10: judicial economy and the concern for
econoElical detenr.tination of litigation weights

fcsor of granting

the Frantz es and IIB have already spent hundreds of thousands

dollars in the course of the

state comi litigation. To require the paiiies to duplicate those costs again would be a
burden to both paiiies. Factor No. 11: at the ti.me the Frantzes filed for ban..lz:ruptcy, the parties
v.-ere fifteen months into their state comi litigation. They were also only five months a'Nay
trial. As a result, this factor ,veighs L.'1 the Frantzes favor. Factor No. 12: the pa1iies \Yill not be
hmi by the relief of stay. Neither pa;iy has yet spent resources on litigating the issue ofliability
breach

contract in

bankruptcy comi. Therefore, lifting the

the lin1ited

defending against IIB' s claim should be granted.
Jurisdiction
'iVhile Bankruptcy Rule 3007 sets forth a process of objecting to the allowance of a claim,
the clain1s litigation process is separated into two different areas for the purposes of detennining
a Comi's jurisdiction: 1) detenniriing the allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate 3 ,

2

Frantzes
it curious that IIB
not already sought to adjudicate the
amount it claims is O\\'ed by the Frantzes. The Frantzes have consistently deJ1jed any liability to
IIB under the guarantees. It ·would seem to make sense to adjudicate
potential liability
to seeking a determination that its claim is not subject to discharge.
3
28 USCS §157(b)(2)(B): "Core proceedings include ... allowance or
the estate."
ciaims

MOTION FOR

4

11--21337-TLM

and

Doc 425

Filed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 17:38:28
Document
Page 5 of 11

detem1i.Tu1g the arD.ount of the claiJ.114 . See
. 1990)

11

In re

1334 supports

st2.te

912 F.

1162,

of
'
rne

COUli

Desc Ma:n

to
stat:s

claim to the b2.nkruptcy court.
of claims·
putative claimant complied

answering the question of

or not a

the ban..1<.ruptcy rules in filing a claim properly under the

-

bad(niDtcv
. code and rnles. Detemun.imr the amount of the claim

a look at

~

state 1a·N to determine if the putafrve creditor is really mved ·what is claimed. Tlus

1S

exemplified by the jurisdictional statutes.
28 USCS §1334(a) directs that " ... the district courts shall have original and exclusiYe
all cases under ti tie 11" (emphasis added). §l 334(b) then states, "the district
courts

have original but not exclusiYe jurisdiction of

title 11, or arising

or related to cases under title 1

refers to the filing of cases under

11,

civil proceedings 2.rising

(emphasis added). "Arising under"
Bankruptcy Code.

re

0

B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). "Arising in" has been defined as "proceedings that ·would
not exist outside of bankruptcy ... " Id. ( citing In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1193
2005). '·Related to" is detennined by

Cir.

at whether the outcome of the proceeding

conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." Id. at 638
(referencing the "Pacor Test"). Thus, the district courts (and by reference the bankruptcy comis)
4

See In re
119 B.R. 763, 769 n.12 (Bankr. E.D.
1990): "Claims litigation is,
jurisdictionally, a hybrid. The state-law rigl1t underlyi...11g a clain1 can, if the auto~11atic stay is
lifted, be dete1mined in state comi ... The actual claim, once a proof of claim is filed, i...nYokes
special bankruptcy rnles and procedures that are created by the Bank.rnptcy Code and
are a
matter of exclusive federal
5
Citing
's, 81 B.?,__. 422,427
S
1 7).

'.vfOTION FOR

5

11-21337-TLM

Doc 425

Filed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 17:38:28
Document
Page 6 of 11

Desc Main

only possess original, not exclusiYe, jurisdiction to hear matters "arising in" and "related to"
title 11.

cases

a

Code is a

matter that "arises under" title 11. Therefore district comis (and by reference the bankruptcy
-·

comis) have exclusive jmisdiction to decide whether a claim ,Yas properly filed. However,
dete1111ination of the arnot:.nt of a claim falls within the ambit
exist outside

a ban..1.c.ruptcy. As a result,

"related to" because the amount

dis"'.:rict court is not wsted ·with

exclusivejruisdictio n to decide such matters. 6 Therefore, either a dist1ict comi (ban..1.crnptcy
comi) QI a state comi has the jurisdiction to hear and detemune the amount of the claim.
Abstention
"Wbere a bankruptcy comi may abstain
state comt

involving

cause

exists for listing the

as to the state

, 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cu:. 1990).

re

COUli

same

deciding issues in fa,,or of an imminent

Despite both the dist1ict comi and the state court having authority, 28 uSCS §1334(c)
provides for mandatory and permissive abstention by the federal comts. Such motions are
typically brought by putatiYe creditors when seeking to finish state comi litigation establishing
their claim. Still,

there is no motion

abstention before the Cami, if the stay relief is

denied, the Frantzes ·will initiate an adversary proceeding challenging the liability IIB alleges is
mved by the Frantz es. Then,

will file a motion for abstention. In order to save the paiiies

and the Cami time and eff01t, if :he Cami were to abstain from the Frantzes' adYersary

6

In re

119 B.R. 763,769 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990): "The sole
111

FOR

for federal
oYer claims, is not exclusiYe

6

Case 11-21337--TUJI

Doc 425

proceedii1g, the

Filed 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 17:38:28
Document
Page 7 of 11

Desc

grnnt the stay relief spaiing the parties from having to
of fili..11g an adversary proceeding

for a

§1334(c)(2) states that "in a proceeding based upon a State lmv claiiu or State la\v cause
action, related to a case under title 11 but not 2.risii-ig under title 11 or aiising in a case
title 11,

respect to ·which an action could not have been cormnenced in a court of the United

States absent

under tr.J.s section. the district coun rand therefore the bank::nmtcy
•

court] shall

C

'

from bearing such proceeding if an action is comnlenced, and can be

adjudicated, in a State forum

appropriate jurisdiction." The requirements for mandatory

abstention are:
l) a timely motion by the party seeking abstention; 2) the action involves purely
state
questions; 3) the action is 'related to a case under title 11;' 4) there is no

'-"·'"'·"--""' federal jurisdiction over the 2.ction absent the petition under title 11;
. con1Inence._..
r1 Ln
. state com1; 6) tn.e
' state cou11 action
. may timely
1s
and a state fornm of appropriate jmisdiction exists.

(citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(c)(2)). \Vhile all seven elements are necessary, the "two major
elements" for mandatory abstention are: "l) the action has been commenced in state court and 2)
action can be timely adjudicated in state court." In re Bliss Vailey

Inc., 1990 B

LEXIS 1912 (Banl:r. D. Idaho 1990).

In this pai1icular case, all of the elements are met.

Frantzes will not belabor the

obvious facts.
II
II

FOR RELIEF FR01\1
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11-21337-

Doc 425

Filed 02/27/15
Document
Page 8 of 11

17:38:28

Desc Main

The Current Dischargeability Litigation
IIB

likely bring up ,he
COUli.

that the parties are cunemly

litigation in

have :r.o bearing on the

OYer

or not

IIB 's underlying claim for breach of contract/guarantees has merit The cunent adversary
pi·oceeding bem'een

paiiies is to reso]Ye \vhetber or not IIB' s putative claim is discbargeable

or not. 7 That is to say, the cunent litigation has nothing to do 1vith ·whether or not

Frantzes

has had nearly five years to seek such resolution. IIB chose not to move for relief of stay
fi:rish the state comi proceeding despite how close the parties \'i'ere to trial. Instead, IIB chose to
litigate the issue of dischargeability before finalizi.c1g its claim in the state court action or even
incorporating it into its adversary proceeding 8. IIB cannot now complain that the Frantzes seek
to finalize

dispute.

AJl this ti.cue, the Frantzes have hoped to be able to resolve their dispute 1vith IIB.
as stated above, that no longer appears tenable. It is trne

the claims asserted

IIB in case no. 13-07024 do request certain amounts, but that is only because, under §523,
nondischargeability is only to the extent of the damages alleged. IIB 's complaint is not for a
7

The title of the complaint is: "Complaint
Determination ofNondischargeabl e Debt
to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2), (a)(6)." The first count is: "Detennination that Debt is
Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A) (Ma1iin Frantz)" see 13-07024 Dkt. 1
22. The second count is: "Detennination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 US.C.
§523(a)(2)(A) (Mmiin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at p. 23. The third count is
"Deten11ination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A)
Frantz) see Id. at p. 24. The fourth count
"Determination that Debt is
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(B) (Mmiin and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at 26. The fifth and
final count is: "Detennination that Debt is Nondischargeable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
(a)(6)
(Maiiin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz)" see Id. at 27.
8
Had IIB done so,
Frantzes 'l',·ould ha\·e
to haYe
matter
in st2te
COUli.

8

11-21337-TLM
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Document
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Doc

blan..~et denial of discharge under

7 (which

Desc !viain

not require a finding of da:.·mges for the

' ·ht
•· ).
unner
L1 a, seCLlOn

it is an

CO~CLuSIO N
Therefore, the Debtors rnotion for stay relief, allo"wing them to adjudicate their state
and affir:112.frs:e defenses against IIB' s claim should be granted because the parties
already spent excessive amounts

money on discovery and mediation i..11 the state court case,

parties v;ere neari..1g trial dates and dates

dispositive motions, a:J.d

of

claims/defenses/affim1afr,-e defenses in Kootenai County Case No. CVl 0-6088 are entirely state
causes of action

\Yould best be adjudged by state comi judges.

RULE 4001.2 l\'OTICE
to

.2 of

Local Bankruptcy Rules,

to Fed. R. Bankr. ?.

9006, any paiiy in interest opposing the motion must file and sen-e an objection thereto not later
seventeen days after the date of serYice of the motion. The obj

shall specifically

identify those matters contaii1ed in the motion that are at issue and any other basis for opposition
to the motion. Absent the filing: of a timelv objection, the court mav 2.rant the relief sou2.ht
vdthout a hearing:, As set fo1ih in Rule 4001.2(d)(3), if an objection is filed to this relief
motion, the objection must be served upon the movant and upon all paiiies receiving service of
the motion. In accordance with Rule 4001.2(e)(l), a paiiy opposing a n1otion shall contact
comt's calendar clerk to schedule a preliminary hearing. At the time of filing the objection to a
motion, the objecting paiiy shall file and sen'e notice of such hearing.

:'.\10TI0N
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S.C.

(Ci)"\

from the stay of any act agai.ri.st property of the estate under subsection (a)
of this
section, such stay is tern1inated ·with respect to the party in interest making
such
request, unJess the court, after notice a::1d hearing, orders such stay continu
ed in
effect pendii1g the conclusion of, or as a result of, a fmal heari21g and
dete1111i11ation under subsection (d) of ti\is section.

DATED this 27'J:i Day

February, 2015.
FRA..1'\TTZ LAW, PLLC

J
Attorney for Debtors

Certificate of Electronic Filing
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27ili day of February, 2015, I electronically
filed the
foregoing Motion for Relief from Stay with the Clerk of the Court using
ClA/ECF system
sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the follmving persons:
David Eash

deash@e1vin2:anderson.com

David P. Gardner

trnsteeui}\vinstoncashatt. com

Nevmrnn
\V. Dyer ,rnrv.w.dver@usdoi 2.0v

J

10

L,a::oe 1...L-L. L.:5-51 -1

uv1

uoc .q.::::::i

Kelly Greene 1\1cCow1ell
E, Olsen

Hierj 02/27/15 Entered 02/27/15 17:38:28
Docu ment
Page
of 11
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li ti Q:ation@ ci Yenspursl ev corn

ecfid@rcflesi:al.com

l\1ichael J. Paukert

mpaukert02nt-1aw.com

Stephen B. :'.\1cCrea

mccreaecfla)cda.twcbc.con1

US. Trustee
Sheila R. Schv,·ager

ssdr;vaQ:er(a)hawle,iroxe11 com
Jonathon Frantz

I FURTHER CERTIFY that on this 27:h day of February, 2015,
I mailed the forgoing
document to

folluwing non-Cl\1/ECF Registered Participants

U.S. Mail:

Lyons
Resolve

PO Box 598
Hayden, Idaho 83835
Recovery Management Systems Corporation
For Capital Recovery
25 SE 2nd Ave., Suite 1120
~v1iami, FL 33131
Joe Dobson
Cold·well Banker Schneidmiller Realty
1924 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Thomas Development Company
413 W. Idaho St.
Suite 200
Boise, Idaho 83702
/s/
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UNITED STATES BAi"KRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
INRE

)
-.)

l\LIBTIN D. FRA.l"\TTZ,
CYNTHIA. l\I. FRA.1"\'TZ,

)
)
)

Debtor.

_Case. No.Jl-21337-TLl\1
Chapt er 7

)
)

l\1EMORA.1~DTJI\1 OF DECISION ON
DEBTORS' :MOTION TO DISMISS OR RECONVERT,
A.i'\D DEBTORS' 1\IOTION FOR RELIEF FROl\1 STAY
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 1
The
the

111

relevant to the pending matters are taken from the record
chapter 72 case and from the hearing on March 30-31, 2015 .3

Thi-ee and a half years ago, in October 2011, lvfa1iin and Cynthia Frantz

1

This Decision constitutes ,he Court's findings and conclusions. Rules 7052,
9014.

2

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to statutory provisions are to the Ban.la-up
tcy
11 U.S. Code,§§ 101-153 2, and citations to the "Rules" are to the Federal Rdes
of
Bankrup tcy Procedure.
3

As expressly stated at that hearing, the Court takes judicial notice of its files
and
under Fed. R. Evid. 201. Wni1e generally
notice of-what was filed, and
does
not mean the contents of those filings necessarily ha Ye evidentiary ,,,eight, see
Credit Alliance
Cmp. v.
Inc. (In re Blume1), 95 B.R. 143, 146-47 (9th Cir. BAP 1
debtor's verified
schedules and statements, ·when offered agaiLst the debtor, haYe
effect under Fed. R. Evid. 801
In re Vee Vinlmee, 336 B.R. 437,449 (9th Cir.
:>1,o,-a
(In re Jordan), 392 B.R.
444 n.32
D. Idaho
0 ,,
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4

("Debtors" ) filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 commencing this case.
/I

Their statement of financial affairs ("SOFA")

~

a

l Ostate court

D~~

B

It is clear that IIB is Debtors' single largest creditor. IIB 's claim arises from
Debtors' unseci..:red guarar:ties of an IIB loan
majority interest. At the time
pending

an entity in 'Nhich Debtors held a

bankruptcy filing the lav;suit had been

over a year. W11ile discovery had commenced and mediation

been attempted, no motions for sun1111a11 judgment had been heard in that suit,
no depositions had been taken. Testimony indicated Debtors filed

barL'k.ruptcy

tbe day before Maiiin Frantz' deposition \Vas scheduled to occur.
March 2012, on Debtors' and IIB 's joint motion, the Comi appointed
Ford Elsaesser, an experienced bankruptcy practitioner and a chapter 7 trustee, as
a "mediator" in the chapter 11.

Comi subsequently approved the employment

of Maggie Lyons and her business, Resolve Financial Group ("Resolve"), to
analyze Debtors' financial activities and transactions. Doc. Nos. 82, 100. 5
application to employ ResolYe asse1ied that Elsaesser believed no medi2:tion

4

Debtors filed a
under § 302, and their schedules indicate their assets are
and
The
of reference, v,:ill at times refer to
in describing
and events
Frantz did not testify at the 1v1arch 2015 hearing and several of the documents refer solely to
Frantz.
to as "Doc. No." and those filed
Adv. No. 1
are

the related
referred to as "Adv. Doc. No."

OF
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successfully conclude until a financial professional thoroughly evaluated, analyze
d
and reported on "Debto rs' transfers, fina.1ces, assets, liabilities, and
Doc. No. 82 at 2.

"report" had been provided to him, Debtors, IIB and the United States Trustee
("UST") on January 10, 2013, 6 and that Debtors and IIB had agreed to a 1Y1edia
tion
session to occur in I\1arch 2013. On March 29, 2013, however, Debtors and IIB
filed aJ ·

for conversion of the case to chapter 7. Doc. Nos. 185, 187.

The case \Vas conven ed to a liquidation case under chapter 7 on Ap1il 23, 2013.
Doc. No. 193.
IIB

an adversary complaint on August 23, 2013, alleging causes of

action under§ § 523(a)(2) and (a)(6). Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM. 7 IIB sought
both
a judgm ent

damages (in an amount not exceeding the full obligations due

under the "Eagle Ridge Loan," the "Tv-1in Lakes Construction Loan" and the
"Line
of Credit" as described therein) and a ruling that such damages, plus interest,

6

A copy of the report ,vas marked at the :\farch 30 hearing as Ex. 212 but never offered.
However, its contents were referred to by Mi1iin Frantz in responding to question
s from his own
counsel, and in cross examination, and later referred to by the chapter 7 trustee,
David Gardiler
("Truste e"), in
The Comi therefore allowed questioning of witnesses that related
to the existenc e of the report and their actions taken in response, com1ection
or regard to it, but it
is not conside red as evidence establishi11g the conclusions 2.sserted therein.
the

Rule

-

")

.)
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attorneys' fees and costs, were nondischargeable. Adv. Doc. No. 1. 8
In late September 2013, Debtors moved for an order requiring
"counterclaim" thev., allegedly
~

against IIB related to

matters

asserted in or--------underly--------ing the--adversar
y proceeding. 9 After Trustee objected,
-------·--~ ~--,.-------~~--

-- -----~~- ----

·-

Debtors 1vithdre\v their abandonment request shortly before a scheduled
evidentiary hearing on that matter.
As noted, administration of

7 case commenced in .April 2013.

After selling a number of personal property assets, Trustee sought turnover of
Debtors' real property in Scottsdale, A.Iizona. Ultimately, after months of
litigation, Trustee v,1as granted authmity to sell this prope1iy. The disputes
request, and Debtors' several alternative litigation strategies in
objecting to Trustee's request and attempting to gain control of the Arizona
property, \Vere described in detail in the Court's oral rnling approving sale and in a
February 2015 decision denying Debtors' request for a stay pending appeal. Doc.

8

Debtors have argued that the adversary proceedin g only seeks a declaration of
nondisch argeabilit y, and does not seek adjudicat ion or liquidatio n of the debt to IIB.
That
assertion is belied by the contents and prayer of the complaint, which seek a detennina
tion of the
amount of nondisch argeable debt. The total amount of IIB 's alleged debt is over $6.4
million.
See Claim No. 6-1. The Court also notes that IIB' s claim, filed on January 30, 2012, has
never
bee1:1 objected to and is thus alfowed, see§§ 501,502, and
facie evidentia ry
z,s to
validity and
see Rule 3001 (f).
9

This motion, Doc. No. 255, asserted that such a counterclaim against IIB had been
asserted in state court litigation, and that Debtors had disclosed it on February and Septembe
r
2013 amendrr:ents of schedule B. This is an
reference to Ex. 204 at 5 and Ex. 206 4,
both of which
list an
claii:1 in an "unk.nown" amount. Debtors'
on
this motion
a
1 million countercl aim. Doc. No. 265.

I
I

11

i
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'

No. 414. 10 In addition, it \Vas established at the March 30 hearing that Debtors
caused several
Com1

to be filed

record on

The first such filing Yvas ren:oved

second was removed after the Court entered an order
'Nas subsequently followed, hmve'i·er, with the filing

Trustee's protests. The
its removal.
a third, post-sale closing,

lis pendens.
On February 27, 2015, just tbJee days after

Court denied their

for a stay pending appeal, and ,vith rescheduled trial in the IIB adversaiy looming
11

in May, Debtors filed a Motion to Dismiss or Reconve1t to Chapter 11, Doc. No.
421 (the "Dismissal;Reconversion Motion"). Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion
?\fotion is terse,

simply states: "The grounds for this motion are that the

debtors ,vant to pay all their creditors. Ibey desire to continue to litigate their
claim against Idaho Indeper:dent Banlr. Dismissal, or conversion of this case to
Chapter 11, is the best way to accomplish this goal." The Dismssal/Reconversion
Motion was served on all creditors. Id. at 2-5. 12

10

The specific findings and conclusions in such rulings are incorporated by this
reference and ·without repetition.
11

Trial had been set to commence on December 1, 2014. Debtors attempted in several
ways to delay commencement of the trial, including
to continue and motions to
disquali:f; IIB 's counsel and seYeral of IIB 's disclosed witnesses. The Court
denied all
such :::eq-uests,
the hearings on the latter did delay the trial date, which is now set for
26, 2015. See Adv. Doc. Nos. 51 (minute entry denying motion to continue), 71 (minute
105
of 12/10/14 oralniling).
12

Debtors also fi]ed a brief in

of the

:t\fotio,1 and sen ed
.)

5
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11

A.n bo'lr and a half after filing their Dismissal/Reconversion Motion,
Debtors filed a Motion for Relief

Stay, Doc. No. 425

Stay Relief Motion seeks

"Stay Relief

purpose of detem1ining

Independent Ban_k[.]"
_
Debtors specifically disclaim any desire to pursue their
counterclaim, and only seek relief to assert "their defenses and affimrntive
defenses" to IIB 's claim. 13
At a bearing on March 3, the Court identified a lvfarch 30 hearing date
Debtors' t\vo motions and set pre-hearing evidentiai7 disclosure deadlines. Under
Rule 2002(a)(4), a hea1ing on dismissal or conversion of a chapter 7 case (\vith
not relevant here) requires 21 days' notice to all creditors 2.nd parties
interest. The date selected by the Court for hearing allowed Debtors to issue a
of heaiing on proper notice. Debtors never provided a notice of hearing to
creditors. Neve1iheless, the Dismissal/Reconversion Motion and the Stay Relief
Motion came on for hearing on lvfarch 30, 2015. The Comi has considered all the

12

( ... contirmed)
it on creditors and

in interest. See Doc. No. 422 at 5, 9~11.

13

For additional context, just prior to these two motions, on February 12, 2015,
filed a "waiver of discharge" and a motion to approve th2t waiver. Doc. Nos. 397,
398. The
expressly excluded the debt to IIB and w2s thus a
waiwr. The Co1.:.1i, 2t
on :!\farch 3, found that§
0)
for
a complete, not a selective or
and it denied Debtors' motion. See Kart:-.man v. Kleinn:ann (171 re
2010 \VL 1641085
. 21, 2010).
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I

testimony presented 14 and the documentary evidence admitted.
In many ,,:vays,

111otions could be resolved on

basis

tl1e

over the course of the two day hearing, the parties specifically raised
and established a number of facts. some of v,;hich the Couii highlights belO\v.

- -

.

I.
Debtors made se1ial amendments to their schedules and statements
throughout the case. The clear weight of the evidence \Vas that all such
amendments ,vere t1iggered by Debtors' undisclosed or inadequately explained
assets and transactions, as identified in the Resolve repo1i, or \Vere in response to
questions and objections raised by creditors, the UST and Trnstee. In sbo1i,
Debtors' amendments 1vere not independently initiated or proactive.
W11en such issues came to light, Frantz said he \vould advise his attomeys 15

-

needed to be changed.. added or deleted. He \Vould later receive signature
~

pages to sign regarding the amendments, but he did not necessarily review the
amendments or verify their accuracy \vhen executing the ve1ifications.

IL
In October 2010, approximately a year before the baIL1<:ruptcy filing
several months after the stmi

14

their
15

the IIB state court suit, Maiiin Frantz settled a

The Court }:as also considered the credibility of all wi'.nesses and the ,veight to be
whether
in this Decisio:1 or not.
Debtors have had fou
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promiss01y note in the face amount of Sl,050,000 01ved to Debtors by their son,
Frantz,

his ·Ni:e, :'.\'1elissa.

disclosed as a "sale"

a note

222.

Tyson

6

On the 01iginal SOFA, this was

equivalent interest in

Frantz

ordinarv course of business." Ex. 202 at 21. Testimony. indicated it ,vas a
~

settlement of the obligation mved to Debtors, not a sale of the note. 17 Debtors later
"explained" to Resolve

they accepted a l

interest in FIG and cash in

satisfaction of the note. See Ex. 223.
As part of this settlement agree111ent, the paiiies amended the FIG operating
agreement to entitle Debtors to a "priority distribution of $50,000 annually p1ior
dist1ibutions." Ex. 224. The distributions ,vere to sta1i 5 years later
(i.e., in 2015) with any pmiion of the payments not made being added to future

payments "until paid in

"

Martin Frantz testified he could not recall the amount due on the note. The
am01iization schedule attached to the note, hmvever, shows total payments of
$52,420 and a balance due of $1,066,316.34 as of 1\farch 2007. Given this

16

The May 2006 note ·was secured by the
LLC interests in Snov;,r Pe2.k l Real
Estate Holding Co., LLC,
interests \,ere acquired by the proceeds of the loan. The note
was payable monthly starting in June 2006. For the first year interest accn1ed at 8% and
at \Vells Fargo Pri:ne plus 1%. The
was subject to a bailoon payment in
June 2016. An attached amortization indicates
defaulted within the first year.
\Vas d-ce

to his
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balance, and since fr.ere is no absolute amount noted in the settlement agreement,
it appears the SS0,000 payments \Vill exist

an extended

Frantz admitted that the right to this income stream \Vas an asset

payments has never been disclosed in any schedule B. Though the separate FIG
mvnership interest \Vas scheduled, the details varied significantly.i8

III.
In the January 201211:0R, Debtors disclosed receipt of $89,619.89 as
management or partner fees, \Vith a notation of "GP FEE INCO:tvffi A.\1J\10N
ASSOC."

228. A settlement staternent on this transaction regarding Ammon

Associates, Ex. 121, indicates Martin Frantz was paid an "exit fee" of $65,250.00
and a $24,369.89 repayment of a "loan" he had made to the entity.
Debtors' l % partnership interest in .A. .mmon Associates \Vas disclosed
else\vhere in this MOR as \V01ih $80,000. Subsequent MORs failed to reference
an mvnership interest in A.mmon Associates. See Ex. 229. Hand-.w1itten notes on
the settlement statement, Ex. 121, suggest the "exit fee" \Vas paid for services
rendered, and that nothing \vas paid "for" Frantz' general partner interest because

18

Debtors' mvnership interest in FIG was disclosed on schedule B but it 'ivas aggregat
ed
with all other
· interests. See Ex. 202. Reference to FIG was deleted in a
amendment, Ex. 204. A reference to a 5 .3 8% interest (r..ot 19%) in FIG with a value
of "SO" was
disclosed in a
amendment, Ex. 206. Hm1'ever, in certain of the
11
a
in:erest in FIG \\'as sho\Yn as v,;orth S260,000. See, e.g, Ex.
229.
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I

all proceeds underthe agreement (net of taxes, secured creditors and closing) had
to be first paid to limited pa1iners. The

"sale" ai1d satisfaction or

termination of the general paiiner interest \Vere not disclosed to or approved by
Comi. 19
1\fa1iin Frantz testified that he

made loans to at least nvo partnerships

during the chapter 11 p01tion of the ban..'Kl-uptcy, including ium11on Associates,
saying this occmTed when "I had to feed the partnership." The loans and the fact
that these paitnerships ov,red money to Debtors (in addition to Debtors' ownership
general paiiner interests) were not disclosed. Nor did Debtors disclose the fact
that the amounts paid in Januaiy 2012 included repayment to Debtors of an
Associates loan. 20

IV.
In October 2012, Debtors attempted to sell rights flmving from their

paiinership interests in entities controlling 21 affordable housing projects. Doc.
No. 127. The sale contemplated that 50% of the general partner's interest in fees,
and 50% of its interest in profits, vwuld be sold to Tailored Management Services,
19

Frantz appeared to argue, though unpersuasiveiy, that if creditors wo'.lld have
no right under a partnersh ip agreemen t to object to a sale, then they would have no right
to
if it were sold in
thus that no disclosure of such a sale during bankrupt cy would
be ~on,,,~;o,i

°

2

Frantz arg,Jed that wherever there were 01nitted
of this
creditors cou 1d
the rest of the infomrntion from tbe Resol\·e "audit." Not only \,,as the Resolve rep01i
not filed
with the Court ur,til Debtors filed it in the
proceeding in Noven-;ber 2014, see Adv.
Doc.No. 64-1, but Debtors cannot reiy on whate\'er
Resolw
from its
to
Debtors' violation of their
c2.ndid snd
disclosure.

OF
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LLC for $40,000, netting $30,000 to the estate after taxes. The motion did not
and candidly disclose that

buyer entity 1vas

one of Debtors'

sons. There v-1ere also issues concerning the reasonableness of the sales price
finances and cash flmv. The motion thus
drew objections
from IIB and the UST.. and it 1vas denied in December 2012 after
hearing.
V.

Debtors' interest in Admiralty Associates \Vas sold during the chapter 11. 21
Franz testified that the sale was directed by and through his brother, Jim Frantz,
,vho had replaced him (or

over" for him) as general partner. Debtors \\'ere

entitled to approximately $92,000

that transaction, 1vhich was paid at or

about the time of the conversion to chapter 7 on April 23, 2013.22 Those funds
\Vere not paid to Debtors but, instead, \rere paid directly to the IRS on Debtors'
behalf, referencing Maiiin Frantz' Social Security number. Jim Frantz later
explained to Trustee that the direct payment ivas to protect the pa1inership from
IRS inqui1ies.
The sale or satisfaction

Debtors' interest in this paiinership \Vas not

disclosed dming the chapter 11, nor approved by the Comi. Nor was the

interest in what \V2.s otherwise disclosed in Debtors'
of
22

Tbe

motion to convert h2d

- 11
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of Debtors' IRS obligation disclosed. 23

VI.

I
I'

The

I

and account following

Doc. No. 225,

"management employment fees." Yet only slightly over $20,000 remained
\Vas provided to Trustee at conversion.
The expe:1dit1res during the chapter 11 are not itemized in the final report
but Debtors refer generally to the MO Rs they filed during the chapter 11 for
infomrntion. Id. The detail in the :tvIORs, Exs. 225-239, 2re summarized in the
final April 2013 MOR included as paii of Ex. 239. That MOR reflects that, over

.
mcome
or('S"
.5

761.05 \Vas realized

and expenditures totaled $369,939.24. Those expenditures included $160,669.40
in personal living expenses? Debtors have a t\vo-person household and claimed
no dependents in their filings. Hmvever, they have argued they at times supp01ied
many of their 14 adult children and spouses and 24 grandchildren. See

246.

These living expenses constitute 43% of all expenditures and average slightly over

23

Frantz testified that he may also have been entitled to repayment of a loan made to this
bi.::t could not re.call if it had been

4

The Court's review
specific
entries in this category on each of the
:v10Rs suggests the amount shov:n on the summary in the last MOR may not be accurate, but the
Court's calculations v,:ould
the acte2] 2mount is eYen
:
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S8,900 per month, not including a mmigage expense that is separately i~emized. 25
These same MO Rs reflect that tlu·ough the course of
Debtors made Sl9,000 in "capital

11,

Eagle Ridge on

deYeloprnent. See Exs. 225,227 at 5. And they made another Sl0,000 capital
contribution to ERTL in March 2012. See Ex. 230. Debtors also made
ERTL of at least $41,500. See Ex. 231

10,000),

to

236 ($8,000), Ex. 239

($7,000 in Januaiy 2013, $5,000 in February 2013, $5,000 in March 2013, and
$6,500 in April 2013). No request to use estate funds to make such contributions
or loans, see§ 363(b)(l), was ever made or approved. 26
During

chapter 11

funds \Vere being infused into ERTL, Debtors'

filings suggested their interest in the corporation had value. 27 ERTL ovl'ns l 04
acres of real estate in n01ih Idaho, adjacent to 50 acres O\vned by Debtors.
Debtors' initial Rule 2015.3 report, Doc. No. 24, \Vas filed in November 2011

25

The MO Rs shmv several months where the non-mo1igage living expenses exceeded
Sl0,000. See Ex. 229 (Sl 1,088); Ex. 230 (£11,265); Ex. 232 ($14,239); Ex. 233 ($22,528); Ex.
235 ($10,308); Ex. 237 ($13,790); Ex. 238 (S
Ex. 239 ($16,074 in
2013).
16

In a letter to IIB 's counsel, Debtors argued that ERTL' s :nonthly expenses of
S3,935.36 (which included payment of Debtors' health insurance) were
as "ordinary course
of bisiness" expenses. Tbs argument was never raised to the
whether i.11 reg2rd to those
monthly expenses or the loans or capital contributions to ERTL.
27

e.g., Ex. 225 (MOR Oct. 2011,
an 87.99% interest worth $870,000).
was
The l\fORs continued this assertion until Ac1 6 cst 2012 when the sa:11e
shown to be wonh $720,000. Ex. 234. This latter
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ascribed, consistent with the earlier lvfORs, a $870,000 value to Debtors' interest
in ERTL. A supplement (addenda) to the Rule 201

report, Doc.

addresses ERTL

then-present

provides Debtors' opinion of

o. 47,

104 encumbered acres as $5.52 million. Debtors subtracted an IIB secured claim
of $4.6 m.illion (an amou:1t that excluded default interest and penalties) and thus
calculated a $920,000 value for their interest in ERTL. 28
HO\vever, IIB 's proof

claim (on Debtors' guarantee of the ERTL secured

obligation to IIB) is filed in excess of S6 million. 29 This indicates Debtors

and

have negative equity in ERTL. Their infusion of cash into ERTL in the fom1 of
loans and capital contributions, in addition to funding operating expenses, during
the chapter 11, \Vas not shown to be appropriate or justified.
'W11i1e there \Vere a number of other matters explored at length at the
hea1irnz,
......... the Court deems it mmecessarv
.., to make findin:2:s
....., as to all such matters.
The foregoing, and the Cami's record, suffice for purposes of this Decision.
Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion Motion was objected to by the UST,
Trnstee, IIB and creditors Duk and i\nn Roell er. The Stay Relief l\fotion ,vas
opposed by IIB. All issues \Vere taken under advisement on March 31 following

28

The :-eason

the difference betweert this S920,000 value and the S870,000 assertiort

is not clear.
29

That claim indicates principal and non-default interest on loan no. 1309 is
S4,672,000. Default
and other expertses increase the
of that loan to
The cli,iu also
lorn (no. 1
of abocJt
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argument. The Comi has evaluated the dockets and record, the evidence, the
arguments

the

and the applicable authmities. It concludes
denied.

must

DISCCSSION At"\"TI DISPOSITION
A.

DismissaJJReconYersion :\lotion

Debtors' Dismissal/Reconversion Motion seeks inconsistent and, thus,
alternative fonns of relief, \Vhich

1.

be sep2.rately addressed.

Dismissal

A chapter 7 debtor's motion to dismiss the case is considered under

§ 7Q7(a), Vlhich States:
may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice
(a) The
cause, includingand a hearing and only
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or cbarges required under chapter
123 of title 28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen
days or such additional time as the comi may allow after the
filing of the petition conm1encing such case, the information
required by paragraph (1) of section 52l(a), but only on a
motion by the United States trustee. [3oJ
As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Gall01vay v. Ford (In re
Galloway), 2014 WL 4212621, at *5 (9th Cir. B.A_P Aug. 27, 2014):

Dismissal of a chapter 7 case is governed by § 707(a): "The

m2kes the three
and not exclusive.

222 F.3d 11

§ 102(3)).
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comi may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a
hearing and only for cause[.]" In re Bartee, 317 B.R. [362,J 365
Cir. B.A.P 2004)], Debtors do
have an absolute right to disrniss their
voluntary chapter 7 case. Id. Like any interested paity,
§
a
a prepondera11ce
exists to justify dismissal of a chapter 7 case. In re Leach, 130 B.R.
855, 856 (9th Cir. BAP 1991 ). Further, dismissal should only be
--granted-if there w-ill 13e no han1:1.·to ·creditors:·~Jn re-Bartee; 31-7· B-.R~ at·
365; Gill v. Hall (In re Hall), 15 B.R. 913, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 1981)
(citing Schroeder v.
'l Airport Inn P'ship, 517 F.2d 510, 512 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
Bartee furtber notes that debtors have the burden of proving that dismissal ·wiil
cause no legal prejudice to interested pa1iies. 317 B.R. at 366 (citing Leach, 130
B.R. at 857). Bartee was an asset case, and the BAP found that dismissal \Vould
have prejudiced creditors because there \Vas no guarantee the debtors v,'ould pay
their debts outside of bankruptcy. The BAP agreed with

bankruptcy comi that

debtors' proposals \Vere too speculative to establish the required lack of prejudice.
Id. Galloway

this proposition: "A debtor's speculative ability to repay

creditors outside bankruptcy is not cause for dismissal." 2014 \VL 4212621 at *6
(citing Twpen v. Eide (In re Turpen), 244 B.R. 431, 434-35 (8th Cir. BAP 2000)).
a.

Debtors' asserted cause and lack of prejudice are
unpersuasiYe

Debtors argue creditors 1vill not be prejudiced by

dismissal of the case,

and they can provide more to their creditors outside bankruptcy by returning to
their preban1-cruptcy
.
business as compared to \Vhat a chapter 7 trustee could
nrovide thrornrh liouidation .

.t:'

~

l
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numerous affordable housing projects. The projects \Vere generally mvned by
single-purpose limited partnerships, in

interest.

Debtors

not

Debtors held a general
such

mterests

from compensation for the development of the projects and their management.
Such

ects benefit from v2.rious types of governmental incentives

including subsidized loans and tax credits. The nature of such projects and credi~s
provides opp01tunities for value to be obtained through "resyndic2.tion" and
refinancing of projects and the restructuring of underlying pa1inerships. These
processes also ·

sales of tax credits, which are dependent on the project,

the discounted value of such credits. Some project transactions
"rehabbing" 1vhich requires remodeling of the physical projects for
Purnoses of such sale or resvndication.
~

~

The existence of Debtors' bankrnptcy imposes a significant impediment to
this business. Maiiin Frantz' baILlzruptcy apparently violates the covenants of the
project paiinerships and syndication agreements, and perhaps regulatory
requirements. He testified that, practically speaking, the presence of his
bankruptcy prohibits sales and resyndications so long as

personally is ·

He indicated that even a completed baILhuptcy \Vith a discharge \Vould
him from paiiicipating in government-assisted affordable housing contracts
related syndications.
The .

ofthe

in Debtors' vie\\\
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problem or obstac1e.31 Debtors claim dismissal vl'ould allmv them to extract
value
the

ects over a 3 to 5

trame,

that

generate

to
more

the bankruptcv., liauida
tion of their 12:eneral partner interests in the numeroi.:s
"
~

limited paiinerships. 32
Debtors ai·gue that future payments to creditors outside barr._kruptcy will
assured by a mmigage on 50 acres mvned by Debtors. 33 A draft proposed
mmigage \Vas admitted as Ex. 165. It contains nurnerm:s blanks and is clecr
ly just
a \vorking document. The exhibit also contains "primary points" providing
some
very general tem1s of Debtors' plan to pay creditors after dismissal. Neithe
r the
draft rn01igage document, nor the "points" explaining the post-dismissal plan
te1111s, ·were provided to creditors, though there \vas a general reference to
Debtors
"grant[ing] equal primity liens on his 50 acres to all creditors except [IIB]"
in the
b1ief accompanying their Dismissal/Reconversion Motion, Doc.No. 422. 34
31

Howev er, Frantz seemed to suggest that even if the banki.uptcy were
to be
unresol ved litigatio n ·with IIB V/Ould
him from qualifying for goverrunent-2.ssisted
financing, tho12gh perhaps other partner s in the project s could qualify.
32

The asserted value of the general pa1inership interests per se was
to wide
by Debtors . See Ex. Nos. 202,20 4,206. \Vhen asked by Trustee
's counsel \vhat
justifie d those change s in value, Martin Frantz could not provide
an answer. As noted, Debtor s'
attempt ed sale of interests in one such limited partner ship to their
son's compan y, Tailored
was
less than the various values Debtors h2d asse1ied in the
Frantz also admitte d he h2d valued such interests at substan tially higher
amounts in
prior financi al statements, but justifie d the later, lovier values as a
result 01 "regula tory vuu,H-•-u
33

Debtors assert this property is \VOrth S2.6 n1il11on.
Trustee

the 50 2.cres

liti

)
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Debtors' arguments regarding lack of prejudice are also based to a degree
on

allegation

the

acres, and the adjacent ERTL property, can

prebank-..ruptcy possibility of such an easement was reflected in a July 2006 letter,
Ex. 150. Hmvever, this proposal required payment by Debtors or their corporate
entity of S40,000 (the first portion of ·which ·was due by December 2006) and
recordation of the easement. These conditions ,vere never folfilled. Issues 1vith
establishing or settling lot lines on the property prohibited closing that transaction.
Nothing other than Frantz' assurances \Vas provided to est2.blish th2.t similar
easements could be obtained to the benefit

the prope1iy at this date.

Thus, Debtors argue that creditors will not be prejudiced by dismissal
because they
have

be paid their claims outside ban.."k:ruptcy and because they \Vili

security of the m01ig2ge on the 50 acres. But Debtors did 11ot establish

either the ability to generate funds for pay:ment, or that their conceptual mortgage
1vould effectively secure creditors.
Moreover, Debtors specifically exclude IIB from the secmity of
m01igage. They argue that even though IIB is their largest creditor, it has a

·; 4· ( ... con t·mue o')
various Frantz' family members and related entities and Debtors' interests in the rural
development/affordable housing projects and partnerships) as one of the most valuable assets of
the estate. Hmvever, Trustee ,vou]d presumptiYe]y liquid2te the property and pay creditors the
differs significantly from
the
proceeds. From the creditors' perspective, this
as
for foture
2.ddress the
inherent in a
tin1e end expense for
creditors in
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"disputed" debt and, therefore, 1vill not receive the same treatment as other
creditors upon dismissal and it

see

secured

1

the mmigage
~..., . See

exa1111nat1on,

admitted that other creditors (the Roellers, and 1:v1ichael Reagan) \Vere or might be
"disputed" as \vell. This "exclusion" of other non-IIB creditors from the proposed
treatment and mmigage \Vas not disclosed in the motion or brief.
A.no th er aspect of Debtors' request to dismiss suggests that creditors are
"guaranteed" eventual payment given Debtors' '\vaiver of discharge." To the
extent this is a reference to Debtors' prior motion to \Vaive discharge, Doc. No.
398, the Comi previously denied that motion, as it improperly contemplated only a
",va1Ver.
At the J\farch 30 heaiing, Debtors again argued they \Vould couple the
dismissal

a "discharge \vaiver." But whether it \vou1d apply to all creditors,

and hmv, was decidedly unclear. More significantly, though, Debtors could not
explain how a '\vaiver of discharge" vrnuld apply should dismissal be granted.
dismissal rnling at this time would moot the question of a bankruptcy discharge. 35
After extended discussion at heaiing, it appeared that Debtors might be suggesting
a dismissal with "prejudice" in the sense of a bar of discharge in any later
bankrupt cy case of debts dischargeable in the dismissed case. See § 349(a).

h2.s yet been entered in this case.
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Debtors never made their precise proposal clear at hearing and, impmiantly,
make it clear to credi~ors in their pleadings. 35
no

dismissal

of the case for the administrative expenses that ha-ve accrned in both the chapter 11
and the chapter 7 components of this 3 V2 year proceeding.
In surn.mary, \Vhile testimony indicated that Maiiin Frantz had historically
high income generating capability tbrnugh the development of subsidized
affordable housing projects, the proposition that he could effectively re-engage in
that field to the s2.rn.e extent \Vas not proven. The security to be provided creditors
in return for dismissal was sketchy

undeveloped. Creditors ,vere not provided

adequate detail concerning the proposals, including identifying all the creditors
"exciuded" from such protection. The suggestion of a "waiver" (or "bar") of
discharge ,vas not adequately explained, and Debtors' themy of "paiiial" waiver
had already been rejected. And the notice to creditors of the details of the
proposal, and notice of hea1ing, ,vas patently inadequate.
Debtors have also argued in suppmi of dismissal that they now feel it ,vas a

36

In closing arguments, Debtors appeared to indicate
if the Couii
the
conditions or tenns they suggested at hearing (at times called Debtors' "plan") were or could be
creditors could later recei;-e notice of those tenns. It ,vas not clear v,-hether
argument related to dismissal as well as reconversion but, in any e-vent, it ignores the
of
notice to creditors.
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mistake to file the voluntary chapter 11 petition (in 2011 ), and to conve1i to

7 (in 201

and

reason for the mistCk"k:e \vas the ir1adequate
as

\Vere

discussed in Bartee, see 317 B.R. at 364, and Leach, see 130 B.R. at 856 and

857-58, and \Vere unavailing.37 iu1d, bere, the evidence before the Couii does not
support the contention. The strategy of filing b2.n_1cruptcy
_
to deal \vith
creditors-primarily IIB-\vas intentional, as v,,as the decision to conve1i. See
Doc. No. 401 (declaration of :!\1artin Frantz in supp01i ofv;raiver of discharge).
That it is now regretted is not cause for dismissal.
And these arguments come long after the decision to file bankrnptcy, and

after the decision to convert. Debtors filed a chapter 11 case in 2011,
assuming the duties and burdens
case and

debtors in possession, and remained in that

control of the property of

estate

\vithout proposing a

for

just shy of 11h years. They then stipulated to conversion to chapter 7 \vhere they
have remained for 2 years. Creditors have been stayed throughout this process,

37

Simil2rly, in In re Guth, 2002 WL 31
(B2nkr. D. Idaho Nov. 8, 2002), the
debtors contended that meetings with attorneys left them with the understandwg they could file a
"single-creditor, single-asset" case to halt a foreclosure. Debtors later sought to dismiss the case
on several grounds, including alleged bad leg2l advice, or their
in understanding or
relying on such advice. The Court, id. at *7, addressed the m1thorities, and the argu:nents
including debtors' alleged "e1Tor" in filing, and denied the request to dismiss under§
inter alia and apropos to the
case, that debtors (i) intentionally sought
relief, intending to use the filing to deal ,vith a difficult creditor; (ii) availed themselws of
and (iii) ··were not
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and none have been paid on their claims. See, e.g., Turpen, 244 B.R. at 435
(creditors can incur prejudice if the

re

considerable

to disn1iss is brought after
, '1

l .J

1

passage

at *7

Mar. 27, 2013) (finding debtor failed to establish cause to dismiss in a case that
had been pending nearly four years); In re Klein, 39 B.R. 530, 533 (Ban__la.
E.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing prejudice from delay, ,;vhether caused by inadvertence
or design). The delay in raising the argument is significant and prejudicial.
The burden, in all regards, 'Nas on Debtors, and they established neither
good cause for dismissal nor the absence of prejudice. Debtors' request for
dismissal ,vill be denied.
2.

Reconversion to chapter 11

Conversions of chapter 7 cases fall under§ 706 of the Code. Under
§ 706(a), a

may convert the case to one under chapter 11, 12 or 13 "at

time, if the case has not been co11ve1ied under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this
title." Here, Debtors stipulated-with IIB-to conve1i from chapter 11 to chapter
7. That conversion \Vas necessarily based on§ 1112, thus Debtors have no
or right to convert the case back to chapter 11 under§ 706(a), and the
Dismissal/Reconversion Motion must fall under § 706(b ). 38 See, e.g., In re Home
38

Since the Court Vias not asked to, and did not, mc:ke findings under § 1112 (b ), and
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Builders, Inc., 2006 'IVL 3419791, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2006) ("V>/here

a

converted

11 is

Chapter 11, ... ::econ-version

§

to

subsection provides:

(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
~~ hearing;-the-comimay c01rve1tc:caseuffdenb:is chaptertcracase under ~
chapter 11 of this title at any time.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit held that:
"[t ]he decision ,vhether to convert [under § 706(b)] is left in the sound
discretion of the comi, based on what ,vill most inure to the benefit of
all paiiies in interest." Willis, 345 B.R. 647 at 654[39 J (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 380 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 2.t 94 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 706(b) does not provide guidance regarding the
factors a comi should consider. In re Quinn, 490 B.R. 607, 621-22,
2012 \VL 6737484, at *10 (Bankr. D.N.M. Dec. 28, 2012). "Since there
. ,.....
;l
£'
are no specmc
!9 ounus 1or conversion, a court snou1d consrner
any1hing relevant that vwuld fm1her the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code."' Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon (In re Gordon), 465 B.R.
, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012) (quotinginreLobera,454 B.R. 824,
854 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011).
0

'

,

,

..

•

1

Schlehuber v. Fremont ]{at'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Schlehube1), 489 B.R. 570,

573 (8th Cir. BAP 2013).
Home Netivork Builders also observed that:

38

( ... continued)
given the nature of the
under§ 111

39

2dvanced by

2nd IIB, the conversion necess2rily occu,Ted

Willis v. Rice (In re Willis), 345 B.R. 647 (8th Cir. BAP 2006).

uoc
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In detennining -Yvhether conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter
11 under§ 706(b) 1vill most inure to the benefit of all parties in intere
st,
including both creditors and debtors, coruis consider the factors
in
§ 1112(b) .... Tbe § 1112(b) factors are considered because
r,,
·
cause
' ~~ 1'11' 2Cu)~
'1".
.
Lnapt
er 1' 1 1::.naer
corrvers1on
from Chapter 7 under§ 706(b) vwu1d be a futile and \Vasted act." In
re
Ryan, 267 B.R. [635,] 637 [(Ban._1a. N.D. Imva 2001)].
2006 VlL 3419791, at *3. As the movants, Debtors bear the burde
n of shmving
good cause for, and benefit to creditors from, reconversion.
a.

Debto rs' shmYing in suppo rt of conve rsion ,ms
inade quate .

The conversion to chapter 11 is premised on the idea that Debtors,
'Nhen
they are once again in control of their assets, \Vill be able to generate
substantial
sums of money as they allegedly did prior to the initial 2011 filing.
But this focus

into a chapter 11. During their chapter 11, from 2011 to 2013, Debto
rs \Vere not
able to generate the same or similar income as they had before 2011
and, given the
consumption of income for personal a.rid other expenses, minimal
amounts \Vere
left for creditors.
Moreover, Frantz testified that even being in a ban.."kruptcy case \Vas
a
disqualif;ing condition or event for his paiiicipation in syndicating
, resyndicating,
and rehabbing the

housing

ects. Vlhether

· was through

covenants in partnership agreements or by reason of governmental
regulations (or
both) \Vas not entirely clear, but Fra:1tz was unequivocal in identifying
the
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significant problems that bankruptcy posed. fadeed, be testified that even a p1ior
discharge entered

a ba:J.k:ruptcy case

be a

in his line of Vi'ork.
to

a

Debtor-directed chapter 11 reorganization to succeed. 40 That Debtors could
effectively reorganize (or even liquidate) in a chapter 11 \Vas a proposition not
established by their proof. 41

In addition, Debtors did not adhere to the :fiduciary requirements and duties
imposed on them as debtors in possession while previously in chapter 11.

40

Debtors' brief in support of the
indicates that: "[T]he va1ue of his projects are
not in the physical value of the assets, ... rather the value comes from the opportunity to obtab
affordable housing tax credit sales. Resyndication and refinancing of the projects, REIT sales
with leasebacks, conservation easements and restm.cturir,g of partnersb.ips are various methods to
for creditors. It is a combination of the general partr1ersbip rights and privileges and
that 1\1r. Frantz has from thirty years building these affordable housing projects
give value. Hmvever, "Without control as the general partner and access to capital markets,
assets are ·worth very little to 1\1r. Frantz or the tms:ee." This aspect of the brief appeared to
be
dismissal of the case. But the altematiYe relief sought, of recorrversion to chapter
11, is also advocated. Debtors' brief even suggests they can propose a confmnable plan, and
acceptance thereof by impaired creditors. But the evidence at the March hearing raises
serious issues of feasibility, given the testirnony of the debilitating, indeed fatal, ramifications for
the partnership projects from Frmtz' pending bankruptcy.
41

Martin Frantz' declaration is illuminating. In attempti..rig to suppo1i the ultimately
unsuccessful "partial" \Vaiver of discharge, Frantz asserted that the initial barr..lcruptcy
Vias
intended to provide a means to force a settlement with IIB that had not been achieved in state
court. He stated: "As soon as a settlement could be reacbed, I planned to iVithdraw from
banki-uptcy without any discharges; since that is the only \Vay I can re-establish access to national
credit and investor syndication/REIT markets, go back to work, and regain my past e2.mings
ability[.] ... It's important to understand that in the finance world in ivhich I work, ifI have any
discharges on my record I ·wiil never be eligible to develop another project for the rest of
my life." Doc. No. 401 at 2. He also stated that he "agreed to convert the case to a chapter 7
desiring to extend my opporti:;nity to settle [with IIB] and again avoid the high cost of civil court
litigation believing that a settlemer:t was still imminent. Again, ·when a settlement is
as
in the prior
I would \vithdra-w from bankn.1ptcy without any discharges since again it's the
way I could re-establish access to financial markets
Id. a: 2-3. "\Vhile the state court
froze my access to credit 211.d national
capital
the
1 a. at.).
T
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Accurate and complete disclosures of assets and liabilities were lacking.
A.mendrnents \x'ere not proactive, but merely responsive to omissions

enors

1vent undisclosed and unrepo1ied. Several appear to violate the Code because
lacked notice and Court approval. A.nd even those that arguably could

'Within

the ordinary course of business were inadequately disclosed and documented.
l\foreover, in \veighing the evidence, the Comi sees the impetus for
reconversion, like dismissal, as less of a desire to pay all debts than it is an attempt
to control or impact the litigation with IIB. It is unclear whether Debtors believe
reconversion to chapter 11 will require a vacation of the pending trial in the

§ 523(a) adversary proceeding, something they have already attempted to
in several 'Nays. If they do, they are \vTong. Under § 1141 (d)(2), a discharge of an
individual in a chanter 11 case is not effective as to debts excepted
from dischanre
~

~

under§ 523. This, therefore, requires resolution of the IIB adversary proceeding
even \Vere the case to be reconverted.

In addition to the prior authorities, in In re Young, 269 B.R. 816, 825
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001), synthesized several factors from case law to detemune if
conversion from chapter 7 to chapter 11 is appropriate:
(1) \Vhether
conversion is sought in good faith;
(2) \Vhether the debtor can propose a confirn1able plan;
(3) The impact on the debtor of denying conversion \veighed against the
prejudice to creditors caused by allmving conversion;
(4) The
of conversion of tbe efficient
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ban_"kiuptcy estate, including the likelihood of reconversion to Chapter
7;
conversion \vould further abuses ofthe bankruptcy process
pen:ert, rather
·
congressional
serve

The Comt finds that ,vh.ile not binding, these factors are instrucfrve and "provide a
good, basic, guideline" to evaluate a reouest

-

J.

<..;

conversion. Id. l\foreover, the

Court finds, given the evidence presented, that the factors identified in Young
\Veigh against the Dismissal/Reconversion :tvfotion.
Having considered the ,vho1e of the record, the Comt, in the exercise of its
infonned discretion, concludes that reconversion of the case to chapter 11 is not in
the best interests of creditors of the estate, and 'Nould not fu1ther the goals of the
Code. The request for reconversion to chapter 11

B.

be denied.

Stay Relief r,:t:otion

Debtors seek stay relief in order to defend against IIB' s assertion of liability
and present affirmative defenses to those claims. But a state comt action is not
necessarily required to detem1ine liability. 42

It is \vell accepted that this Comt can establish the amount of a debtor's
liability in the process and context of detem1ining whether such debt is
nondischargeable. Cowan v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1017-18
(9th Cir. 1997). See also Sasson v. Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864,

of those defenses.
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(9th Cir. 2005); Stanbrough v. Valle (In re Valle), 469 B.R. 35, 40-43 (Ban
..lcr. D.
Idaho 2012). fu1d the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dete1mined that not

a

can

on a disputed state

rn

the course of determining a debt's dischargeability, but such adjudication remain
s

\Vithin both the jurisdiction and constitutional auth01ity of fae bar:_1.crnptcy court
even after Stem v..Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz)
,
469 B.R. 11 (9th Cir. BAP 2012) (adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its entiret
y at
760 F.3d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014)). 43
Given this jurisdictional and substantive la\V undeTpinning, the alleged
"cause" advanced by Debtors for stay relief is unpersu2.sive. Lifting the stay
to
state court litigation on IIB' s claim, and Debtors' defenses to such claim, 1s
not necessaiy. 1foreover, that it is urged at this late date, and ,vhen trial will
commence now in five \\'eeks on the same issue in this Comi, speaks to strateg
ic
desires rather than principled ones.L4

43

These authorities belie the argument in the Stay Relief Motion that stay
relief is
wammted "to resolve this
state law in the state court where it all
" Doc.
No. 425 at 2 (emphasis added). The "state law" iss"\.ce of liability on the
claim is subsumed in the
process of adjudicating the claim's dischargeability. That bankruptcy issue
of dischargeability, of
course, was triggered by Debtors' filing a
petition for relief under Title 11 over 31/i
years ago.
44

As noted earlier, this is not the first arternpt to avoid the commencemen
t of the
m
the
At a pretrial conference in
2013 v,ith Debtors' and IIB's
respective counsel, the Comi set a trial for a year later, to commence on
December 1, 2014. In
October 2014, Debtors sought to vacate a:1d contin1..;e that trial. Their motion
, following hearing
and argument, ·was denied. Debtors then filed motions to
IIB' s expe1i witnesses and
IIB' s counsel. Those motions
a
and Debtors v:ere t1-ms s1..;ccessful in
a
continu211ce of the trial that was to start December 1. But tbese rnotions
themselves v:ere
.)
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l!
The authorities cited by Debtors, including In re Arundotech, LLC, 2009
\VL 7809008 (9th Cir. BAP lvfay 4, 2009), and this Comi's

4

re

"""
.u.

2005), are inapposite. W1lile there are times, paiiicularly early in the bankruptcy,
when allowing a ready-to-try matter to be adjudicated in another fornm is in the
best interests of the parties and the Comi, this is not such a situation. The severai
factors that this Court can in its discretion evaluate include t\\'O that ,veigh heavily
here.
First, Debtors argue that state comi litigation will result
adjudication of
not interfere

a complete

issue of whether IIB has a claim against them, and that this
matters before this Court because "there is not as yet any

adversary proceeding on the matter of liability." Doc. No. 425 at 3. The
complaint's

and prayer, and

foregoing analysis

this Comi' s

jurisdiction and authority in detennining a debt's nondischargeability, overcome
that assertion. 45
Second,

interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and

44

after a nvo-day evidentiary hearing, to lack any 1nerit. The trial was reset and ·will start
2015.
5

26,

In addition, as discussed in an earlier footnote, IIB filed a timely proof of
m
January 2012
approximately S6.4 million. filed claims are ailowed unless an objection is
raised and
see § § 50 l, 502, and a filed
of claim is prima facie evidence of
and 2:mount, see Rule 3001 (f).
there has been no objection to IIB 's claim. If c:ny
of the claim is not
addressed in the
(':ere are a·venues
available to resolve
"

- 30
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economical detem1ination of litigation for the paities strongly supp01ts completing
trial

pends in this Comt. Debtors asse1t the state cou1t trial \Vas some five

IIB .

tl1ey

characterization of the status of the state comt litigation, even assuming it was
once set for trial, Debtors failed to establish how quickly a state comt t1ial ·would
be reset if stay relief \Vere granted. It is patently implausible that a state comt trial
could be rescheduled to occur before

t1ial in the adversary proceeding at the

end of:May 2015.
\V11ile there are other factors that could be discussed, they sim.ply add
additional support to the Comt' s conclusion that stay relief to allow state comt
litigation to recommence is umvarranted. There is inadequate "cause" to graEt
such

'11'oe aerne d .-"
1, f"'Motion w11
an d tl1e Stay R e~1e
IC

'

1

'

Af.

Debtors also urge "abstention" under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)

which the

Comt would abstain from hearing Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM in deference to the
state comt litigation (presun1ably the stayed 2010 litigation).
:tvfandatmy abstention under§ 1334(c)(2)

seven elements: (1) a

timely motion; (2) a purely state law question; (3) a non-core proceeding, 28
U.S.C. § 157(c)(l); (4) a lack of independent federal jurisdiction absent the
under Title 11; (5) that an action is corn.rnenced in state comt; (6) the state

to
are

and need net be further discussed.

OF DECISION - 31

see Doc. "\'o.

call

ll-L'.1331- i LM

Doc 484

Filed 04/16/15 Entered 04/16/15 16:57:29
Document
Page 32 of 34

Desc

!1

court action may be timely adjudicated; and (7) a state court forurn of appropriate
jmisdiction exists. Krasnoff v. _Marsha ck (In re General Carriers
181, 1

).

258 B.R.

Gcn::ales

re

Fulfe1), 159 B.R. 921,923 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); Bov,'en C01p. v. Security
Pacific Bank Idaho, FS.B., (In re Bowen Corp.), 150 B.R. 777, 781-82 (BaIL'kr. D.
Idaho 1993). The required factors are not present.
The Stay Relief Motion, to the extent it embodies a request for abstention,
was not "timely filed." If sincerely premised, rather than an eleventh-hour
strategy, the question of abstention could and should have been raised
months-indeed, years-2go.
Also, the dispute betv,'een IIB and Debtors is not a "purely" state law issue,

II

;:10r are the matters non-core. The fundamental issue in the adversary proceeding is
the extent and dischargeability

IIB 's claim against Debtors. The complaint

seeks a dete1111ination of the amount of the debt and a determination that such
claim should be found nondischargeable under§ 523(a). This is a matter of core
jmisdiction. 28 US.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). 47 Indeed, this Comi

not just core but

exclusive jurisdiction over IIB's § 523(a)(2) and§ 523(a)(6) claims. See
Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, if
Debtors' Stay Relief l\fotion \Vere granted and their the01y follmved,

47

IIB's

Doc. No. 1 2.t 2, ';;12, 5.
Doc. )Jo. 16 at 1-2.

paiiies

th2.t the m2.tter was core u:1cer 28 U.S.C. § l 57(b)(2)(I). Adv.
2.ns\Yer admitted both those
of the
·
Adv.
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\vou1d be required to litigate on t\vo fronts, a situation that does not promote
judicial economy. See also Deitz, supra.
i

0

<

unaer 9 1

lS

similar factors. Jones v. State Fann l11ut. Auto Ins. Co., (In re Jones), 410 B.R.
632, 640--41 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (citing Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In
re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1990)). The decision

·whether to per:.11issively abstain is committed to the Court's discretion. 48 fa
this Comi declined to so abstain, noting that "On balance, the Court concludes the
factors ,veigh in favor of retaining the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court,
and not abstaining." Id. at 641. The Court, having evaluated all arguments,
required factors, reaches the same conclusion in the instant case.~ 9
The Court concludes that abstention under either 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(l) or
(c)(2) is not persuasively advanced or appropriate, and the Stay Relief Motion, to
the extent it seeks such relief, will also be denied.

CONCLUSION
On the foregoing findings, conclusions and analysis, Debtors'
DismissaVReconversion Motion and Stay Relief Motion \vill be denied. The

8

V. City
1075-76 (9th Cir. 1991); Falkv. Falk(ln re
26, 2013).
"

49

(In re

2013

935 F.2d 1071,
Cir. BAP

A.nother comment in Jones is
apropos here: "The Court is ... concerned that.
Defendant's
for abstention may be rrntiva:ed by a desire for 1vhat Defendant
a
more favorable
or
resolution on the merits.
of 1he 2.ction only serves to
both
,nore time and more money
costs." Id at 641.
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will enter an order accordingly.

DATED: April 16,

cJa~

·· TERRY-h-:tvf'{ERS-· ·

CHIEF U. S. BAi"\:lC1UJPTCY ruuGE
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STEPHENB. McCREA
Attorney at Law
?.O. Box 1501
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101
d'iuene, ID 83814
(208) 666-2594 I FAX (208) 664-4370
email: sbmccrea@cda.hvcbc.com
~--Idaho-State BarJ'J o.-16 54-- - - - Attorney for Debtors

UNITED STATES BAN%-izUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
IN THE MATIER OF:

l\fattin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz,
Debtors.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE N0.11-21337-TLM
Chapter 7

MOTI ON FOR ORDER APPROVING WA TVER OF DISCHARGE

& NOTICE

Notice of l\fotion for Order Appro ving Waive r of Discharge
and Oppor tunity to Objec t and for a Rearin g

No Obiection. The Court may consider this request for an order \Vi th out further
,
notice or hearing unless a paity in interest files an objection within seventeen
(17)
days of the date ofthis notice.
If an objection is not filed within the time pennitted, the Court may consid
er that
there is no opposition to the granting of the requested reliefand may grant the
relief
without fmther notice or heari..11g.

Obiection. Any objection shall set out the legal and/or factual basis
for the
objection. A copy of the objection shall be served on the movant.

Hearin2 on Obiection. The objecting party shaU also contact the court's calend
ar
clerk to schedule a hearing on the objection and file a separate notice of hearing
.

:,10Tl0l, FOR ORDER APPROVL'\G WAIVER OF DISCHARGE & l<OTJCE:
PAGE!
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STEPHEN B. McCREA, attorney for the above named debtors, moves this Court for rn order
approving debtors, Frantz' \Vaiver of Discharge as to all creditors which is being filed ·11,1ith the
Court contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion for Order Appro,ing WRiver of
Discharge ("l\1otion"). The Court's approval of this waiver of discharge is required by §727(a)(l 0)

of the BawJUptcy Code. This Motion is based on the debtors' ki1owing decision to waive discharge
- -enterecfinto wffliadvice ofcounsel. The purpose of this Waiver of Discharge

to clarify that the

debtors' previous motion to dismiss was intended to waive discharge to all creditors.
Vlherefore, debtors respectfully request the Court for entry of an order approvbg the debtors'
V{ aiver

of Discharge.
Dated this f ,'.L day ofl,fay, 2015.

,~g~
Isl STEPHEN B. McCREA
Attorney for Debtors

.--
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UNITED STATES BAJ_"\!KRUPTCY COURT

!
\i

DISTRICT OF IDAHO
INR E

J\1ARTIN D. FRA.1~TZ and
---- CYNTIDA-l\'I-;-FRA.1·11n'Z ,--· ·

.

)
)
)
--)

Case No. 11-21337-TL~I

)
)

Debt ors.

__ __ __ __ __ __ _ )

Cha pter 7

ORDER APPROVING \VAIVER OF DISCHARGE
On May 13, 2015, chapter 7 debtors, Mart in D. Fran
tz and Cynthia J\1.
Fran tz ("De btors "), exec uted and filed a volu ntary
waiv er of disch arge unde r
§ 727( a)(l0 ). See Doc. No. 508 ("Wa iver" ), and
Doc. No. 509, a moti on
requ estin g appr oval of the Waiv er ("Motion").
Sect ion 727( a)(l 0) states: "The cour t shall grant the
debto r a discharge,
unless ... the cour t appr oves a writt en waiv er of
disch arge exec uted by the debto r
after the orde r for relie f unde r this chap ter." This
prov ision impo ses several
requ irem ents. The waiv er must be

i11

v,rriting, and exec uted by the debtor(s) post-

petit ion. In addition, the \Vaiver must be filed with
the Com i in orde r for the
Cam i to evalu ate and "app rove " the same. Gene
rally spea king , appr oval follows
the Com i' s finding that the debto r ·waives dischc.rge
knO\vingly, voluntarily, and
v.:ith an aYvareness of the cons eque nces of that act
See, e.g., In re

B.R. 326,328-29(Ban..1a. D.
do not requ ire

, 505

2014). The Federal Rule s of B
to

a

\VAI VER OF DISC HAR GE - 1

s

est

of

~alf u-uoo, -,c,"
I

LJuc

::u_o
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such a -Yvaiver nor for a hearing. The rules do, hmvever, require a notice to be
given all creditors 2nd

in interest after a ,vai-ver

discharge is approved.

Fed. R. B 2.11lcr.
__
P.
On~fay_30, 20}_?J?eb~ors 2nd Debtors' counsel 2ppeared before the Comi
to address the Waiver. Debtors' counsel conveyed his clients' decision to \Vaive
discharge under§ 727(a)(l 0), and represented that they did so after consulting
,vith and upon the advice of counsel, and that the decision was made knmvingly
and voluntarily, and -s;vith a\vareness of the consequences. Identical affiGnations
are made

the \Vaiver itself that was executed by Debtors and filed ,vith the

Comi.
The Comi concludes, upon this record, that the ·waiver meets the
requirements of the Code. The Motion shall therefore be granted and the \Vaiver
shall be, and hereby is, approved.

},11

appropriate notice under Rule 2002(£)(6)

\vill be prepared by the Comi and served by the Clerk.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 11ay 20, 2015

~~-

TERRY lvfYERS
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

DIS
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Sheila R. Schwager, ISB No. 5059
John F. Kurtz, Jr., ISB No. 2396
Timothy Ryan Kurtz, ISB No. 8774
HA'NLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
TelephoEe: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5261
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
jkurtz@haw leytroxell. com
tkurtz@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In Re:

)

Tv1ARTIN D. FRA.NTZ AND CYNTHIA lv1.
FRANTZ,

)

Debtors,

Case No. 11-21337-TUvl

~

Chapter 7

)

)
)

---------------IDAHO INDEPEN'DENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

)

Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024-TLM

)
)
)
)

MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

FOR
\i
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MOTION FOR SA.i".CTIONS
Idaho Independent Bank (''IIB"), by and thrnugh its attorneys of record, Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, hereby moves for sanctions against the Debtors' Martin D. Frnntz
and Cynthia M. Frantz ("Debtors" or "Defendants") and against the Defendants' attorney of
record, Jonathon Frantz, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), based upon the grounds set forth below.

This Court has the Inherent Authoritv to Issue Sanctions in this Case.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), a b2nk111ptcy court has the inherent authority to sanction
pmiies and attorneys for their conduct in bankruptcy cases. Cald11·ell v. Unified Capital Corp.

(In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278,284 (9th Cir. 1996); In re ~McGuire, Case No. 1241681-JDP, 2014 Wl 4418549, *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho, Sept. 8, 2014)(unpublished). These
powers are not governed by mle or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own

to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Hale v.

United States Tr., 509 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). This inherent sanction authority allows a
bankruptcy court to deter and provide compensation for a broad range of improper litigation
tactics. Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehti11e11), 564 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009).

In order to impose sanction under its inherent sanctioning authority, the bankruptcy court
must make an explicit finding of bad faith or willful misconduct Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re

Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). For a finding of bad

the bankruptcy court can

find either bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith. Lehti11e11, 564 F.3d 1061. A finding of
bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for an action prove totally frivolousthere is a colorable claim for the assessment

"] iti gant is
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230 F.3d 9

Cir. 2001).
WI1en issuing sanctions under its iJ:1herent authority, bad faith or willful misconduct
consists of something more egregious than mere negligence or recklessness. Dyer, 322 F.3d at
1196. However, sanctions are available for a variety of types of willful actions, including
recklessness \vhen combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or
improper purpose. Fink, 230 F.3d at 994; In re A. von Townhomes Venture, 1012 \VL 1068770,
(9th Cir. BAP, March 12, 2012)(unpublished). Thus, even if a party only acts recklessly
rather than in bad fait11, the acts are still sanctionable if the reckless conduct is coupled with "an
improper purpose, such as an attempt to influence or manipulate proceedings to gain an

Sanctionable conduct includes improper litigation tactics (such as delaying or disrnpting
litigation), vexatious conduct, bad fait11, wanton conduct, willful abuses of judicial process, and
action in the litigation for an improper purpose or acting for oppressive reasons. Lehtinen, 564
F.3d at 1058; Hale, 509 F.3d at 1148; Fink, 230 F.3d at 992-93; Dhaliwczl v. Singh (In re
2014 \VL 842102, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP, March 4, 2014). Fm1her, sanctions have been deemed
approprL::ite against an attorney based on a determination that an attorney's assertions in a filing
are frivolous. In re Brooks-Hamilton, 400 B.R. 238, 253 (9th Cir. BAP 2009). Sanctions are
also appropriate when conduct is tantamount to bad faith and wastes judicial time and resources
and defiles the integrity of the banJ.r.,..ruptcy system. Avon, at *7.

filing

A

&

:\10TI0N FOR

to delay legal proceedings warrants

LLC, 435

590,591 (9th Cir. 2011

-

re

In

C,

.)
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of a

court action. Id. The court deten11ined that the timing of the removal was highly suspect
because it was filed days before a hearing on a sanctions motion for v,rhich the removing party
had filed no opposition papers. Id. There was also no basis for the removal. Id. Thus, Lhe
banicrnptcy comt detennined that the notice of removal was frivolous and filed in bad faith to
delay the state court proceedings, thereby warranting

imposition of sanctions. Id.; See

In

re .Media Group, Inc., 2006 WL 6810963, *7-8 (9th Cir. 2006)(unpublished) (affinning
bankrnptcy comt' s finding that use of deposition in state comt action to investigate the trnstee' s
administration of the bankruptcy estate was an improper litigation tactic and therefore
sanctionable).

Underlying Facts \Varranting Sanctions in this Case:
1.

On August 23, 2013, IIB filed the above captioned Adversary Action against the

Debtors, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) for fraud and §523(a)(6) for conversion, in which IIB
sought a determination that the loans owed to it via lhe Debtors' guaranties and line of credit,
were non-discharga ble ("Fraud Trial"). Docket No. 1.
2.

Instead of filing an answer to the Adversary Proceeding, the Debtors thrnugh

Jonathon Frantz filed a Motion to Strike. Docket No. 6. Upon briefing and oral argument, this
Court rnled from the Bench on October 29, 2013, that the :tvfotion to Strike was denied in
entirety. Docket No. 13. An Order Denying the Motion to Strike was entered on October 31,
2013. Docket No. 14.
3.

On December 23, 2013, an Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for

·vu.s entered in which the Fraud Trial was set for the week

December 1,

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 4
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conference held on December 18, 2013. The pre-trial conference was attended
counsel for IIB and counsel for the DefendanLs, and all counsel agreed upon the trial dates and
deadlines set forth in the Pre-trial Order. Docket No. 21.

4.

Thereafter it was necessary for IIB to file a Motion to Compel Production of

Documents, \vhich was granted by this Court. Docket No. 43, 52. The mandatory fees and costs
were preserved to be awarded upon the conclusion of the case. Docket No. 52.
5.

On October 3, 2014, the eve of the discovery deadline and shortly before the

Fraud Trial was to first commence, the Defendants, through Jonathon Frantz, filed a Motion to
Amend the Pre-trial Order and Continue the Trial ("Motion to Continue Trial"). Docket No.
38. In tl1e Motion to Continue Trial, the Defendants sought to continue their expert disclosure
deadlines, the discovery deadline, and the trial date. Id. In violation of Local B 211.kruptcy Rule

9011.l(c),

Frantz, as counsel for the Defendants, made unfounded accusation that

Plaintiffs counsel had made "misrepresenta tions and intimations that they would only call
experts to challenge the expe1ts put f01th by the Frnntzes." Docket No. 38. Based upon those
false accusations, they contended they were "surprised" that IIB disclosed expert witnesses and
argued that they were entitled to contiriue the deadlines set fo1th in the Pretrial Order, so that
they could now disclose expe1ts. Id., p.5.
6.

The unfounded arguments as to Plaintiff's counsel were made by the Defendants

and Defer:dants' counsel, despite the fact that the Defendants' counsel had signed multiple
stipulations, unequivocally and expressly agreeing to the deadlines at issue, all of which were
subject to Court Orders. See Docket 47, 47-1. Those

!\10TI0N FOR SANCTIONS
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disclose expert 1vitnesses if the Defenda~1ts

to

disclose expert witcesses, and in fact were to the contrary. Id.
7.

Fu1~J1er, in tl1e Motion to Continue Trial, the Defendants attempted to use a

similar delay litigation tactic that they had attempted before in the underlying ban.Jcruptcy
proceeding, in which they contended the case should be continued so that they could have more
time to determine if Hawley Troxell should be disqualified in representing IIB in the pending
Fraud Trial. Docket No. 38, 38-5. Omitted from the Defendants' contentions 1vas a copy of the
Stipulated Order Granting Motions for 2004 Examination

Debtors, entered in their underlying

bankrnptcy case on January 13, 2012, in which they had acknowledged there was no conflict of
interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the Debtors in the bankruptcy
case or any other dispute against the Debtors. Case No. ll-21337-TUv1, Docket No. 54.
8.

Due to the tenure of the arguments raised by the Defendants in the Motion to

Continue, it appeared that the motion had been filed as merely a delay tactic in proceeding to
trial that had been set ten months prior to the motion being filed.
9.

After briefing and oral argument, this Cou11 denied the Defendants' Motion to

Continue the Trial, and held on October 20, 2014, that the Fraud Trial remained scheduled to
commence on December 1, 2014. Docket No. 51, No. 53.
10.

Then, eleven days later, on October 31, 2014, just one month shy of the pending

Fraud Trial, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell ("DQ Motion"). Docket
No. 55. The Debtors set the DQ \fotion for hearing for November 17, 2014.

\10TI0N FOR SANCTIONS - 6
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November 3, 2014, a minute entry was set

P21-ties

to submit pre-trial briefs, exhibits and disclosure of witnesses for the Fraud Trial, on November
17, 2014. Docket No. 56.

12.

On November 6,

14, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Expert Witness

Rand Wichmm1. Docket No. 59.
13.

On November 7, 2014, the Debtors filed a Motion to Disqualify Expe1t \Vitness

Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan, and Tes M. Strunk ("Resol're Experts"). Docket No. 64.
14.

Wl1ile still preparing to proceed with the Fraud Trial, on November 13, 2014 and

November 14, 2014, IIB filed oppositions to all of the tfotions to Disqualify. Docket Nos. 66,
67, and 69.
15.

In compliance with the tenns of the Pre-trial Order and the minute entry, IIB' s

counsel prepared and federal expressed the binders of Fraud Trial exhibits to the Court and to the
Debtors' counsel so that they would be received by November 17, 2014.
16.

Nevertheless, on November 17, 2014, and after oral argument, this Court vacated

the trial dates and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Motions to Disqualify for December
1, 2014 and December 2, 2014. At the oral ruling on November 17, 2014, this Comt held "that

the showing by Defendants in their submissions was less than compelling or even preponderating
and ,vere not then adequate to justify granting tl1e motions." Docket No. 84, Ex. A attached
hereto, 5:20-23. HO\vever, this Court stated that the Defendants would be provided an
opportunity to present evidence to attempt to "prove them up". This Court explained, "this
;:ipproach w;:is taken not
factual allegations on

because of the handic2p I
; it was also because denying

to
011
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case
and hanging over the plaintiff's law firm \Yhich would prevail, but under a rnling based more on
defective, an eleventh hour approach to the issue than on the merits rnling. So the motions were
set down
17.

December 1 and I reluctantly vacated the trial setting." Id., 5:20-6:9.
It was noted at the conclusion of the Court's November rnling by IIB's counsel

that contrary to the Pre-trial Order the Defendants' trial exhibits had not yet been delivered to
IIB 's counsel. Jonathon Frantz was ordered to inm:ediately deliver the trial exhibits.
18.

At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing for the Disqualification Motions, the

Comt rnled from the bench that the I\fotion to Disqualify the Resolve Expe1ts would

denied.

Then, after the two day evidentiary hearing in which seven different witnesses testified,
Comt entered an oral ruling on December 10, 2014, denying each of the Debtors' Motions to
Disqualify. Docket No. 84, Ex. A attached hereto. In the Oral Ruling, this Court stated in part:
a. "On September 17, I entered an oral ruling noting t.i11at the 111otions could
well be viewed as strntegic rather than meritorious and designed solely to
gain the relief that the failed motion to continue the trial didn't achieve."
Ex. A, 4:18-21
b. "The parties were required to disclose evidence by November 25, at 5:00
p.m. Mountain time. The plaintiff complied with that deadline, the
defendants did not." Id., 6:1-12.
The Comt then set forth its findings on the Evidence and concluded as to the DQ Motion
that:
c. "[P]laintiff s analysis of the facts and the law is supported by the
Mr. Clark was acting as a testifying expert witness only. As such, an
attorney-client relationship was not created. There's no basis to dis
Hmvley Troxell under IRPC 1.9 and defendants' motion,
will, therefore be
" Id, 12:10-15.
In

1v1otion to Disqualify the Ex.pert Rand Wichman, this Court commented:
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on th:s ti'Liin read \Vas emblematic of
of
Defendants to create an alleged role for Mr. Wichr:1an
a suggestion of
delivery or disclosure of so-called confidential information which simply
wasn't there." Id., 19: 10-14.

Further, in denying the Debtors' attempt to dismiss their barL'kruptcy in H1e

underlying banl{rnptcy case in March 20151 (which appears to have been another attempt to
aYoid tl1e Fraud Trial) and deny their relief motion to have the debt determined in state court,
this
Com1 stated:
GiYen this jurisdictional and substantive law underpinning, the
alleged "cause" advanced by Debtors for stay relief is
unpersuasive. Lifting the stay to allow state court litigation on
IIB 's claim, and Debtors' defens es to such claim, is not necessary.
I'v1oreover, that it is urged at this late date, and when trial will
commence now in five weeks on the same issue this Court,
soeaks to strate1:dc desires rather than urincioled ones.
Case 11-21337-TLM, Doc. 484, p. 29 (emphasis supplied).
This Court also noted in that memorandum decision:
As noted earlier, this is not the first attempt to avoid the
conunencement of the trial in the adversary proceeding. At a
pretrial conference in December 2013 with Debtors' and IIB 's
respective counsel, the Court set a trial for a year later, to
conunence on December 1, 2014. In October 2014, Debtors
sought to vacate and continue the trial. Their motion, following
hearing and argument was denied. Debtors then filed motions to
disqualify IIB' s expert witnesses and IIB 's counsel. Those
motions required a hearing, and Debtors were thus successful in
obtaining a continuance of the trial that was to start December 1.
But these motions themselves were found after n two-dav

1 The Debtors nlso atlempted to obtain n Section 727(n)(l0), as to all creditors except IIB,
to
attempt to obtain a
their
to obtain select wniver discharges under 727(a)(l0) was
3, 2015. Case No. 11-21337,
438.

by

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - 9
!I.

Case 13-07024-TLM

Doc 117

Filed 06/02/15 Entered 06/02/15 14:41:05
Document
Page 10 of 44

Desc Main

was reset
will start May 26, 2015.
Id., p. 29,fn. 44 (emphasis supplied).

In a concluding footnote, this Comi stated:
AI1other comment in Jones is fully apropos here: "The Comi is ...
concerned that ... Defendant's request for abstention may be
motivated by a desire for what Defend2.nt considers a more
favorable forum, or perhaps simply as means to delay resolution on
the merits. Prolongation of the 2ction only serves to cause both
parties to expend more time and more money in litigation costs."
Id. , p. 33, fn. 49.

20.

Upon the ruling on the Disqualification Motions, this Court then entered an Order

Rescheduling Trial to commence May 26, 2015. Docket No. 88. Further, this Coilli ordered
that
all exl1ibits be delivered to the Court by January 30, 2015. In addition, Exhibit lists and Witness
lists were to be filed by January 30, 2015, and pre-trial briefs no later than April 30, 2015.
A
status conference \Vas also set for March 16, 2015.
21.

On January 30, 2015, pursuant to the Court's Order, IIB' s counsel filed it's

Exhibit List and Witness List. Docket No. 89, 90. Contrary to the Court's Order, the Defenda
nts
did not file a witness or exhibit list until Febmary 4, 2015. Docket No. 91, 92. In the witness
list
the Defendants identified witnesses that had not been disclosed in discovery. Docket No.
93.
IIB' s counsel requested that the Defendants amend their list to remove the witnesses, which

2 Despite the lack of merit and a elem: determination by this Court after a two day trial on
issues that no attorney client relationship existed between the Defendants and Hawley
the
Frantz, through
attorney Jonathon Frantz, has filed a
lawsuit state comi against Hawley
for malpractice on the very some alleged
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Jonathon Frantz, further conceded that

undisclosed \Vitnesses "had no knowledge of any facts in this case are not called to express
opinions." Docket No. 93, Ex. B. Nevenheless, they continued to contend they would call the
witnesses at the Fraud Trial. Thus, a hearing was necessary, and on March 16, 2015, this Court
ruled from the Bench granting IIB's Motion to Strike the W1disclosed witnesses. Docket No. 99,
102.

22.

At the hearing on March 16, 2015, this Court asked Defendants' counsel,

Jonathon Frantz why he had not yet delivered the Defendants' exhibits to the Court as set forth in
the Comt's Order Rescheduling the Trial. Those exhibits had been due to the Court on January
2015. Defendants' counsel responded that he "was a one man shop" and that "his client
[Mmtin Frantz] had prioritized other matters3 ahead of this task." In response, this Court
ordered that the exhibits be delivered to t11e Coeur d'Alene courthouse no later than March 20,
2015 ("Exhibit Order"). Docket No. 99.

23.

Notably, IIB's counsel had spent hours reviewing the Defendants' tlu·ee (3)

binders of 175 exhibits and furt11er time in negotiating a stipulation as to what would be
stipulated to for foundation and admissibility purposes, which was filed with this Court on
1\farch 13, 2015. See Docket No. 97.

3 These otl1er priorities apparently included a Motion to Dismiss, in which the Debtors were
desperately attempting to convince this Court that they could and \Vould provide for more
recovery to their creditors, lhan the Chapter 7 Trustee. Of course the Motion to Dismiss was
also ::mother effort to attempt to avoid the Fraud Trial. See Case 11-21337, Dockets
458, 466,
a two day evidentio.ry hearing on the l\fotion to Dismiss, this
'1\1otion. Case 11, Docket No.
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through their attorney

Jonathon Frantz, filed an "Amended Exhibit List" on March 16, 2015, in which he withdrevv all
of the Defendants' exhibits and stated he would simply utilize the exhibits submitted by IIB.
Docket No. 100. This of course made the lime

011

Defendants' exhibits and stipulations

thereof, meaningless.
25.

On April 30, 2015, IIB duly filed its 40 page pre-trial brief, which set ford1 the

legal authority providing the basis for the non-dischargable judgment under §523, as well as the
evidence that \Vould be submitted to this Court clearly establishing the systematic and detailed
fraud that the Defendants had engaged in against IIB, apparently from the inception of the first
purchase loan in October 2005. Docket No. 113.
26.

On April 30, 2015, the Defendants, through their counsel, Jonathon Frantz filed a

single sentence pre-trial brief stating they were waiving their right to file a pre-trial brief.
Docket No. 114.
27.

On the very next day, May 1, 2015, the Defendants apparently signed a Waiver of

Discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), as to all of their creditors ("Waiver"). Case 1121337, Docket No. 508. Notably, this \Vaiver of Discharge was not filed until May 13, 2015,
and counsel for the Debtors had no explanation for this late filing. Further, the Defendants did

not set the Motion for Waiver of Discharge for hearing. Notably, the Debtors chose to wait
May 13,

15, to file the Waiver, despite obtaining a ruling from this Court on March 3, 2015,

tlrnt a Section 727(a)(10) could only be considered if it included all debts and creditors. Case
11-21337, Docket No. 438. Instead of filing that \Vaiver shortly after
lvfarcb 3,

15,
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\Vaiver of Discharge for hearing to be

on May 20, 2105, and also set a status conference for the Fraud Trial.
29.

On May 20, 2015, this Court approved the Waiver of Discharge as to all creditors,

and as a result, vacated the Fraud Trial, due to the mootness of the non-discharge issues. Docket
No. 116.

30.

As of May 20, 2015, v,.·hich was one week prior to the date the Fraud Trial was to

commence, IIB had of course expended substantial time, fees, and expenses in preparation for
the Fraud Trial. This was a trial that the neither the Defendants nor their counsel, Jonathon
Frantz, apparently ever intended to actually litigate. Yet, they did not \Vant to advise IIB until
the last minute, so as to cnuse IIB to incur wmecessary fees nnd costs. Such conduct is

sanctionable.
SAi"',TCTIONS SOUGHT BY IIB.
As set forth in the record in this case, the Defendants and their attorney, Jomthon Frantz,
clearly engaged ir1 improper litigation tactics such as delaying and disrupting litigation, vexatious
conduct, bad faith, wanton conduct, willful abuses of judicial process, a waste of judicial time
and resources, and engaging in litigation tactics for an improper purpose. Although sanctions are
nothing to be summarily granted nor sought, IIB respectfully submits that the methodical and
intentional conduct of lhe Defendants and their attorney is tantamount to bad faith, of which they
should not

benefited by, nor should they obtain the rewilrd of intentionally causing IIB to

incur unnecessary attorney fees o.nd costs.
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A. Attorne y Fees for I'\fotion to Compel.

As set f01th in this Court's Order Granting Motion to Compel Production of Documents,

IIB is entitled to sanctions pursuant to the Federal Rule of B ank.ruptcy Procedure, Rule 7037,
as
against the parties andlor attorney whose conduct necessitated the compel motion. Docket No.
52. As set forth and itemized in Ex. A to tl1e Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager, filed concurre
ntly
herewith ("Schwager Aff."), the total fees and costs incurred by IIB as a result of the compel
motion totaled $2,534.50.
B. The Conduc t in Filing the :Motion to Continue Trial Filed on October 3, 2014,
\Varrants Sanctions.

As set forth above, the Defendants waited ten (10) months from the date the trial was set,
the eve of the discovery deadline, and shortly before the Fraud Trial was to commence, to file
a
Motion to Amend the Pre-Trial Order and Continue the Trial. In making the motion to amend
the pre- trial order, the Defendants through their attorney made false and unfounded accusatio
ns
against IIB 's counsel, violating Local Ban..1<:ruptcy Rule 9011.1 (c). The very stipulations signed
by the Defendants' counsel countered the contentions that IIB's counsel had misled the
Defendants into believing that IIB was only going to disclose expert witnesses, if they chose
to
disclose expert witnesses.
Further,

Defendants, through their attorney, contended that the trial should be

continued so that they could determine whether they should attempt to disqualify IIB' s counsel,
despite

fact the Defendants had expressly aclo10\vledged in a signed stipulated order,
by

FOR
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case or in

Debtors.
There was no merit to the Defendants' Motion to Continue Trial and it was summarily
denied after oral argument on October 20, 2014. This Court
Trial would go forward on December

1st

at the hearing that the Fraud

as scheduled. Then eleven days later, the Defendants

attempted to take another run at continuiilg the trial, by filing an actual motion to disqualify
the
law firm of Hawley Troxell. It is evident due to the tenure of the arguments set f mth in the
motion and the subsequent delayed filing of the Motions to Disqualify, that the :t\fotion to
Continue the Trial filed on October 3, 2014, was filed for the sole purpose of delaying and
disrupting the litigation, on the eve of trial no less. IIB incuned unnecessary fees and costs
defending the frivolous motion in the total sum of $3,014.504, as set forth in Ex. B to the
Schwager Aff.
C. The Disqualification I\fotions filed against Hawley Troxell and the IIB Experts
\Vere Filed in Bad Faith for Improper Purpose s of Delayin g Litigation.

The Disqualification Motions filed against Hawley Troxell and the IIB experts were
in bad faith for the improper purposes of delaying litigation. The lvfotions themselves consisted
of conduct tantamount to bad faith and certainly a waste of judicial time and resources. Hawley
Troxell had represented IIB in regard to obligations owed by the Debtors since 2010

4 This total includes 1.4 hours there were also included in the Sanctions request in regard
to
Motion to Compel, as the hearing on 10.20.14 and the orders that were drafted on 10.22.

Thus, if Sanctions are awarded
to Continue Trial, then
totai should
sum of
1.50.
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Defendants,

attorney Jonathon Frantz, caused the DQ Motion to not be filed until
October 31, 2014, just one
montl1 short of the Fraud Trial. They did not even file it on Octob
er 3, 2014, when they filed the
I\1oticn to Continue. Instead, they waited until the very last

thereby benefiting from

their improper litigation tactic of getting the Fraud Trial moved from
the pending December 151
date.
The bad faith is further evidenced by reviewing the submissions
of the Defendants. As
this Court noted, the pleadings filed by the Defendants were not
sufficient to justify the motions
being granted. Neve1theless, the Defendants were making seriou
s ethical allegations against

IIB' s counsel. As a result, and to ensure there was no "cloud hangin
g over the entire case," this
Court vacated the trial date and set the Disqualification Motions
for evidentiary hearing, so they
could be decided on the merits, rather than via default.
After engaging in a two day evidentiary hearing with seven (7) wilnes
ses and volumes of
exhibits, this Court ultimately denied each and every one of the
Disqualification Motions and in
a subsequent decision noted that the motions were found to "l.::ck
any merit."

IIB incurred unnecessary fees and costs in defending the frivolous
Disqualification
lviotions in the total sum of $49,477.62, as set forth in Ex. C to the
Schwager Aff. The fees and
costs incurred by IIB for the three disqualification motions were
substantial for several reasons.
First, each of the three motions filed a month before trial was to
commence were significant to

IIB 's success at trial. Not only did the false allegations as to IIB' s
counsel raise ethical issues
and concerns, as well as provide a "cloud" over the

IIB had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in

if no evidentiary
litigation and

v,:as

case,
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case since at

least 2010 \Vere disqualified. Further, based upon the allegations it was necessary for IIB to
subpoena records from a third party law firm, all on an expedited basis due to the timing issues
the evidentiary hearing. In obtaining those subpoena

consisted of at least two

banker boxes, document s were discovere d that expressly contradicted the allegations being made
by l\.1r. Frantz against IIB' s counsel. Further, the Defendan ts rrt the

minute disclosed an

expert witness they intended to present at the evidentiar y hearings. Thus, it was necessary for
IIB' s counsel to research, file and argue a motion in limine to exclude the improper witnesses.
After oral argument, this Court did in fact exclude the witness, as the intended testimony was not
proper expe1t witness testimony.
Further, the attempt to disqualify the expe11 v;itness testimony of Rand Wichman was
similarly significan t to the success at trial. Mr. Wichman had conducted substantial work in
evaluating the draw requests, tracing of constructi on funds, and the project, and in that work had
determine d that nearly a Million Dollars of the loan proceeds bad been converted. If Mr.
Wichman would have been disqualifi ed, then IIB would have had a serious proof issue in
to the conversio n cause of action.
According ly, due to the seriousne ss of the allegations and the matters, the fees and costs
incuned were necessary , due to the litigation tactics pursued by the Defendan ts and their
attorney.
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D. The Litigation Tactic of Submittin g Exhibits Of \Vhich There Was No
Submit at Trial, Is Sanctiona ble.

to

The Defendants and their attorney, Jonathon Frantz, \Vasted substantial time and mo;1ey
in submitting one

seventy-fo•e (175) exhibits to IIB' s counsel, causing additional time

and expense in working on the exhibit stipulations, and then thereafter simply ar;1ending the list
to have no exhibits, because they refused to provide a copy of the exhibits to the Court, pursuant

to the Court Order. This improper litigation tactic caused IIB to incur unnecessary fees and costs
in the total sum of $6,171, as set forth in Ex. D to the Schwager Aff.

E. Neither the Defendan ts, nor the Defendan ts' Counsel Had Any Intent of
Proceedi ng with the Fraud Trial.

From J\.farch 3, 2015, the date that the Defendants obtained a niling that a Section 72 7
(a)(lO) required a

as to all creditors, to May 20, 2015, Lhe date that this Court approved

such a Vlaiver, the Defendants and their counsel, Jonathon Frantz, intentionally caused IIB to
incur unnecessary attorney fees and costs in trial preparation, when they knew they did not
intend to proceed wiLh the Fraud Trial. On March 3, 2015, the Defendants were informed by
Court that they ca1mot waive their discharge unless they waive their discharge as to all creditors.
On March 16, 2015, the Defendants, through their attorney Jonathon Frantz, filed an amended
Exhibit List in this oction, stoting "None." On April 16, 2015, m1 order is entered denying tl1e
Defend ants' Motion to Dismiss their bankruptcy. Then on April 30, 3015, after receiving the IIB
Pre-trial brief, the Defendants, through their attorney, Jonathon Frantz, filed a single sentence
right to file a

Brief. The

next

as to all creditors under Section
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13, 2015,

even when they filed it, they did not notice it for hearing. It is not until the Court sua sponte sets
the Waiver for hearing for 1\fay 20, 2015 and the Waiver is tl1en approved, that the necessity for
the Fraud Trial on

non-discharge issues is mooted.

In reviewing the entirety of tl1e litigation tactics in both the Adversary Proceeding and the
Bankruptcy Case, it is now evident that neither the Defendants, nor their attorney, intended to
proceed with the Fraud Trial. Instead of filing an enforceable Section 727(a)(l0) waiver of
discharge early on in the case, they first tried several other litigation tactics to attempt to avoid
that drastic measure. They first attempted to delay by mak:ing false statements in regard to
discovery issues
the eve

making vague threats as to IIB' s counsel's ability to represent IIB; then on

trial they file an actual DQ 1\fotion; then when that fails and the trial gets rescheduled,

tl1ey file a motion to attempt to dismiss the bankruptcy case. W1ien that does not work, they wait
until the very last minute and file a Section 727(a)(10) waiver of discharge as to all of their
creditors, mooting the non-discharge 523 issues. \Vhile engaging in these litigation tactics, they
know that IIB and its counsel are preparing for the scheduled 2 week Fraud Trial, in which it is
clearly incuning substantial fees and costs. IIB' s fees and costs are evident by the multiple trial
filings many of which the Defendants simply declined to do, and those that they did do, were not
in compliance with this Court's orders.
In engaging in the litigation tactics that took place in this case, the Defendants and their
counsel willfully disrupted the litigation process \Vith delay rnctics and abuses of the judicial
willful misconduct

ences bad faith

a

for the

the

sanctions.
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fees and costs as to this litigation tactic from March 3, 2015, to

May 20, 2015, in the total sum of $43,960.15, as set forth in Ex. E to the Schwager Aff.5

F. Attorney Fees and Costs are Warran ted For the Sanctions :\fotion

IIB has incuned additional fees and costs in addressing the sanctionable conduct under
this Motion. As of May 31, 2015, those fees and costs totaled $3,396.50, as set forth in Ex.
F to
the Schwager Aff.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the record in this case, IIB respectfully requests that a judgment be awarded
in its favor and against :tvlartin D. Frantz, Cynthia lvf. Frantz, and their counsel, Jonathon D.
Frantz, jointly and severally, for sanctions in the total sum of $102,040.27 .6
DATED THIS,11,Ja.ay of June, 2015.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA VlLEY LLP

By-+-+'-"-"-~----'~~__,.""---__;._.:_-'--"'~"f,1--~+-~
Sheila R. Schwager. ISB No. 5059 /
Attorneys for Pl;intiff Idaho Indepeb

5 This amount includes those fees and costs incurred in regard to the submission of the
Defendants' exhibits. If fees and costs \Vere awarded as requested, this amount would
to be reduced by $6,171 to avoid duplication. The attorney fees and costs incurred from
1, 2015, the date the Waiver of Discharged was signed to lvfay 20, 2015, total $26,667.17.
6

amount
not include the sanctions request of Subpart D, as those fees
a::e also included in the request set
in Subpart
Further, the total i.s reduced by
S343.00 of
in the requests set forth in Subp::u1 A and B.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tl1is'Jj1.{?ay of June, 2015, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SANCTIONS by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of Lhe following:
Jonathon Frantz
FRANTZ LA \V, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln Ste., St. A
Post Falls, ID 83854

0 U.S. l'vfail, Postage Prepaid

Stephen B. :McCrea
608 N011hwest Blvd, Suite 101
P.O. Box 1501
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1501

0 U.S. J\fail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight :!\fail
DE-mail
D Telecopy

D Hand Delivered
0Yemight Mail
DE-mail
D Telecopy

Sh2ila R. Schwager
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

INRE
l\1ARTIN D. FRAi'\fTZ AND
CYNTHL-\ l\1. FRAi"\'TZ,
Debtors.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 11-21337-TLl\1

Chapter 7

-------------)

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
l\1ARTIN D. FRAi'\fTZ, an individual, )

IDAHO L'\TDEPE:NDENT BANK,
an Idaho corporation,

and CYNTHL\ l\1. FRANTZ, an

)

individual,

)
)
)

Defendants.

Adv. No. 13-07024-TLl\1

-------------)

ORDER GRAi'\fTING IN PART AND DEN\'l:NG IN PART
:MOTION FOR SA.1"\'CTIONS

Based on the rnling entered orally this date and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Idaho Independent Bank's Motion for
Sanctions, Doc. No. 117, is GRAL"\JTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Sanctions of $49,477.46 are a\varded to Idaho Independent Bank against 1\1a1iin
and Cynthia Frantz and their

ORDER- l

Jonathon Frantz, jointly and
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DATED: September 14, 2015

~~
00

TERRY L. :tvfYERS

CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY J1JDGE
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

)

MARTIN D. FRANTZ AND
CYNTHIA l\ L FR_,\i~TZ,
Debtors.

_________ ____

)
)
)

Case No. 11-21337-TL'.\f

)
)
)

Chapter 7

)

IDAHO INDEPEN1)ENT BA.i"\:l{,

)

an Idaho corporation,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

Adv. No. 13-07024-TLl\f

l\1ARTIN D. FRA.1"\TTZ, an individual, )
and CYNTHIA l\I. FRAL~TZ, an
)
individual,

)
)

Defendants.

)

------------- )

ORDER DISl\ITSSING AffVERSARY PROCEEDING

Based on the ruling entered orally this date and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above captioned adversary proceeding
is DISI\1ISSED as MOOT.
DATED: September 14, 2015

TERRY L. lvf':{ERS ·

CHIEF U. S. BAi"-JKRUPTCY JUDGE

ORDER- l

AP 142, 142-1

I

D S

BOI

1v1}0..RTIN D. FB. A.~\iTZ and
CYNTHI.:\ M. FBJcJ\iTZ,

Docket No. 3K- 1-21337-TLM

Debtors

a

Case No. ADV-13-07024-TLM
Plaintiffs,
vs.

10..Z".RTIN D. FBP. NTZ and
CYNTHIA M. FR.Il,.NTZ,
Boise, Idaho
er:cber 14, 2015
11:01:37 a.m.

Defendants.

TELEPHONIC JUDGE'S ORAL RULING
CH...Zi.PTER 7

HELD BEFORE THE HONOBP.BLE TERRY L. MYERS
PRESIDING CHIEF JUDGE OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT

Proceedings recorded
transcr
produced

electronic sound recording, ~ransc
io:1 service.
Judge's Oral Ruling

n
( '.JB)

989 :? 55 -

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS :

SHEILA RAE SCHWAGER, Esq.
Troxe 1 Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
(208) 344-6000

FOR THE DEBTORS

JONATHON FRANTZ, Esq.
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, ID 83854
208-297-66 47

2

BOISE,

DAEO

* *
3

* * * *

5

THE CLERK:

6

MR.

7

THE CLERK:

Mr. Francz,

JONATHAN F~.NTZ:

are you on che line?

Yes.

Oh, great.

Ms . S

10

Then I think we'll be

MS.

do we have you on the line?

SCE\'il.AGER:

Yes.

THE CL2RK:

Thanks.

, great.

Thank

you.

13
1

'r(

Give me j st one moment.

9

12

T

PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 11:01:37 A.M.

4

8

*

j;

IHE COURT:

/1

Good mor

to take up Idaho I

..1.':t

15

, counsel.

We are

Bank versus Martin and

ia Frantz, Adversar y 13-7024.

16

This matter is before me on cwo motions filed

17

the plaintif f,

18

as IIB.

19

award of attorney s fees and costs which were incurred in this

20

adversar y proceedi ng.

21

Idaho Independ ent Bank, which I'll referred to

Both of those motions deal with question s of the

The first of those motions is a motion for

22

sanction s, Docket 117,

23

it was filed on June 2 and argued on

24
25

I'll call that the sanction s motion,

e

5.

The second is IIB's motion for attorney s fees and
cost,

Docket Number 121, which I'll call the fees moti

:,) .0.

1

was filed on June 3 and

2

under adv sement at the respecc ive nearing s, after oral

on Julv 28.

3

30th were taken

as counsel fer IIB; and Mr. Franz

4

as counsel for the debcor/ defenda nts, Martin and Cynthia

5

Fr2.ntz.

6

written submiss ions that have been made

7

I've 2.lso conside red extensi ve

8

researc hed author ities.

9

files and records in the adversa ry proceed ing,

10

I've conside r those

the related

-

" J.
1.

s.

I've conside red the
ies and

other indepen dently

I also take judicia l not_ce of the

r 7 bankrup tcy case,

as well as in

pursuan t to FRE 201.

The backgro und for these motions is

12

debtors filed ~heir Ch

13

fil

st

rtant.

The

r 11 case in October of 2011.

signifi cant ongo

The

litigat ion in state court

between debtors and IIB.
15

In

16

11 case to a

1 ',
-'- I

filed

18

l

of 2013, this Court convert ed the

iquidat ion under Chapter

IIB that was st

In

ated to

st of 2013,

r

7 based upon a motion
debtors .

IIB file a

int to con1Inenc e

19

this adversa ry pro

20

debtors were princip les in various entitie s which had entered

21

into agreeme nts with and became obligat ed to IIB and that the

22

debtors '
to the c

in which the bank all

person ally guarant eed those obligat ions.
aint,

the

e Ri

that

Accordi ng

oan ob igation

was represe nted to be $6.135 million as of the
25

cetitic n date.

IB also concend ed that debtors were

Judge's Oral Ruling

(2

r

j_

obl

ed on a iine of credi t in an amoun t cf $283,0 00 as of

2

tf1a t

3

debto rs in the amoun t of all

4

to suffe r, not to excee d the full amoun t due and ow

5

the Eagle Ri

6

compl aiGt such

7

costs and attorn evs fees under those oblig acion s.

s\

also s

9

obl

10

ci.a te

~

aint

for a j

again st

s that debto rs caused IIB
under

loan and line of credi t as define d in the
s to includ e all accru

a determ inatio n and j

ir1t.er est,

And Ii3

that such

ions, when liquid ated, would be nondi s

523 (a) (2) or 523 (a) (6) of the Ban

11

t

EB also in the

able under

cy Code.

a;nt sough t recov ery and award

12

of costs and attorn eys fees incur red in the adver sary

13

proce

14

loan docum ents and guara nties and Idaho Code

15

Sectio ns 12-120 and 12-12 1.

16

I

. .,_

1 -F

i LSe.J....,_ ,

all

a ri

t to the same under the
sions ,

Much of the histo ry o_ this adver sary

ng is

17

set out in detai l in my oral decis ion of March 3 of this
year

18

in the Chapt er

19

of this year in the same case, Docke t 484 in the Chapt
er 7

20

case.

21

also repor ted at 2015 Westla w 17 8068.

22

fu ly

23

decis ions writte n or oral in eithe r the main case or
the

24

insta nt adver sary proce e

25

conte xt, as well as suppo rt for the findin gs and concl
usion s

7

case and in my writte n decis ion of

il 16

That latte r writte n decis ion of April 6, 16 [sic

ncorp orated

?.O.

Those decis ions are

refere nce, as are the Court 's

Those decis ion

Judge' s Oral Ruling

is

or

de

that I enter

L
S ODe

.c

~'

LDe relevan ~ ascects of that

OJ..

3

a~d the events and the liL

l

the partic

5

pretria l confere nce, trial was set for DecerCo er l

6

2Ql4.

8

disclos ure of trial evidenc e,

9

exhibit s to the Court were entered .

ion of all

on are the follow

s

\•vith

- of all counsel at a Deceffibe r 2013

ricte pretria l terus,

conditi ons and deadlin es

and for

10

modifie d in Februar y, June, and

11

certain of the deadlin es,

sion cf DrcDose d
The

rial order ,,_,as

st of 2014 to adjust
the trial date was not

12

13

In October 2014 the debtors o

I

4

trial which IIB opposed .

t

to con~inu e the

IIB also fi ed a motion to compel

discove ry respons es.

6

a hearing on October 20, the debtors ' motion
to
continu e was denied and IIB's motion to compel was granted .
Then on October 31 the debtors moved to disqual

19

IIB's counsel , Hawley Troxell .

20

On Novemb er 6 and 7, the debtors noved to

21

disqua li

22

as

23

Novemb er 17 the Court conclud ed

24

motions could not be resolve d without a devel

25

record.

several of IIB's trial witness es.

ificant amount of activit y.

It,

therefo re,

This generat ed

And at a hearing on
at the disqua if cation

vacated the Decembe r tria

Judge 1 s Oral Ruling

eviden tiary
and

1-

used

2

discru alifica t on Docion s.

sedat e.sin DecercLber for bearin gs on the
After a two-

0, I entere d an oral ruling

4

motion s in all regard s.

5

in the advers ary docket as Docket 105.

6

A transc

hear

, on

ng the deb-:or s'
of that r:.11

is filed

Later that month che trial was re-sch eduled , this

7

time for May 26

8

additi onal pretri al deadli nes were set.

9

29, and June 1th

5

o:::

2015 and

In March of this year the Court grante d II3's

10

reques t to strike debtor s'

11

witnes ses.

rly disclo sed defens e

The Court also remind ed debtor s' counse l of his
13

ob' i

14

o

15

tte cm:rt.

16

exhib its to the plain tiff had occurr ed and been timely made,

1

but the delive ~y of the disclo sed exhibi ts to the court' s

18

clerk had not.

19

regard ing the lodg

20

Court, sua sponte , grante d a brief extens ion of the deadli ne,

21

which

22
23

24
12s

ions under the pretri al orders

del)to rs'

ng the de ivery

ously identi fied exhibi ts to the clerk o
It had been repres ented that disclo sure of the

Instea d of comply ing with the orders
of the exhibi ts and even

then had been missed ,

this

the debtor s electe d not to

and expres sly waived use at trial of all exhibi ts that
they had

ously disclo sed.
While che advers ary proces s was contin uing, debtor s

filed in their

r 7 case a Februa rv 12, 2015, mot_o

Judge's Oral Ruling
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--:; - ,
~

u ::}-

4S

waive their disch arge under Sectio n 727(a) (10), a wave
r

"'- I

wh

er: was to be effec tive a.cco::cdi:"!.

to ::ht submi ssion as ::o

I

3

all credi tors excep c IIB.

4

by a motio n of the debto rs to dismi ss their

5

or co recon verted to

6

the 362 stay in order

This was~ llowe d later chat month

er 7 case

ll and also a motio n to lift
o renew lit

tion with IIB in state

cou::ct~
8
9

At a hearin g on March 3, the Court denied the
att

parti al waive r of disch arge and set the mocio ns to

10

conve rt or dismi ss and for stay relie f for a hearin
g on March

11

30.

12

both the 3

13

After that March 30 hearin g, which actua lly occur red
on

ri

On

15

17

IB ti~e

filed a crial brief for the
to start on

26.

Debto rs on that due date filed a docum ent purpo rting
to waive
sub:Tt ission of their requi red trial brief .
:-iot autho rized

That was an

the Court 's pretr ial order or

other wise.

20

21

1 30,

ng those motio ns.

ding two week trial that was go

18
19

I entere d the writte n decis ion of

16 that I referr ed to earlie r

14

6

and the 3 •:,

Then less than cwo weeks befor e the trial would
co;r.rn ence, debto rs filed in the Chapt er 7 case a

22

13 -

on

13, a waive r of disch arge under Sectio n 7 2 7 (a) (10)
, that

23

now encom passed all credi tors,

24

72

25

earli er, on

(a) (10)

includ ing I B.

This Sect on

waive r was actua lly execu ted almos t 2 wee~s
1, wjich was the

after debto rs'

Judge' s Oral Ruling

(2

couns el

1

decl ined cc f ~e the tria l brie f; and ic
was cwo wee~ s befo re
the disch arge waiv er made it to the Ccur t
dock et.

3

The debt ors s

t

DI this new waiv er on

4

a 17 day nega tive notic e unde r the loca l
rule s.

5

cour se, wcul d not have reso lved the matt er
befo re the tria l

6

vias sched ,Jled -co cor,:-n ence,

7

spon te,

set a

14 the Cour t, sua

20 hear ing in the Chap ter 7 case on the

The Ccur c, foll
9

so on

This , of

that hear ing, ente red an orde r

appr ovin g the waiv er of disch arge and cause
d the requ ired

10

notic e of no disch arge to be issue d

~I 1

on all cred itors .

12

the clerk and serve d

I had also set a conc urren t

20 hear ing in the

13

adve rsary

14

pote ntia l waiv er of disch arge on the

15

Follm <J

16

foun d and conc luded that the waiv er of disch
arge rend ered

17

moot the ques tion of nond ischa rgea bili

18

unde r 523( a)

19

But I did not then , and have not since ente
red any othe r or

20

furth er orde r rega rding the adve rsary proc
eedin g.

21

to addr ess the

disc ussio n a-c that hea

icati ons of the

with coun sel, I oral ly

of spec ific debt s

and I, there fore , vaca ted the pend ing tria
l.

IIB seek s to reco ver unde r it sanc tions mot
on

22

appr oxim ately $102 ,000 of attor ney' s fees
and cost s that were

23

incu rred in the adve rsary proc eedin g and
it asked that such

24

awar d be impo sed join tly and seve rally on
the debt ors

25

thei r at-or ney,

the debt or's son,

Jona than Fran tz.

Judge 's Oral Rulin g

. o.

don

1

II3 sees to recover from debtors under i::.s

2

ic10t

3

f

4

also so,

tely $406,000 in attorneys fees and costs, a
re which is inclusive of those fees and costs ~hich are
under the sanction motion.
In addition to the aLtornevs fees and tne

6

nontaxable costs that are set out in the fees motion,

7

also has filed a bill of costs, Adversary Docket 120, that

8

request $8233.39 of taxable costs under ~ule

9

local rule 7054.1.

10

) and cur

I'll separately address that cost claim

later~

11

12

054

I3

In order to resolve the cost motion -- the fees
motion and the sanct ons sction, the first aspect that needs

13! to be addressed is jurisdict.io n.

IB's c

aint asserted

14

nondis

15

and unde

16

claims under 28,

17

me,

18

157 (b) (2) (I), the debtors' answer expressly admitted that.

abili

claiss under Section 523 (a) (2)

523(a) (6)

and

(3)

The Court has jurisdictio n over such

U.S.C., Section 1133 and 157 (a)

excuse

1334 and 157 (a), and they were core proceeding s under

1- ..,
a

As I noted a minute ago,

IIB s

t

a judicia

20

determinat ion of all damages under those causes of action,

21

an entry of a nondischar geable money j

22

amount.

23

authori

24

nondischar geable debt as pare and Darcel of its deterDinat icn

2S

of nondischa~ geability icself.

in such an

This Court clearly has the jurisdictio n and
t.o enter a j

t

determinin g the amount of a

?.O.

::?,ox
!2C 5)

n

1

The cases of
F.3d 1015.

Both

3

the case of

4

Appel late Panel,

24 ?.3d 864.

the

inch C rcuit Court cf

469 B . . 11,

al

the

als.

inth Circui t

establ ish that prepos ition.

The debtor s'

counse l has

edly and incorr ectly

6

argued that there was no aspect of the advers ary

7

that would establ ish the amount of any debt, but IIB

8

expres sl

9

amount of the total debt this Court:. would determ ine en the

had asKeo for a money ju

t

g

for

sin the

10

eviden ce to be nondis

11

amount was near

12

The au_ho rities were and are clear that this Court can

13

establ ish the amount of a nondis cha

1

;-noney

t

e.

as 11i

II3's estima te of that

as the total proof of claim filed.

e debt and enter a

as part of the Sectio n 523(a)

5

proces s.

6

writte n decisi on,

I've

ained chis before ,

udicat: .ory

includ ing in a orior

noneth eless debtor s contin ually make the

1- '"7I

flawed assert ion that there was no reques t for damage relief

18

or liquid ation of debt.

19

raised again at the July 28 hearin g.

20

In fact that same argume nt was

When debtor s waived their discha rge under

21

727(a) (10)

22

questi on of nondis char

23

debt owed II3 became moot.

24

owed

25

any other ban

of the code and that waiver was approv ed,
lity of any debt,

the

inc

the

That's becaus e all obliga

ens

debto s were render ed nondis charge able in this o
cy case

virtue of the sectio n

Judge's Oral Ruling

2

27 (a) ( 0)

Co lier on Ban

oy at

7 2 . 12 indica ces

2

that it's a

3

debtor s debts are discha rged and tl'..e d.ebtor ' s nor:e:{eIT:Dt

4

proper ty is ad1nin istered by the '.:ruste e, but ac1y debts unpaid

5

iver of any dis

, et a~,

thus ~one of the

the truste e in his adDin istrat~ on survi~v e.

6

Those ever nondis charge able debts wil~ includ e
here,

and do includ e here all obliga tions under t~e

8

guaran tees and the Eagle

9

any other amount that could be establ ished as o~ed by debtor
s

loan,

_hp

linP of credit and

10

to IIB, whethe r or not such amount s were fraudu lently

11

obtain ed or resulc ed from conver sion.
IIB had not conclu ded ics state court action when

13
4

che debtor s filed their initia l Chapte r 11
and its c aim was not conclu sive

ition in 2011

liquid ated co an amount

15

certai n

16

discha rge was filed on the eve of this Court' s

17

trial,

18

procee ding.

a state court J

the obl

Since the waiver of
2015

tions were not adjudi cated in this advers ary

The debtor s waiver caused a vacati on of that

19

ending trial,

20

been liquid ated,

21

be liquid ated in state court.

22

nt.

so,

since the amount of the debt has not yet

if necess ary it appear s that it will need to

The questi on turns jurisd iction ally as to whe~he r

23

or not the fee issues may be de ermine d

24

the presen t motion ?

25

lesser

this Court

r

In regard to the fees motion and to a

under the sancti ons motion , the partie s have

2

1

l

2

3

debat ed issue s

wheth er or not IIB should be

consi dered the creva il
1

pa

fer tne purpo ses of fee

allow ance.

4

In the case of

2011 Westla w 10609 91,

5

a decis ion from the

6

s

7

debto r/defe ndant filed a Sectio n 727 (a) (10) waive r
before the

8

matte r could cone to trial.

9

plain tiffs'

t

Bc.::1

Court ,

denia l of disch arge under Sectio n 72

After fi

the

ainti£ f

and the

::hat the

aint was rende red moot and quest ioning

10

wheth er resol ution of dis

11

jurisd iction to liq"L1 idate the under ly

12

conte sted claim proce eding ,

13

fo

issues depriv ed the Court of

the

claim outsid e of a
Court stated as

ows, quote :

14

"Defe ndanc s' electi on to waive or disc~ arge came in
the middl e of a hotly conte sted matte r invol

16

exten sive disco very.

17

sugge st that the waive r is not relate d to the

18

ainti ffs'

19
20

Close

It there fore found olain tiff to be the preva il
party for purpo ses of allow ance of costs .

21
22

actio n."

It would be dising enuou s tc

This Court would reach the same gener al concl usion
as to preva iling

23

If state

as did the Court in
aw ~vJere

24

party ,

25

20 5 West aw 38585 28,

'

LO

'
.c
ini.o::cm
the issue of preva il

the Court notes the case of
a decis ion in June of this year, whi
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l

I
I found

a

t.o have

led in the absen ce of a j

2

citin g the 8rovi sions of Idaho Civ~l ?roce dure
Rule

3

54 (d) (1) (B),

4

its discr etion the, quote , \\fina l j 11dgrr·. ent or
resr1 lt ot the

5

2ctioT 1

11

6

,

and concl uding that -c:he Court can con.s ider in

close

, when makin g its deter mina tion.

While the parti es have focus ed on

il

7

their argum ents have not, howe ver,

8

and funda menta l juris dicti onal aspec ts prese
nted by the

9

I curre nt

situa tion.

In my view this is a thres hold issue and

10

as such I need to brief ly

11

proce

2
13

,;"hat

16

has been rende red moot,

and how the adve rsary
and from that found ation

occur s on cons idera tion of the fees motio n and

The Ninth Circu it Court of
c

ls has expla ined in

ca e calle d
398 F.3d l 25,

17

And I will only

18

the citat ions .

19

ain

the sanct ions motio n.

14
15

focus ed on the under

and en bane decis ion in 2005 as follo ws.
certa in porti ons of the text and omit

The court state d,

e:

"For a case to fall withi n the param eters of
our

20

limit ed judic ial powe r,

21

have been a live case or contr overs y when the
case was

22

decid ed by the Court whose j

23

rathe r Art

2

pers ist th

it is not enoug h that there may

le I I I requi res

hat a live con rover s

t a l l stage s of the lit

this condi tio:1 is not met,

?.8.

we are revie w ng,

0:1.

":There

the case has becom e 2oot a:1d

1

its reso lutio n is no long er with in our
cons titut iona l

2
3

?he Nint h Circ uit in anot her case call
ed

4

5

or

415 F.3d 994 in 2005 also

cons ider ed simi ~ar issu es.

Ther e, the plai ntif f was a ~usi c

cer who had filed an adve rsary proc eedi
ng agai nst the

6

debt or, Stan ley 30rr ell, also know n
as MC Hawe .er.

8
9

aint iff s
(a) (6)

nond isch arge abil i

of the Bank ruptc y Code .

The

unde r 523 (a) (4)

c.nd

Afte r Pila te obta ined a

10

SUITcillary j

11

j

12

Cou rt deni ed the enti re disc harg e of
Bur rell and his wife

13

unde r Sec

14

cond tion s o~ a settl eme nt

15

Dis tric t Cou rt ther eaft er affir med the

16

sumP .ary j

17

that Dis tric t Cou rt deci sion held , quot
e:

1,,.1as

t

18

ton the 523( a)
0::1

caus es in 2000 ,

and whil e that

to the Dis tric t Cou rt, the Ban

cy

on 727 base d on thei r failu re to comp
ly with

to Pila te.

with the trus tee.

The

Cou rt's

The Nint h Circ uit on

from

"Tha t Pila te's claim s for deni al of
disc harg e of

19

debt were rend ered moot

20

deni ed disc harg e on othe r grou nds whil
e Pila te's appe al

21

when the

cy Cou rt

befo re the Dis tric t Cou rt."

22

C

se

It expl aine d that desn ite neit her part
y argu

23

case was moo t,

24

obli

25

~allo ws,

that the Cou rt of

the

als had an i

ion to cons ider moo tness sua
quot e:

Judg e's Oral ~uli~ g

and it reas oned as

"The distri ct court_ did not proper ly have
2

'
' d'lCt:lOn
''
'
.,,ear L:llS
'. '
JUrlS
'CO
case becaus e the case became

3

moot while it was pennin g before the Dist:ri ct Court.

4

ril 24,

2002,

less than a month before -cne Distric t_

5

Court ente~e d its o~der of j

6

C8~rt entere d an order

7

on other ground s.

8

trial and appell ate court:s lack

9

jurisd iction and the concom itant power to declar e the

10

, the Ban
ng the discha rge of debtor s

If the contro versy is moot, both the

decidi ng the cla

11

ect E'Latter

on the merits ."

SiDila rly iTI the case of

12

276,

13

Distri ct of Virgin ia earlie r this year.

l

addres sed the questi on of its own contin uing jurisd iction

15

over a Sectio n 523(a)

16

had denied debtor s' discha rge in a separa te 727 advers ary

17

proce

I

8

On

a decisi on of the

y Court from the Easter n
The Bankru ptcy Court

advers ary procee ding after the Court

prosec uted by the United States Truste e.

In that

case a trial in the 523(a) action had starte d but was not

19

comple ted before the Court heard and ruled on t:he U.S.

20

Truste e's co~pla int and denied discha rge.

21

there with the propo sition that Bankru ptcy Courts are courts

22

of limite d jurisd iction .

23
24

The Court starte d

It stated , quote:

"Furth er it is almost univer sally agreed that when
a debtor is denied a discha rge,

any action to dete

ne

the discha rgeab ility of indivi dual debts become s moot."

Judge's Oral Ruling
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3ox
8)
8

l

Clos e

2

3

The cita tion s c~n be f

page 280 of that

deci sion .

4

Sim ilar auth orit ies can be foun d in the
case of

5
6

a

2010 West law 4622 451, a deci sion of the
Ban

7

cy Cou rt in the Nort hern Dis tric t of
Alab ama in 2010 .
In

follo wing an expl icat ion of bank rupt cy

8

cour t juri sdic t on and auth ori

9

acti on befo re it was no long er a core
proc eedi ng and give n
the test for a rela ted to proc ee
, unde r the

10
11
12
13

, the Cou rt foun d that the

juri sdic tion al stat utes , whic h is that
the outco me woul d have
an effe ct on the esta te be
adm inist ered , it also foun d
that the case coul d not be a non- core
rela ted proc e

14

Ther e is a ~ece nt case ar

at a sl

ly

15

diff eren t conc lusio n, that 's

16

1093 105 from the

17

debt or waiv ed his dis

18

523( a)

19

had the abil i

20

notw ithst andi ng the waiv er of disc harg
e, beca use it had

21

alre

22

afte r the filin g of post tria l brie fs
and the subm issio n of
the mat ter for a deci sion .
It elec ted to proc eed, quot e
1
"bec ause it had alre
full y liti
d the issu e rega rdin g
dis
abil ity of claim and
s,n clos e
f

23
24
25

2015 Wes tlaw

ster n Dis tric t of Miss ouri .
and that moo ted a

for adju dica tion .
to 1

Ther e the

The Cour t

ng Sect ion

conc lude d that it

idat e the amou nt of the debt ,

hear d all the evid ence and the waiv er
occu rred onl

?.O.

C2

that it was, quot e,
2

3

l

the deb;: owed ."

r for it to dete r~in e the amou nt of

Clos e

Rowe ver given tne focus on

urisd ictio n and

4

moot ness by the Nint h Circ uit in

5

and given the

6

refer ence d tie the Cou rt's abil i

7

its juris dict ion and i;:s core j risd ictio
n unde r 157 (b) (2) (I)

8

of Title 28; and since this c2se is ~ot
like the

9

I conc lude that I could not and shou ld not
reta in and try the
ma;:t er sole ly to liqu idate the c aim of IIB.

10
11

deci sion s tha;:_ -

So with that

to liqu idate the clain to

case ,

and in elab orati on of ny

12

prio r oral deci sion that the adve rsary proc
eedin g was

13

rend ered moot by the waiv er a dis

14

proc eedi ng will need to be dism issed and
the dism issal wil

15

be with out preju dice .

16

conc lude that this

That leav es of cour se the ques tion of the
effe ct of

17

moot ness and dism issal on the fees moti on.

18

chal leng ed my prio r obse rvati on at the time
of hear ing that

19

this adve rsary proc e

20

IIB hasn 't

has been rend ered moot .

aint iff it does argu e, at leas t

icitl y,

But as

that this Cour t

21

can and shou ld addr ess the supp leme ntal
issue of the

22

allow ance of attor neys fees and cost s befo
re ente r

23

orde r of dism issal .

24

Bank ruptc y Cour t has disc retio n to retai n
juris dict ion when

25

judi cial econo my,

Ther e are case s that sugg est that

fairn ess,

conv enien ce and comi ty favo r that

Judge 's Oral Rulin g
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3ox

its

1

2

rete ntio na

I req ues ted

3

~

con c1u ae tha t thos e fac tors do
not

::et enti on a:1.d

The fac tor cf jud icia l econ omy
doe sn't we

4

strcn g.:.. y in favo r

5

cc.s e,

6

udi cati on of the fees r:totio::1..

rete r:tio r1 of the fees mot ion, unli
ke the

c..his case was not. al

fu2. ly trie d 2nd

sub mit ted to the Cou rt prio r to
the moo t.
a vas t amo unt of pre tria l act ivi

9

Fur ther mor e,

reso luti on with the Fra ntz 's,

11

liqu ida te its clai ms

4
5

116
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

24
25

occ urre d, the tria l

abs ent some sor t of non -lit iga tion

10

13

And eve n

' t even corr..:11enced ~/et .

8

12

eve nt.

IIB wil

be req uire d to

nst deb tors in st.a te cou rt.

Thu s,

my

udi cati on of the fee mot on here
wou ld add ress one
lim ited com pon ent, tha t is to
say the adv ersa ry pro ceed ing
of fees and cos t, whe n the und
erly ing clai m it.s elf in
prin c
le, the ent itle men t to any oth
er fees and cos t
ilic urre d
LIB, tho se
or to ban
cy, dur ing the

11, dur ing the Cha pter

7

and in the ulti mat e stat e

cou rt tria l wou ld all need to
be reso lved by a stat e cou rt.
Par sing the fee issu e betw een
two cou rts in this way doe s no
e jud icia l econ omy .
Fur ther , if such a stat e cou rt
tria l wer e to occ ur, IIB 's pre
par atio n for the tria l of
at
case is not tota lly los t and muc
h of its effo rt wil l not be
was ted and tha t wou ld ame lior ate
the jud icia l econ omy fac tor
as wel l.
The issu es in the adv ersa ry pro
ce
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1

Sect ion 523( a)

2

c

3

SLat

ques tion s are our moot woul d be oure

law, the amou nt of the debt .

ion thaL I'll tal

4

The re's one nota ble

~o late r in this deci sion .

As the Nint h Circ uit BAP said in Casa
mont

5

196 B.~. 517 at 524, need less deci sion s
of stat e

6

..LC.VJ

7

For this Cou rt to addr ess only one segm
ent of fee allow ance

8

unde r stat e law does n't resp ect or adva
nce comi

Fede ral Cou rt shou ld be avoi ded as a
matt er of comi

9

In reac hing thes e conc lusio ns I don 't
gain say Lhat

10

the fees IIB incu rred

11

The natu re o

12

conv ersio n, the amou nt in cont rove rsy,
the long hist ory of
tran sact ions , the
of the unde rl ng loan s, the

13
14
15

116
17
18

19
20

exi

n this

ing are sign ifica nt.

the case , whic h soun ded in frau d and

and dura tion of even ts that gave rise
to the

claim s and prec

ated the

aint , the need for

prep arat ion for a tria l of a suit of
this type , and the
spec ific trou bles ome aspe cts cf the litig
atio n that occu rred
in this Cou rt, some of whic h I will addr
ess furt her in a
mom ent, have all conL ribu ted to the
anou nt of fees
incu rred .

21

One conc ern unde rlyin g

pres enta tion of the

22

fees moti on to this Cou rt, unde r the
circu msta nces of

23

mco tnes s of the unde rlyin g case ,

24

purs ues li

25

debt ors it will be in a stat e cour t acti
on wher e that cour L

be that when IIB

l
•
dati on ar:d coll ecti on of its C..Lal;
-;.S

st

Judg e's Oral Rulin g

0

will have less fami liari ty with che deta
ils of cne lit
2

i

I

3

this Cour t and thus with the reaso nabl enes
s of the fee

and cost s incu rred in IIB's prep ar

the case fo::- tria l and

4

in its respo ndin g to the vario us moti ons
and

:i

ot:le r fil

6

allow ance and amou nt of fees and nonc axab
le costs will

7

like ly be a stace cour t's to make on what
ever subm issio ns

8

and argum ents as may be pres ente d, both

9

debt ors.

10

s made by the debt or.

ec'cio ns and

The deci sion as to the

IIB and

the

Io the exte nt that this Cou rt's view of
the

11

reaso nabl enes s of IIB's

12

adve rsary proc e

I am

cy fees and expe nses in the

is mate rial,

I'll make it here .

te fami liar with the natu re, magn itude and

exit y of the unde r ying trans actio ns and
even ts,
15
1

_J_

ton

h

~

pres

ever the enti

I have

of this case and the adve rsary

I

for seve ral year s,

I

I am fami liar with the

17

liti

18

part ies,

19

that pers pect ive I can conf iden tly state
that the amou nt

20

ion that has occu rred and the posi tions
taken

the

I have hear d and ruled on nume rous matt ers,
with

by IIB, whic h are fully and adeq uate

doc:.u nente d

21

the subm issio ns made in supp ort of the fees
moti on are

22

reaso nabl e in natu re and anou nt and

23

incu rred

24

cond uct of the debt ors.

25

moti on are not pers uasiv e.

were appr opri ate y

the matt ers at issue and the liti
The debt ors

ectio ns to the fee
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l
2

But nocwi chs

those obser vation s, which I

clear ly make for the record ,
ousl

3

for the reason s thac I've

stated , the Courc can't enter a decis ion or order

4

addre ss

5

piec~m eal appro ach co Just one a

6

may ultim ately come befor e a state courc and it would
invad e

7

the

8

would be inimi cal with a decis ion that moocn ess of
this

9

proce eding requi res dismi ssal of the oroce e

10

the allowa nce of such fees.

That would be a
of fees and costs that

of the state court to decide all issue s and it

those reason s I will

the

So for

j~risd ictio~ al

11
12

I view the bill of costs that I nentio ned,

13

Adver a

14

would find IIB

15

i s litiga tion the ultim ate relie f sough t of

I

6

Docke t 120 diffe rent

As I've noted the Courc

be the preva il

nondi schar geabi licy.

Unlik e fees,

, achie ving

which in this conte xt are

17

a state law issue ,

18

rule.

19

Local Rule 7054. l, IIB is entitl ed to costs .

20

cost reque st $8233 .39 of taxab le costs .

21

items claim ed and find them to be in accord wich the
rules,

22

they will be allow ed and

23

debto rs.

24

taxati on of cost is a matte r of feder al

Under Rule 7054(b )

of the Bankr uptcy Rules and our
The bil

of

I have review ed the

will be taxed again st the

I'm going to turn now to the sanct ions motio n,
which seeks a lowan ce of a subse t of ~he fees and
cost,

2

ly l/4t h,

as sanc tion s to be

osed agai nst debt ors and

2

thei r coun sel

3

star ti2g po~ ~ is juri sdic tion al foun
datio n and cont ext.

4

basi s or1 v.1hic h this Cou rt can ente rtain the
sanc tion s

S

oint ly and seve rally .

8
9

10
11

2

13

The
....

'

ITlOL lOil

is not iden tica l to that whic h I've just
disc usse d re

6

7

in the

Even if an unde rlyin g adve rsary proc eedi
ng
is dism issed , the Cou rt has juri sdic tion
to cons ider and
se sanc tion s for cond uct in that proc eedi
ng. The case s
of in re:
409 Fede ral
dix 07, a Nint h Circ uit deci sion of Dece
mber 2010 ,
esta blis hed that the Bank ruptc y Cou rt had
juri sdic tion to
se sanc tio:1 s sua
e, afte r form al dism issa l of the
ban
case itse lf, citin g the U.S. Supr eme Cour
t

14

de isio n of

15

39

16

496 U.S.

384 at

Add ition ally the Nint h Circ uit in the case
of

17
18

19
20
21

22

of Octo ber 8, 2010 , held that the 3ank rupt
cy Cou rt had
juri sdic tion to
se sanc tion s, notw ith
the
app ella nt's requ est to volu ntar ily with
draw com plain ts.
It
foun d that sanc tion s are a coll ater al issu
e that the Cour t
may cons ider , quot e:

23

"Aft er an actio n is no long er pend ing beca
use

24

aim to dete r abus e of the judi cial oroc
ess and have no

25

bear

and thus , no res judi cata effe ct on the
ca es

0.

unde rl
2

ng mer its."

Once agai

3

Clos e

the Nint h Circ uit cite d the

deci sion .

4

The 3AP had dete rmin ed in an inte rme diat
e appe al in

5

the

6

adve rsar y did not

case , that the dism issa l of the
ive the

cy Cou: -t of

jur sdic tion to near the sanc tion s requ
est,
8
9

and ethe r auth orit ies.

also rel

ng on

The BA? dee sion is

foun d at 2009 West law 7809 930.

10

The re's also a Nint h Circ uit case call
ed

11

762 F.3d 963, a deci sion in

12

2014 ,

13

Cou rts have anci lary juri sdic tion , amon
g othe r thin gs,

4
5

116
17
18
19
20

in whic h the Nint h Circ uit anno unce d
that Fede ral

quot e:
"To enab le it to func tion succ essf ul

, that is to

mana ge its proc eedi ngs, vind icat e its
auth ori
effe ctua te its decr ees. "
I

and

Clos e

conc lude that I have juri sdic tion over
the

sanc tion 's moti on, notw ithst andi ng the
moo tness and the soon
to be ente red dism issa l of the Sect ion
523( a) proc eedi ng.

21

The grav amen of the sanc tion s moti on
is that the

22

cond uct of the debt ors and thei r atto
rney , Mr. Fran tz, ~as
rope r, in bad fait h and
riou s to IIB.

23

24
25

I have prev ious ly and
chis Cou rt rath er, has

?.C.
(2

ous

sive ly

- excu se me,
sive ly

2

24

1

s1.:r:m1 arized t:he author ty addres sing its inhere nt a1.;.t:lor i ty

2

to sancti on parcie s.

3

2014, Wescla w,

4

That's the case of

441854 9, a decisio n of S

e1cber 8 1 2014.

As before I will relate che holdin gs withou t case

5

ciI-ati on.

6

Court has ~ne inhere nt author i

7

attorn eys for their conduc t in ban

8

inhere nt sancti o2 au~hor i

9

deter and provid e comoe nsation for a broad range of

The Court said under SecL-ic n 105(a)

1

a Ban

to sancti on partie s and
cases.

allows a Ban

The
Court to

r

10

1

11

inhere nt sancti oning author i

12

findin g of bad faith or willfu l miscon duct.

13

the inhere nc sancti on author ity, bad faith or willfu l

t

ation tactic s.

Sefore

miscon duct cons st of someth
ne

igence or reckle ssness .

cy

sing sancti ons under its
a Court must make an explic it
With regard to

more egregi ous than mere
Moreov er the Court' s inhere nt

16

powers under Sectio n 105(a) must be exerci sed with restra int

17

and discre tion.

18

lit

19

litiga tion, bad faith,

20

judici al proces s and acting in the litiga tion for an improp
er

21

purpos e or acting for oppres sive reason s.

22

2014 Westla w 441854 9 at pages 3 and 4 and it cites among

23

other things the Ninth Circu it's decisi on in

25

and

Sancti onable conduc t includ es

on tactic s,

for exampl e, del

ng or dis

r

ing

wanton conduc t, willfu l abuses of

This is found at

t also cites the

Judge's Ora.l Ruling

l

Nint h Cir

2

West law 8421 02.

it 3AP deci sion in

S-I-N -G-H ,

2014

The BAP had also issue d and othe r dee sior
in 2012

4

calle d

5

It too finds that sanc tions are avai lable
for a vari e

6

type s of wilf ul actio ns,

2012 West law 10687 0.

incl

reck lessn ess when

comb ined with an addi tiona l facto r,

such as frivo lous ness ,

8

hara ssme nt,

9

part y does not act in bad faith but only
reck lessl y,

or an imor ooer purp ose, there fore , even if
a

10

that reck less cond uct is c

11

such as an att

12

an
inhe rent

14

and

r.

d with an impr oper purp ose

to influ ence or man

late proc e

to

That 's at page 5 of the BAP deci sion citin
g

the

l

5

note d,

6

misc ondu ct,

17

when

, it is sanc tiona ble unde r a Cou rt's

c

13

of

case .

As the 3AP there

the inhe rent powe r to sanc tion cove rs a broa
d range of
inclu ding wilf ully abus ing the judi cial

proc esse s.

18

In rega rd to the gene ral inhe rent powe r,
Atto rney

19

Fran tz has

20

plai ntif f rath er than invok

21

inhe rent powe r.

22

F.3d 1139 , the Nint h Circ uit reco gniz ed
that the inhe rent

23

powe r to sanc tion is a valid alter nati ve
basi s for

24

sanc tions there wher e the Cour t had mis

25

The Cour t noted that unde r its

that Rule 9011 shou ld be used by the
that Cour t -- the Cou rt's

Howe ver in

509

si g

ied Rule 9011 .

or deci sion of

2

llate Cour t woul d not over turn a Bank ruptc
y Cour t's

1

2

deci sion mere ly beca use that Cour t

31

the ri

ous use of its inhe rent powe r to sanc tion.

4

5

ied the wron g labe l to

The fees and nont axab le cost sough c by IIB
unde r
the sanc tions moti on rela te only to certa in
spec ific cond uct

6

the debt ors and thei r coun sel, Mr. Fran tz,
durin g the

7

cour se of this

8

histo ry of the case and the over all cond uct
of the case woul d
infor m that ques tion.
IIB seek s fees and cost as sanc tions
in the follo wing cate gori es.

9
0
11

Firs t, rega rding the moti on of IIB to comp
el

12
3
14

ion of docu ment s, whic h was gran ted

7
18
19

Adve rsary

Dock et 52, fees are claim ed in the amou nt
of $253 4.50 as
show n at Dock et 118, page s 12 and 13.

15
16

, even thoug h the enti rety of the

Seco nd, in rega rd to the Octo ber 2014 moti
ons of
debt ors to amen d the pret rial orde r and cont
inue the Dece mber
2014 tria l, moti ons whic h were deni ed
the Cour t in Octo ber
of 2014 , IIB claim s fees in the amou nt of
S301 4.50 as found
at Dock et 118, page s 14 and 15.

20

Thir d, rela ting to the debt ors' moti ons to

21

dis

22

IIB' s witn esse s, all of whic h moti ons were
deni ed

23

Cour t in Dece r:ber of last year .

24

and trav el cost s tota ling $182 6.96 are claim
ed, this is a
tota l amou nt of 549, 477. 46 in this categ ory
and is item ized

25

i

IIB' s coun sel, Hawl ey Trox ell, and to disq
uali
the

Fees tota ling $47, 650. 50,
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l

at Docket 118 a~ pages 16

2

Fourth, in connection with debtors'

s losure o:::

3

the exhibits to IIB which was later followed

4

called waiver of submiss on of the actual exhibits to the

~

Court,

6

is at: Docket

s so-

these are claimed in the amount of $6171, itemization
1- -1V
Q

7

Fifth,

8

the full section

9

of trial,

at pages 26

31.

in connection with the del

submission of

27(a) (10) waiver, which occurred on the eve

IIB seeks fees of $42,829 and costs of $1131.15 for

10

a period of March 3 through

11

category totals $43,960.15 and is itemized at Docket 118,

12

pages 32

13
14

5

Sixth, and finally,
mot on itself,

20 of this year.

This

for the work on the sanctions

I B claims fees of $3396.50,

Docket 118 at 43

2nd 44.

16

==rm first

to take up the motion to compe .

17

Recall,

18

Docket Nur:-tber 52.

19

would be allowed pursuant to Civil Rule 37 (a) (5) (A),

20

incorporated

21

requested fees of $2534.50 are reasonable and appropriate and

22

the same will be awarded under the Civil Rule and

23

Rule.

24
25

this Court

ed IIB's discovery motion and entered
In that order the Court indicated fees

Bankruptcy Rule 7037.

as

I conclude that the

cy

I would note this is not a sanctioned ruling and it
requires no special findings under the authorities that

Judge's Oral Ruling
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1
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,----- ----- ----- - ~-- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----

---- ---- ---- ,

1

just sur;:-un arized.

2

Cnder i ,

3

a disco very dispu te unles s one cf the three condi tions
of

5

they are net.

6

of fees for sanct ionab le condu ct, which would be rule
37(b)

7

and (d)

8

this decis ion all

9

Rule and 3ankr uptcy Rule, consi stent with my

The rule here is a fee shift i

fees and costs are allowe d a succe ssful lit

The portio n of the rule that addre sses award

is not at issue .

So I will enter an order fol

the fees of $2534 .50 under the Civil

10

Docke t 52.

11

asses sed again st and payab le

12

Frant z joint ly and sever al

13

ant in

As autho rized

the Civil Rule,

The secon d

order r
the same will be

debto rs and Attorn ey Jonath an

that I'll addre ss is the motio n

14

to ameno the pretr ial order and to contin ue the trial
back in

15

Octob er 20 4.

16

not well taken , nor persu asive

17

on the whole of the record , that they were advan ced
with the

18

purpo se and inten t requi red under the case law for
exerc ise

19

of my

20

seekin g fees relate d to that aspec t of the case will
be

21

denie d.

22

I denie d those motio ns then becau se

~'Vere

But I do not find,

nhere nt sanct ionin g autho ri

The sanct ions motio n

Next I'll addre ss the motio n to disqu ali

IIB's

23

couns el and the bank' s witne sses.

24

Octob er motio ns were

25

motio ns c aimin g that IIB's couns el must be disqu
alifie d for

Recal l that soon afte

udica ted there were addit ional

Judge' s Oral Ruling
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f
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sss
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1

ethi cal reaso ns and that there were comp
ellin g reaso ns to

2

disq uali

3

thei r use at tria l.

4

requ ired vaca tion of the tria l and it reou
ired the hol

5

a mult iple

6

the bank 's claim s

seve ral

9

vaca t

12

13

The decis io~ to defe~ d

ions of unet hica l cond uct and conf lict was

calc ulate d and strat egic .

1

of

attac king the bank 's coun sel and do

8

10

I:3 for

~ne u cirna te reso lutio n of these ma~t ers

evid entia ry hear ng.

so with all

I

witn esses iden tifie d

and pos

It had the des red effe ct of

ing the tria l.

It had tne addi tion al,

and the Cour t finds the desi red effe ct of
outt

coun sel and

IIB to extra ordi nary expe nse and at botto
m, the alleg ation s
lack ed meri t and were denie d in a

sive rulin g

is Cour t.

1

In

emen tat en of the sanc tions moti on

v1ay

15

of Adve rsary Dock ets 125 and 126,

16

prev ious ly undi sclos ed infor mati on abou t
the disq uali fica tion

17

I moti on.

IIB has prov ided addi tiona

A June 4, 2015 , emai l from Mart y Fran tz to
Jack

18

Gust ave! ,

19

with debt ors in a

20

firm ,

21

leve rage that into a reso lutio n of IIB's
claim s agai nst the

22

debt ors.

23

day hear ing and the Dece mber 2014 rulin g
of this Cour t that

24

there was no neri t on the evide nce to the
conf lict of

25

inte rest alle

the CEO of the bank ,

sugg ested that the bank join

ice case agai nst the Hawl ey Trox ell

obta in a big settl eme nt from the firm 's insu
rers and

This rath er brea thta

over ture follo wed the two

ions agai nst t2e rirr.
'

~

,-

'

?.0.

0

The email furth er discl osed that the idea behin
d
2

the

3

a Chica go attor ~ey ~aued K2tz~

4

regar d that the earli er disqu alific ation motio
n press ed

5

again st the law firm was a, quote ,

6

that Katz could ,

ettlem ent propo sal was jo ntly devel

them selve s."
8

e,

meri ts of ah

The e~ail state d in this

"prob e," close quote , so

"see ho1.tv Havl

Close

debto rs and

Trox ell would defen d

And quote , "to evalu ate the

st:.ake s futur e

ice case. "

Close

9
10

It furth er state d, quote ,

"Mr. Katz 's firm neede d

11

to decid e if the case was stron g

t:.o comp el then

12

to pursu e the futur e high- stake s civil

itiga tion on a

13

cont

4

15

l6

nt fee bass ."

Close quote .

That emai l also discl osed that a ma

actic e case

nst Hawle y Trox ell was recen tly filed in civil
court .

It

now appea rs that this case was

17

case CV-20 15 1406 in the First

18

Judic ial Dist rict Cour t, Koote nai Coun ty, what
I'll call the

-9

malp racti ce case.

20

The presi ding judge in that case, the Hono rable

21

John T. Mitc hell issue d a July 29,

22

in that case and cause d its decis ion to be serve
d direc t yon

23

this Cour t.

24

cours e a matte r of recor d in the state court
of

25

take judic ial notic e under Rule 201 of the FRE.

2015, meno randu n decis ion

Not only was it serve d on this

Cour t,

t i s of

which I may

1

The dee sion in the malp ract ice case refl
ects that

2

the su twa s file d on Febr uary 20, 2015
, a

3

afte r I

4

I':',ot ion.

5

stcte men ts in rend er

7

had rule d in Dece mber

e of mont hs

the disq uali fica tion

Mitc hell made seve ral insi

ful ar:d tell ing

his 25 page deci sion .

For ex

"Fra ntz' s posi tion take n in this case dem
onst rate

8

his misu nder stan ding of stat e and fede ra

9

laws and thei r inte ract ion.

10

and the le

11

dem onst rate the absu rdi

12

quot e.

unde

bank rupt cy

The :celi ef

of this litiq atio n."

At page 2,

14

"The fata l fact ual prob lem with Fran tz's

17
18

19
20
21

22
23
24
25

F~an tz

~ng that requ este d reli ef

13

16

eat

Clos e

lS

that Haw ley Trox ell did not repr esen t Fran
tz as an
atto rney in that prio r litig atio n, thus
no con flic t and
no r:,a
ice in the
cy proc eedi ng.
The fata l
lega l prob lem with Fran tz's theo ry is that
the Hon orab le
Terr y 1. Mye rs, pres idin g Chie f Judg e of
the Unit ed
Stat es Bank rupt cy Cou rt, alre ady deci ded
that prec ise
issu e on Dece mber 10, 2014 , afte r a two
day evid ent ary
hear
Fran tz brea thed not a word abou t that prio
r
deci sion in his com plain t and jury dema
nd file d befo re
this Cou rt, file d two mon ths afte r Judg
e
rs'
Clos e quot e.

Judg e's Oral Rulin g

1

The stat e ccur c deci sion late r note s that

2

leas e Fran tz was hone st in disc los

3

wa~

purs ued in 3a

4

le at

that the cor:i_pl int cha

cy Cou rt,

"Fra ntz was ccm plete ly sile nt in his

2int

5

abou t what u

6

disq uali fy.

7

ou~t ted any refe renc e i~ his

8

file d befo re this Cou rt, che fact that
two mont hs

9

earl ier Judg e

10

rs did with Fran tz's effo rt to
As men tione d abov e, Fran tz conv en
aint and jury dema nd

s deci ded Fran tz had abso lute l

no

basi s upon -,1hich to disq uali fy Haw ley Trox
ell."

Clos e

11

12

Tha t's at page 3 of the

13

The stat e cour t ultim atel y gran ted Hawl
ey

ice deci sion .
rox ell's

14 ) r:i_otion to dism iss or abat e the
case .

1s

earl ier 1 make clea r that the Cou rt may
ente r sanc tion s,

6

l 7

The Nint h Circ uit auth orit ies, whic h
I outl ined

J

l

, '\to dete r and prov ide com pens
ation for a broa d rang e

18

or,-

19

liti

ion tact ics can incl ude del

20

liti

ion and acti ng in the lit

21

purp ose or for oppr essi ve reas ons.

22

l
J_

ti

on tact ics. "

Clos e

Thos e in prop er
or dis
ion for an impr oper

This Cou rt has earl ier and repe ated ly expr
esse d

23

conc ern that the moti ons, obje ctio ns and
a

24

debt ors and thei r coun sel coul d well be
view ed as
stra tegi c rath er than ~eri tori ous and
to stra tegi c

25

9-

ss

s adva nced

3

1

desire s rather than or

c

2

DeceF;b er

refere ncing the Octobe r 17 oral

3

rul ~g and agai

4

O oral r 11l
in

ed ones.

ri,

tne

This would be in the

decisio n~

Given their very nature and timing , the

5

disqu alifica t on motion s before this Court were gua_

6

cause IIB and its counse l to

7

This Court found the motion s lacked any merit.

8

appear s that anothe r st

9

i"'tOtion to dis

s

·was at

to

ifican t resour ces.

ay,

It also new

the use of the

ify counse l was a test of the law firm in

10

order to evalua te an antici pated collat eral malpra ctice suit

11

and remati c [sic]

12

disou alifica t on sotion , when the ma

13

actua l

14

the state

15

disqu alifica tion motion bu

16

,

01.::

of the behavi or in this Court on the
ctice suit was

the debtor s and their counse l disclo sed to

rt the existe nce of the ban
not its unst:cc essful outcom e.

I can leave to

Mitch ell the questi ons

17

concer n

18

the

19

here is that all this conduc t points to t.he i:r,prop er 1Jse
1

20

indeed the misuse of litiga tion tactic s to cause econom ic

21

injury to an oppone nt and its counse l in the form of

22

increa s

23

increa se the bu~den of liti

ion and concom itantly inc~ea se

24

the poten tial of settlem ent.

And even

25

goa

the lack of candor and the relate d issues under

daho Rules of Profes sional Conduc t.

o

l '~
_lL

ion costs.

delay of the

That manife sted intent was to

f not settle d,

ng trial was achiev ed using

Judge 1 s Oral Ruling
.0.

The salien t point

of the case

the cond uct

sel, Jona than Fran tz, was f
3

and :or oppr essi ve reas ons and its

4

or dis

ng litig atio n.

debto ::-s

an

se

and cons eque nce was
As that case law

otes ,

5

will ful acti ons and even reck less cond
uct, when comb ined

6

r purp ose or hara ssme nt, will adeq uate
ly s

7

requ ired fi

8

9
10
l

12

th
the

of bad fait h and will ful misc ondu ct.

This Cou rt, ther efor e, on the ent
reco rd and with

sis on the fact s set fort h toda y, as

well as in its orio r deci sion s, find s
that the moti ons to
disq uali fy IIB' s coun sel and witn esse s
were made in bad
fait h,

3

S

14

s

r

r purp ose and man ifest will ful misc ondu
ct.

ctio ns are appr opri ate.

11 be asse ssed .

ions are com pens atory in natu re.

IIB reau est fees and

J1s

nont axab le cost s of $49, 4 7.46 ace

16

item izat ion at Exh ibit C, Dock et 118,
page s

17

I find and conc lude that the same or othe
r appr opri ate

18

claim ed and sanc tion s in such amou nt will
be asse ssed aga ns
debt ors and thei r coun sel, Jona than Fran
tz, join tly and
seve rally .

19
20
21
22

The next cate gory soug ht
to prov ide,

25

6

23.

the bank is the refu sa

or the so-c alle d waiv er of use of the
prev

disc lose d exh ibits .
24

to my revie w of the

s

The debt ors disc lose d 175 prop osed

exh ibits , indi cati ng an iGte ntio n to use
them at cria l.
disc losu re was tise ly made and the plai
ntif f rati ona ll

?.J. 3oz
3, I s
(2Q ) 9 9 ?455 -

This
d

1

reas onab ly devo ted s

2

eval uati ng thos e prop osed exhi bi s,
and cons ide

3

the ccnt ext of its own exhi bits and
the othe r disc over y in

4

the case .

5

Marc h 2015 ,

6

fica nt time to anal yzin g and

When the Cour t was addr ess
inc

the stri

matt ers befo re it in

of the defe ndan ts'

rcpe -ly disc lose d defe nse witn esse s,

it remi nded coun sel

7

that debt ors'

8

bank , but the orde r of the Cour t requ
red that the or

9

exh ibits and thei r coo es be deli vere
d to the cler k and that

exhi bits not only had to be disc lose
d to the

l

10

the dead line for do

11

Mr.

12

allow ed him anot her week to do so, thou
gh by all righ ts the

13

docu ment shou ld have been alre

Fran tz to c

4

so had pass ed.

The Cou rt inst ruct ed

y with the orde r and fini sh his task
and

and read y to be

when the in tial dead line

Mr. Fran tz filed ,

at

15

the end of the grac e peri od allow ed

16

use of any exhi bi s.

17

$617 1 in fees .

18

in eval uat

19

neve r real ly inte nded to use.

20

and disc losu re of the exh ibits , coup
led with a late r waiv er,

21

as evid enci ng a desi gn,

22

bank to unne cess ary work and expe nse.

23

take n

24

pre tria l orde rs is,

25

not

the Cou rt, a waiv er of

IIB' s requ est in this rega rd seek s

It argu es that it incu rred time and
expe nse
exh ibits , whic h in the bank 's view debt
ors

the debt ors'

IIB sees the iden tific atio n

whic h from the outs et was to
Whil e the

and coun sel to

fran kly,

the

unfa thom able ,

with the
and the Cou rt is

ssed with the post fact o ratio nali zati
ons,

it c

0
.v

6

1

reach tne concl usion that the ident ificat ion

2

and orov sion of the same to the bank at the init a

3

we~

4

any exhib its

5

~~n°~ ion~ motio n will be denied .

CI

the exhib its
deadl

e

done with a then orese nt ana existi ng inten t to never
use

6

all.

For that reason this aspec t

The next aspec t is the del2y or the debto rs in

7

filicg

8

execu ted that waive r, corre ct

r coIT<p lete sectio n 720 (a) (10) ·v1aive r.

the .:::atal ly falled -- flawe d

al waive r appro ach that

9

had earli er attem pted, they

10

did so on

11

13, the trial was sched uled to start on

l.

vvhen

The waive r wasn' t actua lly filed until
26.

IIB reque st

sanct ions in the amoun t of $43,9 60.15 , which encom pass
fees
13

and costs incur red from March 3, when debto rs becan e
aware

14

th::-cu

15

not .:::- y I

16

was appro ved.

ny rul
to

17
8
19
20

that a parti al waive r of disch arge would
20, the date that the waive r in prope r form

Initia lly the Court would conclu de and find that
the prope r t

spa::1 for the

of sanct ions on

this behav ior would be from May 1, when a prope r and
27 (a) (10)

iant V}ai ver was execu ted to May 13, the

21

it was filed befor e the Court .

22

sanct ions motio n, I believ e the fees in the short er perio
d of

23

time would be $16,0 44.

24

shoul d be addre ssed as a sancti on?

25

Exhib it E to the

The quest ion is wheth er this amcun

From the prior ~ul

?.

In revi

on the carti al

iver,

debt ors and coun sel knew that only a

waiv er of

disch arge as to all claim s woul d be cons
is ent
and with case auth oriti es.

It clea r

ith the cede

was one avenu e

4

avai lable for debt ors to resol ve matt ers
and of cour se it

5

woul d have tne cons eque nce of moot

6

ther efor e,

7

to May 13.

8

that IIB was

9

dela y was simp ly for the purp ose and the
inten t to incre ase

0

the cost incu rred

the tria l.

has to be on the reaso n for the de

The focus
from

l

IIB asse rts that debt ors and thei r attor ney
knew
ng dil

tly for tria l and that the

the bank .

In subm issio ns made in

11

oppo sitio n to the moti on, debt ors asse rt
that the reaso n for

12

sitti ng on the

that

l exec uted waiv er for two week s was so

coul d

ore one last a

Ther e are attac hmen ts,

C

at settl eme nt.

emai ls betw een the

ies

attor neys that indic ate sett emen t discu
ssion s did in fact
16

occu r.

17

bank and its dilig ent coun sel woul d be fina
lizin g

18

prep arati ons for the

19

awar e that ,

20

tria l.

21

Even

debt ors were obvi ous y awar e that the

tria l,

even

debt ors were

if nece ssary they could file waiv er and
moot the

I can' t find on this reco rd that the two
wee

dela y

22

in filin g the waiv er was done with the purp
ose and inten t to

23

oppr ess and caus e expe nse,

2L

of dela y and to incre ase the inju ry,

25

woul d inev itabl y be filed .

that is to say delay for the sake
know ing that the

ver

Had the settl eme nt been reach ed,

38

1

the tria l prep arati on expe nse would stil l
have been incu rred

2

the bank , but che waiv er of cour se,

in the cont ext of a

3

settl e~en t, woul d not need to be

4

cour se, deal s with not just the bank 's debt
.

5

reaso ns I find that the reco rd is insu ffici
ent to s

6

the sanc tions moti on and chis aspe ct of che
moti on will

7

deni ed.

8
9

sed and the waiv er of
For those

IIB also , as I noce d, requ ested fees and
costs for
bri

t~e s2nc tions notio ~, that 's unde r Exh ibit~
to the

10

moti on.

Whil e a port ion -- whil ed

11

moti on is go

to be gran ted, as I've indic ated , a

12

si

ion will not, and I have conc luded that I

,13

fican t

ion of the sanc tions

will not awar d fees incu rred in brie f

and argu

the

anct ions ~,oti on.
15

So Lhe moti on

ill be gran ted in part , the amou nt

16

of $49, 477. 46 will be asse ssed agai nst the
debt ors and thei r

17

attor ney,

18

othe rwis e

19

conc lusio n,

20

brie fly addr esse d.

2l

Jona than Fran tz,

join tly and seve rally and I will

the sanc tions moti on.

In reach ing this

I think ther e's one othe r issue that shou
ld be

Atto rney Fran tz has argue d that IIB,

in see

22

sanc tions agai nst him but not agai nst the
debt ors'

23

attor ney, Mr. McCr ea,

24

othe rwis e show s that the moti on is urge d
impr oper

25

I've note d,

is evide nce of pers onal enmi

othe r
r

I've deter mine d that a port ion of the mot
en w
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1

1

be grante d, an assessm ent nade

21 not also agains t McCrea ?

ointlv and severa l

The first ands

5

-:hat

4

thus,

5

second and more tellin g answer has to do with the conduc t
of

6

the advers ary procee ding.

7

outset of the advers ary procee ding, moved unsucc essful ly to

8

strik.e the

9

McCrea later appear ed as co-cou nsel

3 did not reoues t sancti ons agains t Mr.

I'm not real

McCrea and,

oresen ted with that auesti on.

But a

Attorn ey Frantz

at the

int and subseq uently answer ed i

.

Mr.

Docket 17.

In

10

S

11

Docket 32.

12

advers ary procee ding

13

the deb~or s had asked Mr. McCrea to cease repres entatio n in

14

the advers ary procee ding in order to reduce legal costs.

15

did not allow Mr. McCre a's total withdr awal.

16

indica ted that he would be respon sible for one discre te

17

aspect of the advers ary procee ding and that would be,

18

trial occur and should Jonath an Frantz be called to testi

19

Mr. McCrea would have to act as debtor s'

20

examin ation and cross examin ation of Mr. Frantz .

21

hearin g on the disqua lificat ion of IIB's counse l, the mat-:er

22

which suppor ts the award of sancti ons was conduc ted

23

Attorn ey Frantz .

24

aspect for which I have today,

25

appro priate ly impose d.

r of last year Mr. McCrea fiied a motion to withdr aw,
Then in the Octobe r motion s filed in the
Attorn ey Frantz , he repres ented that

Instea d I

should

counse l during the
The two

It is that aspect of the case and only that
found sancti ons to be

Mr. McCrea was not involv ed there,

Judge's Oral Ruling
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I

l

nor does it appea r

2

case that

e was involv ed in the relate d state court

've discu ssed earlie r.

3

~

I perce ive no reason for

of the sancti ons relate d to the

4

disqu alific ation motio n on Mr. McCre a and canno t,

5

Tt1ake tf':e finC.i ngs 2nd concl usion s that are :::-equ ired
of rrte

6

under the case law.

7

Addit ional

, I c·ose lv observ ed the condu ct of all

8

couns el in this case and in the under lying ban
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lJNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Re:
Idaho Indeuendent Bank
c/o Sheila RSchwager
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
POB 1617
Boise, ID 83701
Plaintiff,
:!\1artin D. Frantz
PO Box 830
Rathdrum, ID 83858
Defendant

)
)
)

Case

11-21337-TLM

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Chapter Number: 7
AdYersary Proceeding No.: 13-07024-TLM

)

NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND OF DEADLII\IES RELATED TO RESTRICTION
AND REDACTION
A transcript of the following document number:
139 - Hearing Held Appearances: Telephonic: Sheila Schwager Attorney for Plaintiff; Jonathon Frantz Attorney for
DefendantRep ort Proceedings: The Court issued oral findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.
'aintiffs Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs, Doc. No. 123, was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Plaintiffs
~otion for Sanctions, Doc. No. 117, was granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff will be awarded $49,477.46
in sanctions under the Courts inherent power against Debtors and Debtors counsel, jointly and severally. Plaintiff will
also be awarded fees and costs of $2,534.50 under Rule 37 associated with a previous discovery dispute, Doc. No. 52,
against Debtors and Debtors counsel, jointly and severally. Plaintiffs bill of costs, Doc. No. 120, will be approved.
The adversary proceeding will be dismissed as moot. The Court will enter orders consistent with its oral
decision.Audi o File Location: BOI-CTR.c\15 (RE: related document(s)l 17 Motion for Sanctions filed by Plaintiff
Idaho Independent Bank, 123 Application for Compensation filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) (dj)
was filed on 9/29/15.
The parties have until 9/24/15 to file with the court a Notice of Intent to Request Redaction of this transcript. The
deadline for filing a request for redaction is 10/8/15.

If a request for redaction is filed, the redacted transcript is due 10/19/15.
If no such notice is filed, the transcript may be made available for remote electronic access upon expiration of
restriction period, which is 12/16i15 unless extended by court order.

To review the transcript
redaction purposes, you may purchase a copy from the transcriber or you may view the
document at the clerk's office public terminal.
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Elizabeth A Smith
U.S.

Court
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Date Created: 9/29/2015
Total: 8

Recipients of Notice of Electronic Filing:
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aty

John F Kurtz, Jr
Jonathon Frantz
Sheila R2.e Schwa2:er
Stephen Brian McCrea

mccreaecf@cda.twcbc.com

TOT.AL: 4
Recipients submitted to the BNC (Bankruptcy Noticing Center):
pla
dft
dft
ust

Idaho Independent Bank
c/o Sheila R Schwager
Hawley Troxeil Ennis &Hawley LLP
POB
1617
Boise, ID 83701
Martin D. Frantz
PO Box 830
Rathdrum, ID 83858
Cvnthia M. Frantz
PO Box 830
Rathdrum. ID 83858
US Trustee
Washington Group Central Plaza · 720 Park Blvd, Ste 220
Boise, ID 83712

TOT.AL: 4

AP 143

Case 13-07024-TLM

Doc 143

Filed 09/25/15 Entered
Document
Page 1 of 5

15:09:38

Jonathon Frantz

Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, ID 83854
Telephone: (208) 262-3893
Facsin1ile: (208) 262-3894
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Mariin D. Frantz and Cyntr.t.ia M. Frantz, Defendants.
UNITE D STATES BAL1\KRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

I

Re:

Case

11-21337-TL:M

MARTIN. D. FRAi"\JTZ and CYNTHIA M.
FRANTZ,

Chapter 7
Debtors.

IDAHO INDEP ENl)EN T BA.t"l\:1(, an Idaho
corporation,

Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024

Plaintiff,
vs.

I\1.A.RTIN D. FRA."\JTZ, an individual, and
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.

I
:\OTIC E OF
OF ELECTION

Desc Main

Case 13-07024-TUv1

Doc 143

Filed 09/25/15 Entered 09/25/15 15:09:38
Document
Page 2 of 5

Desc Main

XOTICE OF APPEAL and STATEl\1ENT OF ELECTION
Martin D. Frantz

C;11thia M. Frantz, the Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal

U.S.C. §158(a) from the ORDER GRA.t'\TTING IN PART AND DENxING JN PART
MOTION FOR SANCTION S (Doc. 135) of the bankruptcy judge entered in this adversary
proceeding on the

day of September, 2015.

The names of all paiiies to the order appealed from and the names, address, and
telephone numbers of their respective attorneys are as follows:
Appellants:

:1\1artin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz, represented by:
Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St., Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Ph: 208-262-3893
Fax: 208-262-38 94
Email: jonathon@c dalegal.com

Appellee:

Independen t Bank, represented by:
Sheila R. SchYvager
John F. Kmiz
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main St, Suite 1000
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Ph: 208-334-60 00
Fax: 208-954-5261
Email: sschwager@ haw leytroxell. com
jkmiz@haw leytroxell.c om

Pursuant to 28

.S.C. §158(c)(l) Appellants elect to have the appeal heard bv the

United States District Court rather than by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2015.

NOTICE OF
ELECTION - 2

STATEI1.IENT

FRANTZ LAW, PLLC

Case 13-07024-TLM

Doc 143

Filed 09/25/15 Entered 09/25/15 15:09:38
Document
Page 3 of 5

Desc

Certificate of Electronic Senice

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tbis 25th day of
true and conect copies of the foregoing to the follmving:

5, I

sent

John F Kmiz, Jr.-jkmiz@hav,1leytroxe1l.com
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@hav;leytroxell.com

By~-/=s/~J~o=n~at=h~o~n=F~r~an=t~z~~-

"\'OTICE OF
ELECTION - 3

Ca~~ 13-07024-TLM

II

Doc g3

Filed 09/2~/15 Entered 09/2:5/15 lzl:88:SIB
Document
Page 4 of S

Desc Main

UNITED STATES BANXRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

INRE
l\1A.RTIN D. FRAi'\'TZ Ai'\'D
CYNTHIA. l\L FRANTZ,
Debtors.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 11-21337-TLl\1

Chapter 7

)

______ ______ _ )
)

IDAHO INDEPK\1DENT BAi'\'K,
an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

)

Adv. No. 13-07024-TLM

)

MARTIN D. FRA.NTZ, an individual, )
and CYNTHIA l\l. FRAl'\fTZ, an
)
individual,
)
)
)

Defendants.
______ ______
_)

ORDER GRA.NTL'\'G L'\f PART AI\.1D DEJ\1YING IN PART
l\10TI0N FOR SAi~CTIONS

Based on the rnling entered orally this date and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Idaho Independent Bank's l\1otion for
Sanctions, Doc. No. 117, is GRANTED IN PART Al\TD DENIED IN PART.
Sanctions of S49,477.46 are mvarded to Idaho Independent Bank against Mmiin
and Cynthia Frantz and their attorney, Jonathon Frantz, jointly and severally.

ORDER- l

Car~ 13-07024-TLM

I

Doc l~S

Filed 09/1~/15 Entered 09/1~/15 1:3:88:Sffi
Document
Page S of g

Desc Main

I

DATED: September 14, 2015

~~

TERRY L. JvfYERS
CHIEF U. S. BAi~KRlJPTCY JUDGE

ORDER-2

AP 150

Case 13-07024-TLM

Doc 150

Filed 10/09/15 Entered 10/09/15 17:16:37
Document
Page 1 of 2

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz La,v, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, ID 83854
Telephone: (208) 262-3893
Facsi..111ile: (208) 262-3894
Email: jonathon@cdalegaLcom
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Ivfa1iin D. Frantz and Cynthia I\1. Frantz, Defendants.
CNITED STATES BAi"\TKR.lTPTCY COliRT
DISTRJCT OF IDAHO

In Re:

Case

l'vfARTIN D. FRA}HZ and CYNTHY,,. :tvf.
FRAt"\JTZ,

Chapter 7

Debtors.

IDAHO JNDEPE1',,1DENT BAi"'JK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
l\iA.RTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CYNTHIA M. fRA_r'.)TZ, an individual,

IS

ON APPEAL- 1

Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024

Desc M

Case 13-07024-TLM

Doc 150

Filed 10/09/15 Entered 10/09/15 17:16:37
Document
Page 2 of 2

Desc

STATEJ\'IENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The

are the Issues on Appeal:
1. Did the Bankruptcy Court eIT in granting sanctions against the Frantz
es' attorney,
Jonathon Frantz?

2. Did the Bankrn ptcy Court e1T in granting sanctions against the Frantze
s?
DATED this 25th day of September, 2015.

FRA'\'TZ LAW, PLLC

Jonathon Frantz,
Attorney for Defendants.

Certificate of Electronic Senice
I HERE BY CERT IFY that on this 9th day of October, 2015, I caused
that ECF sent trne
and conect copies of the foregoing to the following:
John F Kurtz, Jr.- jku11z@hawleytroxell.com
Sheila Schwager- sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

IS

ON

2

n

